


201150

JPRS-SSA-84-062

1 June 1984

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report



19980319 136

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

6  
130  
A07

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

1 June 1984

## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

## CONTENTS

## ANGOLA

- Dos Santos Blames Portugal for Poor Relations  
(Luanda Domestic Service, 13 May 84)..... 1

## BURUNDI

- Briefs  
Former Minister in Court 3

## CAMEROON

- 'Northern' Responsibility for Coup Assessed  
(Laurent Zecchini; LE MONDE, 14 Apr 84)..... 4
- Effect of Abortive Coup on Unity Examined  
(Laurent Zecchini; LE MONDE, 17 Apr 84)..... 7

## CAPE VERDE

- President Visits New Industrial Enterprises  
(VOZ DI POVO, 14 Apr 84)..... 10
- Fishing Cooperation With Spain To Be Expanded  
(VOZ DI POVO, 14 Apr 84)..... 12
- Briefs  
Boat From Iceland 13

## CHAD

- Agricultural Talks at Pala Cover Many Fields  
(INFO TCHAD, 13, 17 Apr 84)..... 14
- Yields Key to Self-Sufficiency  
Crop Yield Discussed

## GUINEA

Swiss Investments Bolster Gold Production Effort (Jean-Luc Lederrey; JOURNAL DE GENEVE, 25 Apr 84).....	17
Preservation of Traditional Values Urged With Ongoing Reforms (Editorial; Mody Sory Barry; HOROYA, 14 Apr 84).....	20
Open Letter to Information Services (Nava Toure; HOROYA, 14 Apr 84).....	22

## GUINEA-BISSAU

TASS, ANG Sign Technical Cooperation Agreement (NO PINTCHA, 7 Apr 84).....	25
Council of Ministers Announces Price Rise of Basic Items (NO PINTCHA, 7 Apr 84).....	26

## IVORY COAST

Economy, Debt Rescheduling Discussed (Louis Guilain; AFRICA, No 159, Mar 84).....	28
--	----

## KENYA

Coping With Drought in Kitui District (Gideon Nzoka; THE KENYA TIMES, 27 Apr 84).....	34
Moi Urges Reforestation (Makokha wa Musebe; THE KENYA TIMES, 28 Apr 84).....	37
Meeting Strengthens Relations With Emirates (Editorial; THE KENYA TIMES, 30 Apr 84).....	38
Training Facilities Available for Textile Industry (Victoria Okumu; THE KENYA TIMES, 30 Apr 84).....	40
Briefs	
Fuel Shortage Reported	42
Bridge Is Swept Away	42

## LIBERIA

Friction Within National Muslim Council Reported (THE NEW LIBERIAN, 10 Apr 84).....	43
Country's Banking, Liquidity Crisis Discussed (Lawrence Thompson; THE NEW LIBERIAN, 23 Apr 84).....	45

Peoples Redemption Council 'Declares War' on Tax Evaders (THE NEW LIBERIAN, 24, 26 Apr 84).....	47
--	----

Liquidity Problems, Corruption, Editorial  
Firing Range Set up  
'Tax Clearance' for Travel

LAMCO-LMWV Agreement Gives Workers More Benefits (THE NEW LIBERIAN, 27 Apr 84).....	50
--	----

#### MOZAMBIQUE

Increased Production of Coconut for Export Planned (NOTICIAS, 17 Apr 84).....	52
--	----

Sweden To Train Electrical Substation Operators (NOTICIAS, 17 Apr 84).....	54
---	----

Urban Green Zones To Increase Food Production (NOTICIAS, 18 Apr 84).....	56
---	----

Department for Training Meteorological Experts Planned (NOTICIAS, 18 Apr 84).....	58
--	----

Production School Planned for Salamanga (NOTICIAS, 19 Apr 84).....	60
---	----

#### NAMIBIA

Economic Prospects, Problems That Follow Liberation Viewed (Dawid J. Vermeulen; DIE VOLKSBLAD, 4 Mar 84).....	62
--	----

REPUBLIKEIN Comment on Political Development (Editorial; DIE REPUBLIKEIN, 26 Mar, 3 Apr 84).....	64
---	----

Damara Departure From MPC  
Savimbi Role  
Attitudes of Namibia Leaders

#### SENEGAL

PDS General Secretary A. Wade on Future Plans for Governing (Abdoulaye Wade Interview; WAL FADJRI, 27 Apr-1 Jun 84)...	68
---	----

#### SOUTH AFRICA

Detention Deaths; Editorial Policy Discussed (SASH, Feb 84).....	74
---	----

Recruitment Strategies To Reserve, Allocate Labor Analyzed (Marian Lacey; SASH, Feb 84).....	76
---	----

Sash Seen Facing Mounting Pressures, Challenges (Jill Wentzel; SASH, Feb 84).....	89
Black Sash Affiliation With UDF Mooted (Helen Zille; SASH, Feb 84).....	94
Significance of Nkomati Accord Discussed (FRONTLINE, Apr 84).....	101
Realistic View of Bophuthatswana, Mangope Advanced (Johann Graff; FRONTLINE, Apr 84).....	103
Analysis of Afrikanerdom Split Offered (David Williams; FRONTLINE, Apr 84).....	106
UPPER VOLTA	
Recent Events Reviewed; Document Circulates on Campus (Passek-Taale; L'OBSERVATEUR, 13-15 Apr 84).....	111
ZIMBABWE	
Convicts To Be Put To Work on Rural Development Projects (THE HERALD, 5 May 84).....	114
ZNCC To Train Ex-Combatants Engaged in Co-op Ventures (THE HERALD, 6 May 84).....	116
Minister of Information Scores South African Based Correspondents (THE HERALD, 7 May 84).....	118
New Food-for-Work Program in Buhera Benefits Drought Victims (Munyaradzi Chenje; THE HERALD, 7 May 84).....	120
Mazowe Farm People Refuse To Be Evicted (William Bango; THE HERALD, 8 May 84).....	123

ANGOLA

DOS SANTOS BLAMES PORTUGAL FOR POOR RELATIONS

MB141529 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 0700 GMT 13 May 84

[Text] Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the president of the People's Republic of Angola, has blamed the Portuguese Government for the deterioration of its relations with the Angolan Government. In an interview with the Lisbon weekly, O JORNAL, the Angolan head of state said that the attitude of the present Portuguese Government with regard to activities by the Angolan counterrevolutionaries in Portugal explains the present state of relations between the two governments.

President Jose Eduardo dos Santos divided relations between Angola and Portugal into three distinct phases. The first phase covers the period from the independence of Angola in 1975 until 1978, which was characterized by an 170 percent increase in trade between enterprises of both countries and by the good development of political and solidarity relations between nongovernment organizations. Despite these good relations during this phase, Portugal supported the puppet gangsters in their activities, but this support lessened with the spirit of Bissau resulting from a meeting between the late President Agostinho Neto and General Ramalho Eanes, thus marking the beginning of the second phase.

The Bissau spirit, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos said, marked a very promising period for cooperation between Portugal and Angola. During this period, a financial agreement was signed between the Angolan National Bank and the Bank of Portugal. Also a cooperation agreement in the field of electricity was signed. The Bissau spirit was affected by a lenient attitude of Portuguese authorities toward the free movement and subversive activities of groups mounting armed terrorist attacks against the Angolan people and their legitimate government from Lisbon, the Angolan president said.

The third period in Portuguese-Angolan relations began with the eighth Portuguese government led by Pinto Balsemao, during which the second joint commission session was held which reinvigorated cooperation between the two countries. The session could not take place earlier due to hostilities against Angola which caused a climate of distrust and tension. This was also the case with regard to official contacts between both governments. Gen Ramalho Eanes' visit to Angola in April last year was also considered by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos as having immensely contributed to improving the climate of trust and revitalizing economic and socioscientific cooperation between the two countries.

However, the president of the People's Republic of Angola deplored the present Portuguese government of Prime Minister Mario Soares, which has upset the understanding as the government is now permitting anti-Angolan activities in Lisbon. This situation has forced Angola to protest strongly to the Portuguese Government and to urge a reevaluation of bilateral relations.

With the regard to [the] situation in southern Africa, the Angolan head of state believes that the diplomatic peace efforts undertaken in the region must be complemented by efforts by the international community to effectively implement UN Security Council Resolution 435/78 providing true independence for Namibia. Only in a climate of peace can we increase the regional cooperation within the framework of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference to eliminate the dependence which some countries of the region still have with regard to South Africa and subsequently to end backwardness and to also ensure our sovereignty in the economic field. This is what President Jose Eduardo dos Santos said in conclusion.

CSO: 3442/365



## BURUNDI

### BRIEFS

FORMER MINISTER IN COURT--For the past four months, the Bujumbura Court of Appeal has been conducting the trial pitting the Ministry of Justice against Alexis Ntibakiranya, formerly general director of the SRDI (Regional Development Company of Imbo) and minister of agriculture and livestock raising and the people's representative elected from Kayanza Province, who is now being held prisoner in the central prison of Mpimba. Five hearings have already been devoted to the very complex trial since the beginning of December 1983. [Excerpt] [Bujumbura LE RENOUVEAU DU BURUNDI in French 5 Apr 84 p 2] 11,464

CSO: 3419/599

'NORTHERN' RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUP ASSESSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Apr 84 pp 1, 5

[Article by Laurent Zecchini: "The Lost Wager of the Cameroonian Rebels"]

[Text] Yaounde--The municipal cemetery is strangely deserted. A few hundred meters from the sports stadium, the site, which nature has taken over, is peopled with sparse tombs flanked by headstones and a few crosses leaning at an angle. In the extension of the entryway, two unconcealed heaps of laterite strike one's eye. Two common graves: One, 10 meters long and 4 meters wide, is still empty. The other, covering some 20 meters, has been filled in and one can easily detect the tracks of a mechanical excavator. It was here, on Tuesday, 10 April, that part of the bodies picked up in the streets of the capital following the 6 April confrontations were piled.

The city is calm, colorful, sunny, just as usual. The attempted coup d'etat on Friday, 6 April, that shook the regime of President Paul Biya left few traces on Yaounde and after a few hours spent crisscrossing the main districts and seeking out the bomb craters and destroyed buildings, one almost doubts it happened at all. The fighting with heavy weapons, the strafing by the Fouga-Magister planes, the firing from the Gazelle helicopters: Where did it all take place? What city was under siege? By day, Yaounde betrays its recent convulsions only by the presence of a few groups of soldiers in strategic spots, but at nightfall, detachments of nervous soldiers take up their posts nearly everywhere.

But let us look again. Aha! There indeed! At the Presidential Palace, that monstrous birthday cake of a building cautiously overlooking the city and its wooded hills. The main gate still stands agape. One bullet-riddled wing is partially destroyed. A pile of crushed beams, the remains of two street lamps, some debris on the ground. The Yaounde airport is intact, little affected by the military presence and at the Douala airport, the economic capital, little more than routine attention is paid to the passenger list, the baggage. Not all the rebels are dead or in prison and the authorities do not want the remaining few to slip through their fingers.

However, they believe they know where the fugitives can be found. La Briquetterie, the poor Haoussa (northern ethnic group) district adjoining the Pamoun district, has been surrounded by the army. Several dozen soldiers are

assigned there or patrol the streets, their American M 16's over their arms (unloaded, however). Armored AML vehicles equipped with machine guns or 20-mm canons control the area. One truck guards the entry to the National Police Advanced Training School and, as the government daily CAMEROON TRIBUNE (one of whose reporters, Bandolo, said to be dead, revealed the attempted coup in a kind of lyric epic poem), "courageous, even reckless children, several times helped the forces of law and order to track down the outsiders trying to mix with the civilian population." In short, the informing came about quite naturally. But as the same daily writes: "In the hospitals, particularly Central Hospital, another atmosphere reigns. The people are there, silent, tense, looking haggard, trying to find their loved ones among the dead in the morgue. And the bodies continue to pile up, of all ages and types."

How many? On Thursday evening, 12 April, the Office of the President published the official figures: 70 dead, including 4 civilians and 8 "loyalist" elements; 52 wounded, 1,053 rebels arrested, 265 gendarmes "missing" and all the leaders of the rebellion "known to date" captured, except for one low-ranking officer, "being actively sought." Diplomatic sources agree that the total number killed is clearly higher (without giving one any faith in the fantastic figure of 6,000 given in Paris by the UPC [Union of Cameroonian Peoples]). Will the exact number ever be known? The people bury their dead quickly, almost furtively, especially those from the north, so that their neighbors "will not find out." The diplomatic corps has done its figures: No Frenchman, no European was killed or wounded. Only one young Lebanese about 20 years old, Schidiac, died uselessly for having stopped 20 meters after the order of a soldiers' barrier. One of them fired the fatal shot.

There were naturally stupid blunders against civilians or rebels who, despite their surrender, were killed. But the page has nearly been turned on a traumatized Cameroon.

But for heaven's sakes, they are saying in Yaounde, let us not revive that eternal quarrel pitting the southerners against the northerners! This slogan has already been expressed by President Biya. "It is a tiny minority of ambitious men hungry for power (LE MONDE, 12 April), who were trying their luck. Furthermore, the forces participating in the restoration of the situation included Cameroonians of all origins, without distinction as to their ethnic, regional or religious affiliation."

Above all, it is now a matter of calming things down. The rebels undoubtedly believed -- wrongly -- that the people would immediately go over to them, that the army would remain neutral in the beginning and then finally defect. But no one did and the army, organized as a social body, did not join the rebel elements of the Republican Guard and the gendarmerie.

Then who and why? Young northern officers and junior officers of that veritable Pretorian guard of the Cameroonian president, powerfully armed (which explains the time it took the "loyalists" to put down the rebellion) and whom Biya, after taking power, made the mistake of not reorganizing as he did for the army, even though he knew that the Guard had been set up by and for

his predecessor, Amadou Ahidjo -- in other words, essentially northerners? During their trial, the leaders, "who will be tried without delay and punished," will probably supply a partial answer. One can wager that Col Ibrahim Saleh, commanding officer of the Republican Guard, Capt Awal Abassi, commanding officer of the Guard Artillery Unit, Reserve 2d Lt Yaya Adoum (who read the rebels' proclamation on the radio), Issa Adoum, general director of FONADER (National Rural Development Fund), Lieutenant Arouna, of the Koutaba Elite Intervention Force, will be "asked" to admit the complicity they enjoyed, even the names of those who were behind the abortive action.

An hour and a half, two hours, is more than enough time to bring off a coup. However, the rebels wasted a great deal of that time, which could only work against them. As the excessively scattered action went along, the troops remaining loyal to the regime moved on Yaounde. The outcome given the disproportionate numbers involved, was inevitable. Fighting was limited to a few sites, which explains why there are no signs of confrontations in the capital except for a few blocks of houses: the headquarters of the Guard in Obili in the Ndjong-Melen district, the Yeyap Camp, headquarters of the general delegation of the gendarmerie, the residence of the chief of staff of the armed forces, General Semengue, that of the deputy commander of the Yaounde military area, Col Asso Emame, and finally, that of Minister of the Armed Forces Andre Tsoungui.

What will be the consequences of the coup for Cameroon? What role was played by those whom the Cameroonian press calls foreign mercenaries (there is a great deal of talk of the "Moroccans," but since Ahidjo was received in Rabat by the Royal Academy, are not favorably viewed in Yaounde)? It is too soon to answer these questions. "The quake is over," one CAMEROON TRIBUNE editorial noted, stressing that "the authors and protagonists involved in the operation are all from the former northern province." For Cameroon to dwell on the reemergence of these old demons is not a wager of stability for the future.

11,464

CSO: 3419/599

## EFFECT OF ABORTIVE COUP ON UNITY EXAMINED

Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Apr 84 pp 1, 4

[Article by Laurent Zecchini]

[Text] Cameroonian authorities have just put their finger on the person they believe to have been the instigator of the bloody coup attempt that occurred on 6 April in Yaounde. Actually, the news does not come as much of a surprise since, according to the minister of the armed forces, the coup's author was Ahidjo. The abortive coup was only, he added on 14 April, the extension of a plot financed by "Northerners" denounced in August 1983 and resulting in the death sentence meted out to the former president for absconding. The sentence was commuted to life in prison by his successor.

President Biya is now leaving it up to his close aides to resume the campaign against his predecessor, who, from his Riviera retreat, immediately and categorically denied any implication in the uprising of the presidential guard. This attitude on the part of the current Cameroonian chief of state suggests two possibilities for the time being: Either he has chosen to strengthen his image as a rallier, leaving to others -- mainly the military -- the thankless task of bringing the supporters of northern revenge into line. Or, yielding to pressure from his entourage, mainly in the army, Biya may have decided to break up a number of northern bastions, thereby announcing demotions in order to weaken the political patronage on which Ahidjo had mainly relied.

Whatever the case, President Biya did not duck the test. He affirmed that he wanted to encourage mild changes, admitting that the obstacles to reform are too great to enable him to avoid a confrontation with his adversaries. At least, this is the version that Ahidjo's successor wants to make people believe.

Whatever the responsibilities on both sides, Cameroon has experienced very disturbing events the past few months. One cannot help wondering about the difficult unity of a nation whose importance in Central Africa is obvious. Ahidjo was not able to get it going. Nor has Biya faced the challenge. Brought forth in pain, Cameroon experienced quite exceptional expansion under the iron hand of Ahidjo, but serious tensions again emerged not long after his resignation.

In the immediate future, Cameroonians can mourn for the liberalization proposed by Biya. Their country will continue to know difficult times because it would be astonishing if the Northerners -- even if the label stems from a hasty simplification -- do not try to defend themselves. It is now Cameroon's stability that is in question, which can only disturb its weaker neighbors or those which face serious problems themselves.

Yaounde--Coming from any other person, the remarks may have appeared irresponsible, but the man who spoke that Saturday, 14 April, Andze Tsoungui, minister of the armed forces, played an essential role in ensuring the continuity of the nation in the hours and days following the abortive 6 April coup. It was therefore while weighing his words that Tsoungui made two serious accusations: On the one hand, it was the former president of Cameroon, Amadou Ahidjo, who was the author of the abortive coup d'etat. Second, it was a northern plot. In so stating, the minister could not have been unaware that he was making a speech that is radically contrary to the statements by the president of the republic, who, on 10 April in a message to the nation, stated: "The responsibility for the abortive coup d'etat does not belong to any given province or Cameroonian of a given religion."

Seated near the minister, a short, fat, little man, dressed in military fatigues, without any particular insignias, occasionally spoke to confirm the assertions. Div Gen Pierre Semengue, chief of staff of the armed forces, echoed the statements of his minister: ("It was the former president who trained the rebels, we are certain. That coup was but the extension of the plot which the president of the republic denounced on 22 August.") "Without being trained by the former president, I am sure they would not have attempted the coup." If one is to believe Tsoungui, the leaders of the rebellion ("captains," according to General Semengue) "wanted to restore power to the former supporters of Ahidjo." The Republican Guard, which made up most of the rebel troops, was made up "of over 99.99 percent of people from the north," said the minister. "All the rebels were from the north," General Semengue agreed.

But the conspiracy, which made the Republican Guard the partner of civilians, along with elements from the police, gendarmerie and the army, would probably not have been possible without the aid of the "businessmen from the north who financed" plans for the coup. "One of them," Tsoungui stated, "turned over 10 million francs to one of the organizers." These "few" northern businessmen were "denounced" by the rebelstaken prisoner, who "immediately admitted what they had done." Of course, the guard close to the chief of state, which contained the assault launched by the rebels on the Presidential Palace, was not itself made up of a northern majority, but the Cameroonian Army, which remained loyal to the regime, is also made up of soldiers from the northern provinces who did not hesitate to fire on members of their own ethnic group. On the staff, on the other hand, officers from the southern regions are largely in the majority, even if, as General Semengue stated, "on my staff, I have my 3d Bureau chief, who is a northerner."

## Troubling Effectiveness

In addition, several elements enable one to assert that the imminence of an attempted coup was perfectly known to certain circles. "We had fragmentary information indicating that something was afoot," Tsoungui said. On Thursday, 5 April, the eve of the action, a number of rich Cameroonians reportedly made withdrawals of large sums of money from their bank accounts. These "normal" withdrawals sometimes amounted to 100 million CFA francs (1 CFA franc = .02 franc). According to unofficial sources, Cameroonian authorities reportedly intend to institute ceilings on the amount of liquid assets that can be withdrawn, ceilings applying to private persons as well as companies.

General Semengue also confirmed that changes among the officers of the Republican Guard were about to come about. "That was no secret," he said. The decision to move these measures up was reportedly made following reports alerting the chief of state to the need to take measures concerning the Guard and its security services (LE MONDE, 8-9 April). In the current stage of the investigation, it would appear that colonels Ousmanou Daouda and Ngoura Bella Belladji, respectively chief of staff of the chief of state and commanding officer of the 1st Military Region, who have just been removed from their posts, are simply guilty of disturbing ineffectiveness. "No one saw them before the situation was restored to normal," General Semengue emphasized on Saturday, adding that "they knew very well what was happening and could have alerted the troops."

The chief of staff of the armed forces believes that the attempted coup had been planned far ahead of time, mainly because "orders had been issued (for the Guard) for certain equipment." The investigative commission, made up of both civilians and the military, began its work on Wednesday, 11 April, and will make it possible to shed light on this last point: At what level of responsibility, within the army and the government, could the decision to order equipment (presumed to be military) have been taken without awakening some suspicion somewhere?

This new intensification of the Cameroonian crisis (the accusation against the northerners and President Ahidjo) once again creates the feeling that a certain indecisiveness seems to mark the political decisions now being made in Yaounde.

11,464

CSO: 3419/599

# PRESIDENT VISITS NEW INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES

Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 14 Apr 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] The secretary general of the party and president of the republic, Comrade Aristides Pereira, last Wednesday visited a number of industrial enterprises installed in Praia, accompanied by the minister of economy and finances, Comrade Osvaldo Lopes da Silva. The Butane-Gas Filling Station in Achada Grande was one of the units visited by the chief of state.

The National Equipment and Vehicle Maintenance and Repair Company (SONACOR) was the first stop in the visits to the industrial units made by the president of the republic. It is a new enterprise already in the final phase of completion and occupies an area of 2,619 square meters in Tira-Chapeu. Its cost was estimated at about 150,000 contos and its establishment is part of the country's dynamics of industrial development and maintenance of the national automobile fleet. This company is also responsible for the import and marketing of vehicles, equipment and accessories and representation of the trade marks involved.

Its equipment, which is already in the final phase, as well as the specialized training of technicians who are going to insure its operation in this initial phase, is in charge of a specialized Swedish corporation SWEDEC, with which SONACOR signed a contract.

The shops are divided into large specialized units: diesel motor section, gasoline motor section, recapping section, electrical and auto mechanical section, and a foundry shop. It appears that the recapping section will be the company's most profitable unit in the immediate future because of the guarantee that a recapped tire will operate as if it were new for about half the cost.

At this enterprise Comrade Aristides Pereira learned about the company's facilities as well as the condition of the workers from its director, Pedro Burgo.

The president of the republic then visited the Butane-Gas Filling Station in Achada Grande, also in the final phase, with the beginning of operation scheduled for next May.



This station, with a capacity of 1,500 tons of gas, should put an end once and for all to the problem of breaks in supplies of a market whose consumption capacity is little more than 3,000 tons per year. This unit belonging to the National Fuel and Lubricants Company (ENACOL) was built according to the most modern safety conditions which a product of this nature requires, the bottle-filling process being quite simple. It has a warehouse to receive 3,780 empty bottles and 2,880 full bottles. The gas, which is conducted by pipeline from the port of Praia to the pressure depots, reaches the filling nozzles by an automatic system.

The last enterprise visited was the National Pharmaceutical Products Company (EMPROFAC), where about 40 different types of medications are produced. With the shops operating in the Praia Hospital, EMPROFAC already insures the production of a varied spectrum of pills, ointments and medicated syrups under the most modern technical and hygienic conditions. Operating over these installations, the Directory General of Pharmacy has a laboratory where it conducts strict control over the composition of all the products manufactured by the company.

8711

CSO: 3442/354

FISHING COOPERATION WITH SPAIN TO BE EXPANDED

Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 14 Apr 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] Development of the agreement established in 1981 between Cape Verde and Spain was recommended by the delegations of the two countries, which met in Praia from 7 to 10 April.

The two delegations, headed by the Cape Verdean secretary of state for fisheries and the director general of the Spanish Foreign Ministry, respectively, decided at the same time that there will be another meeting this year to implement the actions to be carried out.

A memorandum which recommends development of the agreement established in 1981 between Cape Verde and Spain in the fisheries area was signed at the end of the meeting of the Spanish-Cape Verdean joint commission held in Praia from 7 to 10 April.

The secretary of state for fisheries, Engineer Miguel Lima, who headed the Cape Verdean delegation, speaking at the opening of the proceedings of the joint commission, considered that its primary and principal objective was to strengthen cooperation between the two countries in the area of fisheries, both in the technical-scientific and material sectors, having in view improving that cooperation from what it has been up to the present.

It should be noted also that it was stated in the final document that the joint commission will hold another meeting, possibly this year to implement strengthening the actions to be taken.

8711

CSO: 3442/354

## CAPE VERDE

### BRIEFS

BOAT FROM ICELAND--The vessel "Fengur" offered to our country by the Icelandic Government at the time of the official visit by the president of the republic, Comrade Aristides Pereira to Iceland, should arrive in Cape Verde on 6 May 6, "PV" learned from the Secretariat of State for Fisheries. The "Fengur" is a vessel 27.3 meters in length with a beam of 7.4 meters and a gross weight of 140 tons. Its crew is made up of 20 men and it has a hold capacity of 50 to 60 tons of fish. This vessel will also engage in fisheries scientific research. [Excerpt] [Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 14 Apr 84 p 3] 8711

CSO: 3442/354

## AGRICULTURAL TALKS AT PALA COVER MANY FIELDS

## Yields Key to Self-Sufficiency

N'Djamena INFO TCHAD in French 13 Apr 84 p 3

[Excerpt] The pre-planting meeting ushering in the 1985-1985 farm year, which began on 9 April, completed its work yesterday at Pala in Mayo-Kebbi. For two days experts from all government departments concerned with rural-zone development, the top executives of companies operating in the southern zone, the prefects of the five southern-zone prefectures, and members of the CNC representing these prefectures surveyed the results of the 1983-1984 farm year and took a long, hard look at development problems in an attempt to find approaches and solutions to them.

The city of Pala was chosen for these meetings because of the tremendous farming potential it contains and, in general, the no less promising resources available in the Mayo-Kebbi. In his remarks opening the conference, the prefect of Mayo-Kebbi, Mr Pofinet, voiced his pleasure at seeing the conference held in his district. This gave him the opportunity to review the farm situation in Mayo-Kebbi. Mr Pofinet, who pays particularly close attention to the human factor in all matters of economic development, explained that despite the war and the abominable weather last year, Mayo-Kebbi, thanks to its human potential, came through it creditably at all levels. Even so, the agricultural situation in this region is still cause for concern. A 2,000-hectare decline in arable land, coupled with a shortage of rainfall, meant a harvest that fell 210,000 tons below the preceding year's level. That shortfall must be compensated for, and the Prefect believes that Mayo-Kebbi must be provided with high-yield seed grain.

As for the cotton crop, the Mayo-Kebbi prefect is pleased: "We did better than we have ever done before," he said. With its record 46,000-ton crop, Mayo-Kebbi produced 30 percent of the nation's cotton crop, and that puts it out in front of all the prefectures in the cotton belt. The prefect had high praise for the experts from the National Rural Development Office (ONDR), but welcomed the chance to call the government's attention to the things that need doing to improve the quality of life in rural zones. First

on his list was the obsolescence of most farm equipment. Pofinet cited the Sarh recommendation which called for a complete rehabilitation of Chad's farm equipment construction company (SOMAT). Getting that plant back into operation, says Mr Pofinet, would create jobs and, most important, give the district's farmers the tools they need to do their job. Most important of all, though, in the prefect's view, is the need for government to establish dialogue with the rural masses so that they can be brought freely and willingly to accept the government's goals as well as certain technical innovations that are incompatible with their interests.

#### Crop Yield Discussed

N'Djamena INFO TCHAD in French 17 Apr 84 pp 8,9

[Excerpt] The preparation and planning meeting for the 1984-85 farm year, which began its deliberations on 9 April, adjourned on Thursday after mapping out a comprehensive plan of action for the farm year ahead.

The Pala meeting fits naturally into the mainstream of government action on behalf of the rural world. At Sarh in 1983/84 the price per kilo of unginned cotton went up 10 francs. Pala has gone along with that trend: from 80 francs, the price per kilo has risen here to 100 francs. Peanuts "en amande" have also gained 20 francs on the market, up from 70 to 90 francs per kilo. This price rise across the board reflects the government's move toward a fair-price policy in order to reward and provide new incentive to the farmers' efforts. In an interview with the press at Pala, the minister for agriculture and rural development said that this action is designed to make room for the establishment of large-scale agricultural operations. Once the farmers are getting a fair price, they will redouble their efforts to produce more, said Agriculture Minister Djindingar Dono Ngardoun.

The record for last year's planting has proved satisfactory. One need only look at Mayo-Kebbi's example, so brilliantly presented by district Prefect Pofinet, for all doubt on that score to vanish. Mr Pofinet made the point that Mayo-Kebbi, thanks to its human potential and despite malign perversity in the weather, came through with flying colors.

Third-ranked last year with a production of 22,012 tons, behind Moyen-Chari's record-setting 30,460 tons and second-ranked Logone with 23,752 tons, Mayo-Kebbi prefecture boosted its standards to hit 46,000 tons, or 30 percent of total national output. There has been marked progress in this prefecture from the 1982 level of 351 kilos per hectare and 811 kilos per hectare in 1983 to better than 900 kilos last year.

He also cited maintenance work on some tracks and waterways and major repairs to the Bongor and especially the Ere ferries, which are the only transportation available to the lawmen assigned to guard the COTONTCHAD gins and mills in the Mayo-Kebbi.

The 1983/1984 farm year would have been even better, according to Mr Djidingar, had it not been stunted by the early cessation of the rains and by the malicious maneuvers of Libya, which tried repeatedly to burn crops in this part of the country. The predicted crop, which had been estimated at 120,000 tons, turned out to be a startling 150,000 tons. The recommendations of the previous conference at Sarh, which were never implemented, are still a major handicap, including recommendation 3 which called for the reactivation of the Biliam Oursi "A" file and for providing the "B" file with the necessary resources to work its developed acreage. As for the sorry state of farm equipment and the shortage of spare parts, reactivation of SOMAT was unanimously urged.

In the area of food crops, the minister pointed out that the shortages reported in some sectors and the demand in the major cities are going to create a food shortage even in areas where the harvest was adequate. This is why outside help is going to be indispensable again this year. This must not be allowed to become an unhealthy habit, warned the minister. Meeting our own food requirements must not make us dependent on others. To this end, Mr Djidingar urged officials and dealers in food crops to spur local production and achieve self-sufficiency in food, which is still the prime concern of the government of the Third Republic. The minister also stressed reclamation and irrigation, because we cannot rely on rainfall to water our crops any more: rainfall these days, he said, has become a random, capricious thing, and we dare not gamble with our food supply.

As for the work of the several committees, we shall report only the recommendations of the economic committee assigned to study the financial, economic, and social aspects of rural development. In order to get food production off to a new start, it advised a general awareness campaign, under the aegis of ONDR, to promote food production. COTONTCHAD and the ONVSD [expansion unknown] were instructed to offer optimum prices for these products, while the National Cereal Grains Office (ONC) must be given the necessary funds to play its regulatory role.

6182

CSO: 3419/615

SWISS INVESTMENTS BOLSTER GOLD PRODUCTION EFFORT

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 25 Apr 84 p 4

[Article by Jean-Luc Lederrey: "Guinea Will Soon Be a Large-Scale Gold Producer Thanks to Swiss Investments"]

[Text] Guinea's vast gold reserves, to date unmined, are beginning to be developed by Swiss interests through the Omnium Investment Company based in Freiburg.

Guinea, which was recently the stage for a coup d'etat following the death of President Sekou Toure, is one of the poorest countries in the world and has an annual average per capita income of about \$300. However, it has significant potential wealth, particularly in the area of mining: this country has one-third of world reserves of bauxite, about 2 billion tons of high quality iron ore, diamonds and even gold. Guinea's gold-bearing deposits are currently being developed by Swiss interests.

The American firm Chevaning Mining and Exploration Ltd, headquartered in New York and with a subsidiary in London, has two mining claims in Guinea with a surface area equal to that of Switzerland. These claims cover one-fifth of Guinean territory and contain 80 percent of the country's estimated gold reserves. Chevaning Mining is controlled by the Swiss Omnium Investment Company, headquartered in Freiburg. Laurent Butty, Freiburg's national representative, heads the board of directors.

The Omnium Investment Company controls several service firms in the banking, financial, real estate and maritime fields. In particular, it controls the Geneva firm of Atlantis Consulting S.A. which provides service, management and consulting in the areas of finance and investment; it is providing management services for the gold mining project in Guinea. The omnium also controls the Atlantis Bank (formerly the Banking Company for Industry) in Geneva, the Zurich firm Fico S.A. (which is active in the area of maritime transport), the firm Montreal Omnium (which finds and manages real estate investments in the United States and Canada); it also has interests in mining and petroleum companies in Africa, Brazil and the United States.

In its annual accounts as of 31 December 1983, the firm reported a balance sheet total of 78 million francs, fiduciary operations of 190 million, receipts of 7.6 million and a profit of 1.5 million. The stockholders are a group of Swiss and Dutch businessmen, with the Swiss in the majority.

#### Guinea's First Gold Mine in 1985

Chevaning Mining and its Swiss backers are currently completing a prospecting phase and a feasibility study regarding the development of the country's gold deposits. The firm recently decided to continue to the mining production phase--the first mine will be operating in 1985. The firm spent about \$5 million during the prospecting phase and plans on investing about \$10 to 12 million to construct the first mine.

In all, \$125 million must be invested in the next 3 to 5 years to open several gold mines. In order to finance this development phase Chevaning Mining will increase its capital in a few months by issuing public stock so as to interest other investors in these Guinean projects. This firm's stock is already traded on the unofficial market in New York.

In addition, Chevaning Mining is currently looking for other industrial partners to jointly develop the gold resources in this region, which is too large for a single company. It is currently negotiating with one of the largest American mining companies.

#### No Industrial Development Until Now

Guinea's gold resources have been studied and partially identified since the fifties by groups of French and Soviet geologists, but to date they have not been developed on a large scale. Guinean gold is primarily placer gold, which means that it is mixed in extremely small quantities (a few grams per ton) with alluvial sand and gravel. Until recently (10 to 15 years ago), this type of deposit was not mined on a large scale, only vein-type deposits were (in South Africa, for example).

Until now Guinean ore has been used only on a small scale by the local population which produces 1 or 2 tons per year according to estimates.

#### Large Reserves

The increase in the price of gold and advances in mining techniques have recently made it profitable to extract placer type gold, of which Guinea has substantial reserves. The prospecting studies have already identified resources of about 4.7 million ounces of gold (about 140 tons) on the claims held by Chevaning Mining and estimated potential resources are much higher than that. This means that Guinea could soon become one of the world's major gold producers.



The gold will be mined by a joint venture of which the Guinean government will constitute one-half. The project, which was set up under Sekou Toure's regime, has received the blessing of the new Guinean leaders who came to power following the coup d'etat of last 3 April. The new leaders in Conakry have decided to encourage the liberalization of the country's economy and to be more open to the West, which had been tried by the old regime after a long flirtation with the Soviet Union lasting from 1959 to 1976.

9720

CSO:3419/605

PRESERVATION OF TRADITIONAL VALUES URGED WITH ONGOING REFORMS

Conakry HOROYA in French 14 Apr 84 p 1

[Editorial by Mody Sory Barry: "Change Without Alienation"]

[Text] The recovery which the CMRN [Military Committee for National Recovery] is calling on us to carry out is a long, hard and patient fight, a fight to be waged and won. To do this, there are many things that we must give up. First of all, there is: apathy, laziness, absenteeism, quick solutions and other subjective references that include nepotism, racism, regionalism, demagoguery, favoritism, etc....

So that the recovery, which the CMRN urges us to achieve and which we enthusiastically support, can be translated into actions, the first step in this necessary leap requires a renunciation, a real repudiation of certain practices that used to be identified with our daily lives of yesterday. For each and every one of us, it is a matter of changing our thinking, habits and behavior as well as our hierarchy of values.

But change does not mean alienation. Far from it! There are value standards which are identified with character and which we must preserve as a people, as the heirs of rich ancestral traditions and cultures that should be preserved as a basis of our pride. It is not by embracing this or that trend, custom or lifestyle that we will experience this regained freedom, which is dear to us. Frenzied infatuation with everything that is foreign often leads to alienation, and alienation has never favored the development of man, much less the development of initiatives.

What must be avoided above all is the prostitution of our customs in the name of a so-called freedom that would actually be only dangerous licentiousness. This appeal is addressed in particular to our young people, who must not abuse their regained freedom by replacing yesterday's rigid rules of living with rules that are harmful and paralyzing, rules that turn a nation's vital forces away from the virtues of effort, honor and responsibility in dignity.

Change without alienation means that everyone should enjoy all his democratic liberties without jeopardizing the harmony and cohesion of our people, our

country's future and our people's character, without allowing himself to drift into degrading pleasures and enjoyments, and finally, without repudiating our people's traditions and customs in favor of others that are alienating.

This is the first and essential step that will enable us to boldly confront all the problems of recovery in all sectors of national life. It is this approach, a source of harmony in effort, discipline, dignity and responsibility, that will mobilize us in the various areas of reconstruction to achieve the recovery sought. For as the chief of state pointed out, "The recovery, which we urge with all our hearts, will not be achieved by a miracle."

11915

CSO: 3419/606

OPEN LETTER TO INFORMATION SERVICES

Conakry HOROYA in French 14 Apr 84 p 4

[Article by Nava Toure]

[Text] Without a doubt, the date of 3 April 1984 has, openly and unashamedly, become part of Guinean history. Although it is more than premature to judge the import of the action of the soldiers who took over the vacant government on 3 April, after barely 24 hours there remained no doubt as to public support for the reasons given and for the general goals proclaimed by the CMRN [Military Committee for National Recovery], among which special emphasis was placed on the right to free expression of personal opinion.

It is not my intention to review the deserved praise by the Guinean people for the CMRN's action, which opened for them the way to a genuine resurgence that began with public enthusiasm in 1958 and was quickly checked and then halted between 1961 and 1962. My modest purpose here is to direct the attention of everyone, and of the press in particular, to the prerequisites for translating into social reality the necessity of justice, which cannot be dissociated from the existence and actual practice of civil rights, among which freedom of expression is in the forefront.

The CMRN has played an historic role by resolving an apparent impasse that was more or less secretly condemned by everyone, including the former regime's officials. Now it is up to us to act, to channel (although any idea of control and censure is far from my mind) and to use the energy and wealth of this terrific effervescence of ideas and thoughts which the Guinean people have never lacked, but which unfortunately have always been scorned, if not treated ruthlessly, through their authors by the former regime, which paradoxically always preached and urged, in its rhetoric, the people to make individual and collective efforts in thinking and acting.

It is obvious that no regime has ever come to power with the express intention of oppressing the people; the most noble aims and intentions are always loudly proclaimed: liberty, dignity, justice, prosperity. It is in practice that the regime's nature becomes clear, not only as a condition of the character of the men who comprise it, but also as a result of general spinelessness, which produces and propagates hypocrisy. Everyone knows how vigorously the CMRN condemns demagoguery in its communiqués. Regardless of individual opinions as to the

longevity of the resolve to establish and guarantee freedom of expression, and human rights in general, we must trust in the resolve of the CMRN's intentions. Besides, can we do otherwise at the risk of ruining an historic chance, perhaps the only chance for a long time to come?

Thus everyone, and the press in particular, has a great responsibility in the resurgence which the CMRN ardently urges us to make, a resurgence which it alone cannot achieve. The people's real resurgence must begin with each person's self-reconciliation in order to have a chance for national reconciliation. Each person's self-reconciliation means, first of all, abandoning the brazen and unrestrained will to please the government, a will that kills any critical spirit and any lucidity or, if not, forces someone to lead a double life filled with duplicity: public life with its "truth" and private life with its "truth." If demagoguery is a system of flattering the multitude, and thus the people, it must be acknowledged that demagogic remarks are, in the final analysis, less common among the average Guinean than the panegyric of those in power, a modern but natural extension of backwoods shamanism.

Self-reconciliation is the active acceptance of criticism and argument, which create a true public debate, the essential foundation of democracy.

In this process, the press (HOROYA, radio and television) have an extremely important role to play. But HOROYA, radio and television are state-controlled institutions, you might say. But this overlooks the long experience of Western Europe's state-controlled newspapers, radio and television which, despite often superficial criticism, have generally proved to be a positive experience that has hardly stifled the free expression of opinion. The men of the press in Guinea have an imperative transition to make in order to help the people and the CMRN to democratize society and to eliminate the disinformation established as a system by the former regime. For the democratic quality of information directly contributes to the maturation of public opinion and national awareness.

Reporting does not mean singing the praises of those in power. Reporting does not mean commenting enthusiastically on the actions and decisions of public or private officials. Reporting does not mean reciting a litany of stereotyped phrases in a wooden language composed of unsurprising statements whose purpose is already apparent at the outset. Reporting does not mean getting children to say the "statements" whispered to them in front of the microphone or the camera. Reporting does not mean avoiding carefully asking officials at whatever level embarrassing questions. Reporting does not mean being merely a sounding board without a soul or conscience.

Reporting means making it unnecessary for Guineans to have their ears glued to foreign radio stations reporting on what is happening in their own country. Reporting means lifting the doubts engendered by all of the more or less founded rumors that our country attracts in such large numbers. Reporting means presenting reports succinctly and soberly and allowing the various opinion groups to express themselves. In short, reporting means intelligently promoting the debate by abandoning a tone of harangue and speechifying, which detracts from the message.

The CMRN has opened the door wide for us. Gentlemen of the Guinean press, help us to prevent that door from closing again on us! Help the people of Guinea to dismantle the mechanism of disinformation, which retards the development of public opinion.

I am not an expert in communication. Perhaps these are some disorganized ideas, but they surely express all the--still fearful--hopes hanging in the minds of all Guineans who, beyond all of today's events, are attempting to make out the country's future through the information system, whose nature can serve or harm the cause of democracy.

I know that the transition for the members of the press will not be easy. It is a process that is far from short and which needs the support of all those who are good-willed. The Guinean press undoubtedly includes some members--regardless of their sex--of great intelligence and definite competence who are willing to change. I hope that they manage to overcome all obstacles. The severity of my view, if it is severe, is not at all ill-intentioned. I hope that the views of all Guineans will be stern with regard to themselves and to others in a positive and constructive sense.

The press can and should help us, for it should not be forgotten that the profession of journalism, when practiced with judgment, intelligence and competence, is the noblest profession there is. But when practiced with duplicity, lies, sycophancy or presumptuousness, the profession of journalism becomes the worst of all.

Forward to true democracy!

11915

CSO: 3419/606

TASS, ANG SIGN TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT

Bissau NO PINTCHA in Portuguese 7 Apr 84 p 3

[Text] A technical cooperation agreement was signed at the end of Friday morning at the headquarters of the Soviet News Agency (TASS) and the Guinea-Bissau News Agency (ANG).

According to the agreement, TASS grants ANG the right to disseminate all of TASS's news in Portuguese to its subscribers in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.

For that purpose, TASS will supply a copier to ANG and the teletypes for the TASS news subscribers, as well as spare parts.

ANG will take care of all reception expenses.

At the same time, TASS will also guarantee to send an engineer to Bissau to install the equipment and train ANG cadres. The two sides concur in the continuation of the support rendered by TASS to ANG in the training of cadres.

It should be recalled that up to this date TASS has already trained four ANG technicians in the area of communication.

In the meantime, it is envisaged that one journalist and one technician from ANG will go to the USSR this year for advanced and middle-level training, respectively.

The present agreement was signed for the Guinean side by Comrade Francisco Barreto, director of ANG, and for the Soviet side by Vladimir Zubkol, TASS representative in Guinea-Bissau.

Present at the ceremony were Comrade Joao Quintino Teixeira, chief editor of the newspaper NO PINTCHA, in addition to representatives of the NOVOSTI and ANOP news agencies in Guinea-Bissau, Oleg Brichakov and Jorge Heitor, respectively, and workers of our news agency.

8711

CSO: 3442/354

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ANNOUNCES PRICE RISE OF BASIC ITEMS

Bissau NO PINTCHA in Portuguese 7 Apr 84 p 3

[Excerpts] The Council of Ministers met on the 4th of this month under the presidency of Comrade Major General Joao Bernardo Vieira, secretary general of the PAIGC and president of the Revolutionary Council.

Taking up the first item on the agenda pertaining to the organization of a roundtable in Portugal, scheduled for 21-23 May of this year in Lisbon, Comrade Bartolomeu Simoes Pereira, secretary of state for planning and international cooperation, took the floor to present the introductory report stressing the need to implement a combination of actions as quickly as possible with the aim of finalizing the work leading to holding the aforementioned roundtable, for which he proposed the creation of four task forces.

As for the second item on the agenda, Comrade Carlos Correia, minister of commerce and crafts, spoke about the new price schedule of some basic products.

After listening to the detailed explanation of the minister of commerce on the need to proceed with increasing the prices of those products, the Council of Ministers discussed this problem, analyzing it objectively and deciding that the new price schedule for the products listed below will be as follows as of this date:

Rice - 29 Pg for wholesalers, 30 for retailers  
Oil - 85 PG for wholesalers, 90 for retailers  
Flour - 28 Pg for wholesalers, 30 for retailers  
Sugar - 55 Pg for wholesalers, 60 for retailers  
Soap - 130 Pg for wholeslaer, 150 for retailers.

In pursuance of that decision, the Comrade President called attention to the need to let the goods circulate freely throughout the national territory, taking into account the difficulties and the shortage of basic products which force the citizens to go from one place to another.



He declared also that henceforth on supplementary tax can be charged on goods intended for consumption, with the exception of the customs legislation in effect on this subject which orders the collection of general customs fees, coastwise transactions of entry and departure of goods by sea, as for example: Bissau-Bolama, Tombali-Cacine and Bissau-Farim, and vice-versa.

The aforementioned tax is 3 per 1,000 on the total value of the goods intended for sale. The small amounts for consumption should not pay the aforementioned tax.

8711

CSO: 3442/354

ECONOMY, DEBT RESCHEDULING DISCUSSED

Dakar AFRICA in French No 159, Mar 84 pp 75-78

[Article by Louis Guilain: "The Ivory Coast's Foreign Debt"]

[Text] After long hesitation, the Ivory Coast has rescheduled its foreign debt, a way for it to regain its strength and better attack the crisis. Nor should the decision destroy its reputation as a prudent and pragmatic country that meets its commitments to pay.

The members of the Political Bureau of the party, the PDCI-RDA [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally], met in the presence of members of the government, presided over by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny.

The telecaster making the announcement stated that "this meeting, whose purpose was to examine the economic situation, enabled the party's top leaders to hear a detailed report by the chief of state on the Ivory Coast's domestic and foreign debt and on measures to be taken to overcome the crisis."

The official bulletin published for the public announced protective measures and in particular, the rescheduling of the foreign debt.

"The Political Bureau, aware of the need to preserve the storehouse of confidence enjoyed by our country with international financial circles careful to avoid any halt in our development, passed the measures to reschedule the government's debt and ask the government to undertake the negotiations needed for the purpose."

One will agree that the tone of the bulletin is serious and in keeping with the situation that is equally serious and also in keeping with the reflections of the Yamoussoukro ram. With firm courage, he is facing an unlikely set of circumstances designed to topple his remarkable undertaking, an object of unanimous admiration not long ago.

Over 2 Trillion

In order to foil destiny, he once again appeals to his people, whose merits one will recall:

"The members of the Political Bureau are pleased that the Ivorians have demonstrated a heightened sense of civic duty and patriotism by accepting the sacrifices imposed on them by the circumstances."

Once again, they are asked to understand the government's decisions, as cruel as they might be to their pride, and courageously accept the consequences of the situation in order to "emerge from the impasse" and "pursue our development in the higher interest of the country." "To emerge" is the blunt phrase. The times are not right for a flowery style.

As soon as one speaks of figures -- the nitty gritty, after all -- only clear, concise, dry mathematical language is suitable. We shall therefore speak here about a figure equal to or slightly higher than 2.37 trillion CFA francs in order to situate the debt, with the service on that debt costing some 405 billion CFA francs in 1983.

Ivorians could find some consolation in comparing their fate with that of most developing countries. In 1983, their foreign debt went from 321 trillion CFA francs to 340 trillion.

Mrs Krueger, vice president of the World Bank, announces an imminent increase in the receipts of the developing countries (from 10 to 12 percent a year, counting from 1984-1985). In the meantime, like the Ivory Coast, over 30 countries have reshuffled their debt between 1982 and 1983 for a total amount of 42 trillion CFA francs.

The Ivory Coast's foreign debt more than doubled from 1978 to 1982: 1978, 968.6 billion CFA francs; 1982, 2,195.200 trillion CFA francs.

It is interesting to compare these figures with those on the gross national product (in billions of CFA francs). These are contained in the table below.

On 31 December 1983, the Ivory Coast's foreign debt amounted to 2.37 trillion CFA francs, including 1.79 trillion for the secured debt. Service on the foreign debt, along with the debt itself, regularly increased: 1978, 38.7 billion CFA francs; 1979, 53.2 billion; 1980, 74.1 billion; 1981, 108.3 billion; and 1982, 162.5 billion.

In 1983, service on the debt amounted to 405 billion CFA francs, while reimbursement of interest and commissions totaled 207 billion. Capital reimbursements totaled 198 billion.

#### Repayment

Given these figures, the regime's critics, the very persons who so highly praised it in good times, use no euphemisms to put another nail in the coffin.

For them: foreigners and nationals alike, the Ivorian debt is the direct result of poor management of public affairs.

What is one to think of their judgment?

Actually, for nearly 15 years, borrowing has constituted one of the essential sources of development financing.

Prices for basic export products, especially coffee and cacao, provided all the necessary guarantees for the policy.

Starting in 1980, the sudden and vertiginous drop in these prices no longer permitted the Ivory Coast to meet its obligations without outside help and it therefore began to borrow money to pay the service on its own debt.

As long as it could, the Ivory Coast tried to maintain its course in order to save at any cost the flattering reputation it had acquired abroad.

However, the deterioration in the terms of trade were joined by more destabilizing factors making all efforts to keep one's head above water futile.

In chronological order, there was first the international crisis affecting all countries that do not produce oil, followed by the rising cost of the dollar. Nearly 50 percent of the Ivorian foreign debt was contracted for in that currency, meaning that when the Ivory Coast borrowed 1 billion CFA francs in 1980 (in U.S. dollars), it must now pay back 2 billion, with service on the debt increasing in the same proportions.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Debt</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>GNP</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1978	968.6*	+ 4.5	1,825	+ 18.5
1979	1,074.5	+ 10.2	2,050	+ 12.3
1980	1,265.1	+ 17.7	2,220	+ 8.3
1981	1,826.8	+ 44.4	2,300	+ 3.6
1982	2,195.2	+ 20.2	2,500	+ 8.7

\* The previous year, the total debt (debt plus commitments) amounted to under 500 billion francs.

#### Structure of the Debt (percent)

U.S. dollar	44.7%
French francs	26.8%
German marks	7.0%
Swiss francs	3.0%
Belgian francs	4.5%
Ecus	3.3%
Misc.	10.7%

But this is not the whole story of the country's financial problems. In fact, the country depends on France economically. Being dependent on the franc area was for a long time a considerable advantage, but that is no longer the case. The continuous depreciation of the French currency compared with other foreign currencies does not facilitate the task of the Ivorians.

Finally, there was the drought and its harmful effects. The drought, the most catastrophic in the past 25 years, has delayed cacao production and

marketing, resulting in "losses which Minister Sery Gnoleba said were particularly damaging to the financial equilibrium of the public sector at the end of 1983."

Speaking before the London Club, Gnoleba emphasized certain aspects of the Ivory Coast's misfortune:

"The substantial drop in the level of public and parapublic investments, due to the increasing difficulties in obtaining the planned foreign credits to finance those investments; the very marked drop in activity linked to the decline in investments of the public sector, on the one hand, and to the growing difficulties with funding of the different partners of the Ivorian economy; and the decline in tax income during the second half of 1983, due to the decline in economic activity."

#### Domestic Debt

The drop in tax revenue is explained by the funding difficulties of the private sector, difficulties partially due to the government's domestic debt. It amounts to over 200 billion CFA francs, based on optimistic estimates. In fact, since the Ivory Coast has granted priority to repaying the foreign debt, there is local stagnation of enterprises of which the government had been a traditional customer.

Building and public works were the first victims of government austerity and were all the harder hit because the government delayed the repayment of debts it had contracted with them from month to month.

Since it is impossible to please all the people all the time, it was difficult for the Ivory Coast to satisfy all its foreign and local debtors. The choice made led locals to sacrifice themselves for foreigners. With the government no longer being what it had once been, a major generous financial backer, the public sector went to the banks, which themselves soon grew tired of the red ink and turned off the water. Then came the layoffs, wage freezes, failures, and so on.

The crisis was not immediately apparent and it took some time for people to become concerned. In 1982-1983, Ivorian industry was content to exceed the 1 trillion figure in turnover. Nevertheless, there were signs that the machine was flagging.

#### Draconian Measures

The government quickly became aware of the gravity of the situation and as early as 1980, in agreement with and with the help of the Economic Cooperation Fund and the World Bank and with the backing of the International Monetary Fund, took measures aimed at setting up a rigorous rehabilitation program so as to restore the financial equilibrium without compromising national development.

Among these measures is the liquidation or reorganization of national companies and parapublic organizations that were often the subject of scandal because of their incompetent management.

Regular and investment expenditures of the government were substantially reduced in order to bring about increased public spending.

It should be recognized that the Ivorian readjustment program did not respond to all the hopes placed in it because of the external factors already described (deterioration in coffee and cacao prices, spiraling cost of the dollar and excessively high interest rates, weakness of the franc).

On the domestic plane, the death blows stemmed from the stagnation of the economy, partially due to the government's austerity policy. One must again mention the debt to economic partners established in the Ivory Coast, the drought, brush fires, the sometimes scanty harvests and the oil resources that fell below initial hopes.

#### Rescheduling of Debt

As a result, it was essential to reschedule the debt, with financiers comparing the operation with a breath of fresh air.

One must understand that the debt rescheduling does not involve the multilateral debt (the debt contracted with the World Bank, for example), but only 95 percent of the bilateral debt. The request officially made to the Club of Paris would suspend reimbursement of the principal and interest.

The results of the IMF work on the Ivory Coast's recovery plan are already known. Its conclusions will be presented to Washington by the Fund's board of directors. The final report will be passed on to the Club of Paris. In particular, it mentions the problems of modifying reimbursement dates and the establishment of banking commissions.

The financial balance can finally be restored on new foundations, making it possible to repay the domestic debt and will thereby embark the country upon a new path favorable to productive investments.

In order to achieve this good result, the government is now imposing a budget of strict austerity and is preparing to breathe new life into the economy, particularly industry, by granting total aid (export privileges in countries outside the CEAO, investment code, improved taxation for companies established locally, customs tariffs, and so on).

The mere fact of recognizing the possibility of future economic success would tend to prove that the Ivory Coast was not "KOed" by the heavy blows it has suffered. Hunkering down, it is regaining its strength.

#### Confidence of Business Circles

The "Old Man" built upon a rock the image of a wise, pragmatic, far-sighted and reliable Ivory Coast. It is the fable of the ant, in a sense, and with the

help of fate, it would turn into a cicada "in order to subsist until the next season."

Nevertheless, in the world of finance, they do not reason as they do in the world of Aesop or La Fontaine and one does not get rich by paying off one's debts too quickly! In this, we join the French moralist, who in careful terms warns that too great a haste in paying off one's debts to others would involve a certain amount of ingratitude....

The Ivory Coast is not ungrateful, first of all, and it is guarding its chances for a new and better start, second. Other countries have confidence in it because of what it has already done in the past and also because of the Draconian measures it has imposed on itself in order to remedy its afflictions.

The Ivory Coast's private sector has also faced the facts by providing concrete proof of its support for the government, which still has a remarkable technical infrastructure in all the fields of activity in the country. It is therefore not a matter of starting from scratch, but only of pausing, falling back in order to regroup.

Then there is the oil.

It is true that it did not respond to the expectations of the country's leaders, but its contribution is not negligible. There is talk of 2 million tons in 1985, without counting the gas from the "Espoir" deposit. It is not Peru, much less Saudi Arabia, but in these times of crisis no profits can be neglected.

We thus come to the conclusion, in response to the claims of the eternal detractors of the Ivory Coast, accused of mismanagement by them. In truth, we could not situate it in time. It would be difficult to place it in the period of the "Ivorian miracle." The nation had to handle a crisis that befell it from the outside and it is indeed a miracle that it did not succumb to the heavy blows.

11,464

CSO: 3419/619

## COPING WITH DROUGHT IN KITUI DISTRICT

Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 27 Apr 84 pp 9, 14

[Article by Gideon Nzoka]

[Text] The hot sun glares mercilessly over the already scorched earth, slowly and painfully destroying the pitifully little vegetation still remaining.

The rivers have long turned into vast stretches of sand-filled trenches that one finds hard to believe ever contained water.

The few remaining starving cattle have to be driven long distances in search of the meagre and continually diminishing supplies of water and pasture.

These are just a few of the manifestations of the 18-month-long drought that has hit Kitui district, which has a long history of droughts, so much so that quite a number of the older people in the area can pin their dates of birth and other important events down to such-and-such a drought, all of which are appropriately named. (No one has as yet, however, come up with a name for the current drought).

Kitui district is mostly made up of land that is only marginally productive agriculturally and this--and the continued lack of rain--has dealt a severe blow to the district's farmers, most of whom are only small-scale subsistence farmers without any other source of income. Though the drought has affected the district as a whole, the southern parts are the worst hit.

### Fears

David Kyalo wa Mutisya, in his late 80s, a farmer in Ikutha location of southern Kitui has since last year lost more than 150 sheep and over 80 head of cattle to the drought at his Matikoni farm. This has drastically reduced the number of his livestock (he now has less than 20 sheep) and he fears that he will soon have none left as no end to the drought seems to be in sight.



The livestock and his crop farms are his only source of income, on which he has to support a large extended family. He says that during previous droughts he was able to move his livestock to better areas and save them but now "better places" simply don't exist.

Kyalo's is not an isolated case. Most farmers in Southern Kitui have lost and continue to lose a lot of their livestock to the drought. Compared to the rest of the district, the area is one of the most productive agriculturally but is also one of the most vulnerable to the ravages of drought. Many a family has to make do with the fruit of the widely grown Muamba tree for supper and little else.

The drought has even made some farmers in the area become poachers. They hunt--or send their children out to hunt--the small, starving population of dik-dik and other small game, mainly from the nearby Tsavo National Park. They use catapults, arrows and other traditional weapons. Said one man who requested anonymity: "We know it is against the law and punishable to hunt, but then, what else can we do? We have to find some food for our families..."

Others have to make do with food sent to the area by the government. According to the assistant chief of Ndili sub-location, Mr Justus Nzou Mwanzaku, since October last year people have been given free food four times, the period between two consecutive hand-outs varying between four months and three weeks. For the food to be enough, he adds, it has to be given out at least twice a week. The adults in every family are given a kilogramme of maize and a kilogramme of beans each. Only those who have been certified by the Food Distribution Committee as not having another source of food are given the food assistance.

But Mwanzaku is of the opinion that virtually everybody in the area is in need of free food. He also adds that if this year's expected April to June rains don't result in high yields for farmers, the Kitui people might need government food aid up to April 1985.

In the past few months the government has given thousands of bags of maize and beans to be issued free to drought-stricken wananchi. However, the distribution of the food aid has not been very efficient. It has left many people complaining of unfairness and corruption. Whereas the District Officer, Northern Division, Mr J.A. Kamau says that there was enough food to feed all the affected people, the method of distribution in certain areas such as Ikutha location, with irregularly long periods of time elapsing between the subsequent hand-outs, has left a lot of the locals dissatisfied. Kamau points out that the food given to the district by the government "was enough" to facilitate weekly handing-out.

Some locals have also charged that some of the chiefs were asking for two shillings from each of the persons receiving food, claiming that they were for "transport cost." Gideon Ulembwa, a hides and skins dealer at Migwani Market in northern Kitui wonders when these "costs" were incurred since the food was taken by government lorries to the affected areas.

People in Ikutha have also complained of being asked to pay two shillings before they got any food. Observers point out that the cost of transporting several bags of maize to even the remotest areas of the district, if not done by the government, would not cost much more than Sh 200, and wonder why chiefs should allegedly demand two shillings from each of the usually over 250 recipients of the food aid in any one area. There have also been claims that some chiefs were actually selling the food to the residents but these reports have not been confirmed.

The government, in its food aid programme, has also tried to deal with the situation by relaxing regulations restricting the buying of maize at wholesale prices from the National Cereals Board to licensed traders, thus allowing individuals or groups of individuals to buy the maize directly from the board depots in the district.

But there's hope. Already, the long-delayed seasonal rains have started falling in some parts of the district and it is the hope of all in the district that the rains will grant Kitui farmers at least a harvest. They are in need of one.

CSO: 3400/974

## MOI URGES REFORESTATION

Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 28 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Makokha wa Musebe]

[Text]

**PRESIDENT Daniel arap Moi yesterday urged Kenyans to prevent desertification for the benefit of future generations.**

President Moi made the call when he led thousands of Kenyans on the National Tree Planting Day at Kiserian plains, Kajiado District, where thousands of trees were planted.

"Centuries ago, places like Misri (Egypt) had plenty of trees and rivers and as a result, people who died could not rot due to natural medicines provided by trees," he said. "Now that there are no such trees and the world is turning into a desert, people who die rot."

He banned the commercial harvest of timber in Rift Valley except for local consumption only.

He directed the ministry of Natural Resources to ensure that trees which did not survive were replaced. He also

told them to continue planting trees in the remaining area at Kiserian. He told the ministry officials not to wait for the Tree-Planting Day to plant trees but to carry on with the exercise throughout the rainy season.

Moi cited with disappointment the destruction of indigenous trees in Kakamega forest. He asked where those cutting down the trees would get others as the lifespan of trees was longer than of a human being.

He urged farmers not to cultivate along river banks as this would cause more fertile soil to be washed into the rivers. He cited the Sagana river which, he said, had washed away a lot of fertile soil from Murang'a and part of Nyeri.

He said Nairobi University students had left a big landmark at Kiserian by planting thousands of trees. He directed that the site be called "University Forest — Ngong" in memory of the good work done by the students.

The president said that one of these days he will join students in building gabions to prevent soil erosion, to which the students shouted "tomorrow, tomorrow", meaning today. However the president said they needed a rest before embarking on gabions.

About outside loans and grants, the president said Kenya was a self-reliant country.

He also directed that the 50 goats he had been given by the area's residents be given to Nairobi University students.

Welcoming the president, the Minister for Environment and Natural Resources, Mr. Eliud Mwamunga, said his ministry's target was to plant 200 million trees per year. He said more Meru oak will be planted around Mt. Kenya and other hardwood trees in Kakamega.

President Moi arrived at the site at 12.45 p.m., accompanied by the vice-president and Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Mwai Kibaki.

MEETING STRENGTHENS RELATIONS WITH EMIRATES

Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 30 Apr 84 p 6

[Editorial: "Another Boost for Afro-Arab Unity"]

[Text]

THE three-day state visit last week by the president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, further strengthens Afro-Arab unity and boosts the relations between Kenya and the Emirates. Seen in an even wider context, the visit has been a practical illustration of Kenya's determination to co-exist with other countries of the world on a non-aligned basis.

Both Kenya and the UAE are already culturally linked by Islam. They have in common the characteristic of ethnic diversity and unity. The UAE is made up of Arabs, Iranians, Pakistanis and Indians. They speak different languages, such as Arabic, Persian, English, Hindi and Urdu. Furthermore, as was expressed in the joint communique issued at the end of the visit, the two countries hold similar views with regard to South Africa's apartheid regime, the future of Namibia, the Middle East crisis, the escalation of super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, current world economic problems and the need for meaningful North-South dialogue.

It was, therefore, only logical and appropriate for the two countries to have agreed to set up a joint ministerial commission headed by their foreign ministers to strengthen Afro-Arab unity and examine more closely other issues of bilateral interest. Such a commission could become a valuable instrument for developing the ties of friendship and co-operation between the two countries.

One of the possible areas of meaningful co-operation between the two countries is in research on dry land farming and agriculture. The Agricultural Trials Station at Digdagga in the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, established in 1955, has been engaged in continuous research into methods of dry land cultivation and livestock rearing. As a result it is now possible to grow a great variety of fruits, vegetables, animal fodder and tobacco for local consumption around oases and irrigated areas. The UAE department of agriculture pays a lot of attention to educating farmers in the newly developed methods of cultivation.

Very similar effort is being made in Kenya as part of the government's land reclamation policy. No doubt a cross-fertilisation of research findings and agricultural discoveries between the two countries would boost food production and thus facilitate greater co-operation. Areas such as Baringo, Kitui, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Taita-Taveta and others which have been earmarked for arid and semi-arid land development programmes stand to benefit from such mutual exchange.

The quickest and easiest way in which Kenya could benefit economically from her ties with the United Arab Emirates would be through direct financial assistance. The Emirates, so richly endowed with oil, are in a strong position to offer such aid. Abu Dhabi, one of the Emirates, is probably the richest country in the world in terms of income per capita, so we hope that the republic will consider increasing financial aid to Kenya to catalyse greater economic development and improve the living conditions of our people. The recent state visit by the UAE head of state did, in fact, indicate the likelihood of such assistance.

CSQ: 3400/974

## TRAINING FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR TEXTILE INDUSTRY

Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 30 Apr 84 p 9

[Article by Victoria Okumu]

[Excerpt]

FOLLOWING an incubation period of over a decade, Kenya Textile Training Institute (KTTI) is now in full operation having enrolled the first thirty students early this month.

The pressure for trained personnel in the textile industry which is one of Kenya's largest industrial sectors having over 20,000 employees has been so great that in 1973 the Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE) requested the government to set up training facilities for the textile industry.

### Skills

Employees have always been forced to get their training abroad or learn the skills on the job through experience from the already trained.

Following the request, Kenya Government made a survey for training requirements and approached the Netherlands Government for support.

By 1978, an agreement was reached with the Netherlands promising to finance training of KTTI staff including machinery and equipment for instructions.

A supplier of machinery for instruction was to be identified with an aim to have training facilities at KTTI that would

equip students with knowledge in a field full of diverse management principles and machinery.

Says KTTI general manager Mr. P. K. Kapur, "each industry had what they thought to be the best for their companies and what we really wanted to achieve with the establishment of KTTI is a uniformity to get one certificate for all that would be recognised by all textile industries."

Kapur explained that although textile employees had been getting trained it was at an institution and level decided by the employer.

The overseas training also proved expensive as the government had to refund training expenses through the industrial training levy fund programme.

Star Industrial and Textile Enterprises Limited, Bombay, India was appointed to procure and install the machinery. Star is a group of companies ranked among the top textile machinery manufacturing and consultancy organisations in India, with a turn-over of over 130 million US dollars per year.

Star has in the past built up and commissioned textile mills in Sudan, Tanzania and Algeria among many other African countries.

At the KTTI, Star group has not only installed machines but were commissioned to provide advisory technical services relating to architecture, civil and structural design of the Institute.

KTTI has a spinning, weaving and processing department in addition to a laboratory for quality testing. Arrangements are being made to include facilities for knitting machines to be part of the training programme.

KTTI's spinning department is equipped fully with various models of machines that a student is likely to encounter in any industry around the country. A cone winding machine sets the factory chain of activities by converting the incoming cotton into cones.

Machines to twist the cones of cotton are installed into two sets, the old models and the newest variety being made available for the student to use.

There are also smaller models of the factory machines "for students to experiment on" if they wish and from the models students will have some "spinning geometry" according to Star Group's regional manager Mr. C. P. Kainth.

The machines are not all from India; an assortment has been made and there is for example a sophisticated cone winding machine from West Germany.

The spinning section also has a variety of warping machines, combers, draw frames, right frames, beams and looms, and has facilities to offer the latest technology in spinning called open-end spinning."

CSO: 3400/974

## BRIEFS

FUEL SHORTAGE REPORTED--Nairobi is experiencing a shortage of kerosene and wananchi are scrambling for the little that is available in a few petrol stations. Long queues of wananchi waiting for kerosene could be seen in several parts of Nairobi. Petrol stations visited by The Kenya Times said they had not received their supply of kerosene although they had placed orders. One petrol station in Eastlands had not received its supply since April 15 and customers had to be turned away. Another petrol station along Ngong road drained its supply within minutes on receiving it because of the many customers who went to buy it. A random survey carried by The Kenya Times showed that hundreds of wananchi had to travel long distances carrying jerricans in search of kerosene. Kerosene was among other petroleum products whose prices went up a few days ago. The price hike was attributed to procurement, distribution and marketing problems as a result of the devaluation of the Kenya shilling against the World Bank's Special Drawing Rights (SDRS) and other major currencies such as the US dollar which is the official oil trading currency. The price hike was announced by energy and regional development minister Nicholas Biwott last week in a press statement. [Text] [Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 30 Apr 84 p 24]

BRIDGE IS SWEEPED AWAY--A bridge connecting Kitale Town and Kwanza-Namanjalala was swept away following a heavy downpour. Communication between the centre and the town is now cut off. Rural access roads in the area are also becoming impassable because of the rain. The councillor for area, Mr William Wanyama Walukhu said flat areas were becoming flooded. He said the situation could become dangerous if a solution was not urgently found. Walukhu thanked the government for containing security in the area which had been under constant attack by cattle rustlers. [Text] [Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 28 Apr 84 p 3]

CSO: 3400/974



FRICTION WITHIN NATIONAL MUSLIM COUNCIL REPORTED

Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 10 Apr 84 p 16

[Text] The National Muslim Council of Liberia has reacted sharply to what it termed as the unilateral dissolution of the National Muslim Council and the setting up of an interim committee to run the affairs of the council.

In the 13-page document, issued here recently, the council noted that the dissolution action by a handful of council members was inconsistent with the constitution of the Council and added that on a two-third majority the executive committee of the National Muslim Council has the power to make decisions affecting the organization.

The Council said the action was an effort on the part of its opponents to "paint us black in the eyes of the Muslim and the public in general."

Accordingly, the council said this clique of council members recently called a meeting at the Executive Pavilion here aimed at mis-presenting and mis-interpreting the objectives of the National Muslim Council.

The council in its reaction contended that its opponents were not "clothed islamically or legally with authority to dissolving a duly established organization."

It then called on all its affiliate members to make every effort and to resolve "this unfortunate situation in the spirit of islamic justice and fair play."

The council said despite such "provocative action" it remains committed to its objectives of maintaining peace and unity among all Muslim organizations in the country.

The National Muslim Council of Liberia founded in 1974 is aimed at coordinating and monitoring the affairs of member organizations, as well as representing them at national and international forums.

The organization chaired by Alhaji Vamunya Corneh comprises various Muslim organizations in the country including the Muslim Congress of Liberia, the Muslim League of Salafiya and the Muslim Community of Liberia, among others.

However, since April 1980, Alhaji Corneh has been unable to carry out the functions of chairman of the Council due to ill health.

The organization has been chaired by the first vice chairman of the council Sekou Bility.

The council in its reaction said since then, Alhaji Corneh has never informed either the acting chairman of the executive committee of his recovery and readiness to resume official duty.

It noted that the cause of agitation has been on the "over-ambitiousness of some Council members for the leadership of the Council who have resorted to inviting outside forces against the council in order to accommodate their personal whims or notions."

The Council then explained that a candidate for council executive leadership should possess "a commendable character and conduct consistent with Islamic ethics."

It pointed out that this quality would not only enable a candidate to know the details of Islamic injunction and their application, but also help him to appreciate "the basic principles of Islamic laws and its objectives."

CSO: 3400/976

COUNTRY'S BANKING, LIQUIDITY CRISIS DISCUSSED

Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 23 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Lawrence Thompson]

[Text] The Governor of the National Bank of Liberia (NBL), Mr Thomas D. Voer Hansen, has challenged any of the commercial banks in the country to provide evidence that an increase in NBL's reserve requirement was responsible for their inability to lend out money.

Governor Hansen threw the challenge last Thursday during a Chamber of Commerce luncheon for banking, insurance and business executives at which time the executives demanded that he put in proper perspective the current banking and liquidity crisis in the country.

Many of the banking executives attributed their inability to lend out money as well as their refusal to accept government cheques and cheques from counterpart banking institutions to the increase in the National Bank reserve requirement from 15 percent to 30 percent.

In his clarification of the matter, Governor Hansen said when the national legislature created the national bank the reserve requirement was then 15 percent.

"But when the 15 percent reserve requirement was increased to 30 percent by the People's Redemption Council in February 1983, government felt that the increase was enough during that particular period," said Mr Hansen.

He said "if there had been no such increase commercial banks would have felt the financial pinch much harder two years back."

The governor attributed the liquidity crisis to the decline in exports on the one hand, and interest payments on foreign debts on the other. For instance, he said exports declined from \$600.4 million in 1980 to \$430.8 million in 1983.

Interest payments on foreign debts according to the governor increased from \$23.9 million to \$50.9 million during the same period.

"While there are no definite figures to indicate capital flight, the residual item in capital outflows of the balance of payments does indicate substantial magnitude ranging from \$20 million to \$40 million per year since 1979," Mr Hansen said.

He said that the Liberian government has been financing heavy deficits ranging between \$90 million to \$99.5 million during the last three years, thus, heightening the crisis.

The governor, however, intimated that discussions were being held between the appropriate government ministries and authorities of commercial banks to find solutions to the problems.

Although he declined to disclose the contents of said discussions, he, however, promised to inform banking executives as well as the public as to the results of those discussions.

Speaking at the occasion, the president of the Bankers' Association of Liberia, Mr David Vinton, said that government's deficit at the end of 1970 was \$2.6 million as compared to \$77.5 million in 1983.

Mr Vinton who is also president of the Liberia Bank for Development and Investment observed that the current liquidity crisis should be tackled from the root causes which he said were both national and international.

He said by all indications government was spending more money than it generated.

One of the panelists, Mr Dexie Peters, President of the Association of Insurers in Liberia, expressed concern over certain provisions contained in the decree creating the National Insurance Corporation.

CSO: 3400/982

PEOPLES REDEMPTION COUNCIL 'DECLARES WAR' ON TAX EVADERS

Liquidity Problems, Corruption

Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 24 Apr 84 pp 3, 6

[Editorial: "PRC Declares War on Tax Dodgers"]

[Text] The recent decision of the Executive Council of the People's Redemption Council (PRC) to summarily execute any member or members of the Special Tax Collection Force caught soliciting or accepting bribes not only shows the gravity of the nation's liquidity problems, but also the depth of Government's frustration over tax-doggers and corrupt officials.

At stake is \$26 million due the Government of Liberia in taxes ranging from real estate to corporate, income and excise taxes.

The deadline has been set for April 28, 1984; and, slowly but surely a process that might have an indelible mark on Liberians' sense of honor, responsibility and accountability is being put into motion.

Whatever the end result, if this is made a standard practice or a standing order, Government would have assured the redemption of our lost honor and patriotism from those who are tempted to sell national interests for piece-meals and personal aggrandisements.

To understand the situation that led to this decision would require an examination of the various efforts and measures by the Government in general, and the Ministry of Finance in particular, adopted to ensure prompt and effective collection of taxes.

Despite the best of these measures and efforts, some Liberians directly and indirectly connected with the collection of taxes have still found ways to evade, help foreign residents and businesses evade taxes and thwart Government's efforts. A great disservice to the nation.

Based on the unpatriotic attitude of these corrupt officials and individuals, certain groups of foreign residents and businessmen have been encouraged to flout government's regulation with impunity. These have gone as far as paying patronages to these individuals to ensure effective and continuous perpetration of this act. Understandably, some Liberian businessmen have also joined the ranks of tax-doggers.

Government's decision relative to the collection of her collectable is indeed most welcome, even though to some it may be too hard a line. However, it is known that a chronic disease deserves a drastic cure.

In this regard, Government would do well to look keenly at the myriad of stores both LPA and non-LPA, both foreign and local. In the Monrovia City alone there are over one thousand of these stores owned by the Lebanese, Indians, Fullahs, and Nigerians in addition to the Liberian-owned stores and shops. Most of these are not paying. If they are, to who?

Another area to look at would possibly be beer booths and parlors that are either not paying any taxes or paying for a shop while practically running a regular club to all intents and purposes. These are areas that either have been neglected, overlooked or wilfully left out of the tax-paying sphere.

The declaration of war on tax-doggers by Government is, however, a short-term high effect program. While it is going on, it is also high time that the tax-collection machinery of this country be overhauled. If necessary, let's discard the old system and develop a system that would be effective and conducive to our particular situation.

We also need to take a closer look at the issue of rural taxes. True, the Hut Tax was abolished because it contained many flaws, but it has become imperative at this point in our history that every Liberian has to take some responsibility in the running and maintenance of the country.

The rural masses have on several occasions signified their interest and desire to pay some sort of tax towards the upkeep and maintenance of the nation. Let's give them a chance. After all, the Republic of Liberia is not limited to the City of Monrovia nor are her citizens only in Monrovia.

A tax of \$5.00 per head per month for every eligible citizen of voting age would not be out of place. Rather, it would make them have a sense and feeling of being part of the system. More than IT IS THEIR CIVIC DUTY TO THE NATION.

Keep up the good work.

#### Firing Range Set Up

Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 24 Apr 84 p 1

[Text] The Liberia Electricity Corporation (LEC) yesterday erected utility poles where tax evaders or those found receiving bribes would be executed.

Last Friday, the Liberian leader constituted an 11-member committee of senior PRC members including 200 military and paramilitary officers to collect taxes owed government amounting over \$26,000.

The nationwide tax collection campaign which started yesterday will last until Saturday, April 28.

The Liberia Electricity Corporation erected nine utility poles at the Barclay Training Center beach site to constitute the firing range for the execution of tax evaders and their accomplices.

The Head of State's directive followed a meeting Sunday of the Executive Committee of the ruling people's Redemption Council (PRC), and the special task force at which time the Liberian leader stated that anyone found accepting bribe during the tax collection campaign will be executed by firing squad without delay.

The decision, according to an Executive Mansion release, applies to council members, police officers, soldiers, as well as revenue and custom officers of the finance Ministry and Liberian businessmen. It said that foreign businessmen found in the act would be deported and their properties confiscated.

#### 'Tax Clearance' for Travel

Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 26 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] Liberians and foreign residents wishing to travel will now have to obtain a tax clearance before being allowed to leave the country, the Ministry of Finance announced yesterday.

A press release issued late yesterday evening signed by Finance Minister G. Alvin Jones said "failure on the part of any individual to obtain said clearance will leave the appropriate authorities with no alternative but to deny such individual exit visa to travel."

The release attributed the decision to "the ensuing tax collecting drive" which was recently launched by the PRC Government.

CSO: 3400/976

LAMCO-LMWV AGREEMENT GIVES WORKERS MORE BENEFITS

Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 27 Apr 84 pp 3, 12

[Text] A collective bargaining agreement was Wednesday signed between the Lamco Joint Venture Operating Company and the LAMCO Mine Workers' Union (LMWU) at the Ducor Intercontinental Hotel in Monrovia.

Among several benefits to be enjoyed by the workers as a result of the agreement are wage increment, improved medical facilities and improvement in annual leave.

Other terms of the agreement also centered around better housing facilities which include the construction of 40 additional housing units for the workers at the Buchanan operation, and the renovation of workers' dwelling houses at the Yekepa operations.

Under the agreement which will last for two years, there has also been an increment of twenty seven cents in labourers' wages and vacation travel allowance of \$25.00, while the retirement pension benefit has increased by ten percent.

Signing on behalf of the LMWU was its president, Mr Aloysius S. Kie while the General Manager of LAMCO Mr John Pervola signed for the company.

In remarks, Mr Pervola hoped the signing of the agreement would create an atmosphere of mutual respect between management and workers.

He said such gesture would pave the way for cooperation between them so as to make things easier and better for both parties.

For his part Mr Kie said that the aims and objectives of the union was to create and preserve a balance in industrial relations in order to maintain industrial peace.

Among other objectives of the union, he said it was to collect and disseminate information regarding problems which they face in connection with labor-management relations.



Deputizing for the Minister of Labour John G. Rancy, the Deputy Minister of Labour Ayun Cassell said the revolution can only be a success when there was understanding between management and the workers. He assured both parties that law and order will be maintained in the management-workers relations.

CSO: 3400/982

## INCREASED PRODUCTION OF COCONUT FOR EXPORT PLANNED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Apr 84 p 3

[Text] Raising the production and productivity indices and consequently achieving the financial recovery of the SOCOCO Plant in the province of Zambezia are the immediate tasks assigned by the FRELIMO Party Central Committee member and provincial secretary of the party organization for Zambezia to the recently appointed board of directors of that enterprise, which produces and exports grated coconut. The appointment of Cassam Gulam Hussein, according to the provincial secretary, is a part of a party and state strategy to strengthen the leadership on the production front in the province of Zambezia.

The SOCOCO plant, built in 1970, has experienced successive financial crises since 1976, when state intervention took place, as a result of poor management and the now ancient equipment with which it was operating.

These two factors, linked with low production and the constant breakdowns of the factory equipment, forced the enterprise to undertake numerous debts with the bank to guarantee its survival. By the end of 1979, SOCOCO had a deficit of 6,144,500 meticals.

If indeed the reason for contracting this volume of debt was the factors mentioned, the lack of good sense and a proper economic and financial approach contributed to the size of the debt total reached.

### Use of the Old Equipment

As the secretary of the provincial committee of the party in Zambezia stressed at the installation of the new board, there has previously been no concern at that enterprise for the full utilization of all of the capacity of the factory equipment and the raw material, coconuts, as well.

Another factor contributing to the fact that the SOCOCO has until the present been in a difficult financial situation was the market price of grated coconut, which never allowed the enterprise a profit margin sufficient to offset production costs.

In order to produce 1 ton and 700 kilograms of grated coconut (the capacity of the factory at the time), the production unit needed to process 20,000 coconuts per day. This volume cost the enterprise 50,000 meticals, while the market price for grated coconut ran about 30 meticals per kilogram.

## Financial Recovery of the Enterprise

At present, thanks to the rise in the price of the product to 50 meticals per kilogram, the profit margin of the SOCOCO has increased to 25,000 meticals. However this has not as yet enabled the enterprise to pay off all its debts, with the deficit totaling currently more than 5,000 contos.

The secretary of the Central Committee of the party organization defined the financial recovery of the enterprise, an increase in production and productivity and utilization of the full installed capacity of the plant, as the immediate tasks to be carried out by the new board.

"We must seek immediate measures which will lead us to full utilization of the coconut," Omar Luis Francisco said at the installation of the new SOCOCO board.

According to the outgoing plant director, the installed capacity is 30 tons of grated coconut per month. However at the present time, the daily production of the SOCOCO is estimated at a ton and a half of grated coconut.

This level could only be achieved thanks to the improvements made on all the factory equipment between 1977 and 1979, during which period the factory was shut down for repairs. Even with the completion of this work, the SOCOCO only succeeded in producing 50 percent of its total capacity.

In the view of the new enterprise director, the repair of the equipment is one of the prior conditions for guaranteeing a good production rate, and thus the financial recovery of this unit, the only one of its kind anywhere in the country. Another fact which hinders the harmonious development of enterprise activities, we were told, is the lack of production means.

At this time, the enterprise is faced with enormous difficulties in getting the coconuts from the purchase area to the plant. "The lack of transportation is one of the difficulties the enterprise encounters," the outgoing director commented.

In fact, the SOCOCO does not have a single vehicle for the pursuit of its productive activities. To bring the coconuts from the purchase area to the plant, the enterprise has had to use rented trucks, which pushes production costs up.

5157

CSO: 3442/344

## SWEDEN TO TRAIN ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION OPERATORS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] A group of five students in the specialization course for Electric Power Company of Mozambique (EDM) substation operators are to travel to Sweden in the middle of May, where they will complete their training. After their return, they will engage in a practical apprenticeship in the substations of this enterprise in the northern part of the country, a source in the vocational training sector of that body informed NOTICIAS.

The specialized training of these future EDM cadres began last 20 March, 2 days after the conclusion of the English course which served as a basis for the beginning of the specialization phase.

The students had completed various stages of training, specifically orientation and integration, in addition to the basic training in the electrical sector.

While the five to be chosen from among the best students will continue their training in Sweden, others will be assigned to the substations and still others will work in the underground cable sector.

### Apprenticeship in the North of the Country

"Thirty days is the scheduled period for completing the specialized training of the five students. During this period, they will deepen their knowledge in this sector, and after their return they will work for some time at the Caia, Alto-Molocue, Mocuba, Nacala, Quelimane and Nampula substations," the same source explained further.

This same official informed our reporter that at the present time, an equal number of workers who completed the first specialization course are employed at those substations. According to the schedule set by the EDM training sector, they will attend another training course on the maintenance of substation equipment.

### Aid From NORAD

The training programs being implemented there have the support of the NORAD. As a specific example, the dispatch of the five best students at present to take the subsystem operators specialization course is cited as an example. All of the expenditures will be covered by this agency (NORAD). The decision to send them there, moreover, was the result of an offer by that agency.

## Underground Cable Sector Course

Another course, for underground cable operators, is also planned for this year. It is scheduled to begin within the next few months. It is designed for enterprise workers only, and financing will be provided by the ENEL [National Electric Power Agency], an Italian enterprise in the electrical sector.

As the EDM source explained, this enterprise proposes to provide aid ranging from materials to advisers and other requirements.

The training of cadres for this sector is regarded as of primary importance, based on the fact that at present only the city of Maputo has trained workers for the sector, and in limited numbers even so.

It is with this in mind that the workers who will take the course will be selected throughout the country.

It is hoped that by the middle of May, the documents for acceptance in this course will be ready. The course is scheduled to begin immediately after the end of the specialization course for substation worker-technicians.

## Smoothing the Edges

The training of cadres in the EDM through programs conceived for the purpose began in 1981, with the first operation of the center for the purpose. From then until the present, clearly defined goals have been achieved thanks to the efforts made by the leadership in the sector, in particular where the organizational aspects are concerned.

"We have been following the training process step by step, and there is even efficient coordination between us and a project official on the level of the support bodies, as is the case with the NORAD," our interlocutor told us in this connection. He noted however that the greatest difficulty faced by the Vocational Training Center is, on the one hand, the lack of teaching materials and, on the other, space, which is increasingly inadequate as the need augments.

5157

CSO 3442/344

## URBAN GREEN ZONES TO INCREASE FOOD PRODUCTION

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Apr 84 p 1

[Text] In order to intensify the organization process in the green zones sector and guarantee that the urban districts will be used as a basis for planning and the production of foodstuffs to supply the city, the agrarian institutes have just been strengthened with technical cadres capable of dynamizing crop and small animal species production in the capital of the country. This measure was announced yesterday at a meeting Maputo City Executive Council President Alberto Massavanhane had with the administrators of the urban districts and the new cadres assigned during this process.

The majority of these cadres are individuals with higher agrarian training and individuals with experience and a reasonable approach to farm production in the cooperative, family and private sectors. Their appointment comes within the current stage of reorganization of the green zones as such, with a view to ensuring the harmonious development of the sector.

## Combatting Hunger

As Alberto Massavanhane stressed at the meeting, this action comes within the general process of urban development organization based on the new administrative division. It is designed to involve the green zones more actively and to equip them better so that, through intensified support of the agrarian institutes, they can more effectively direct the productive units, thus making it possible to derive the maximal yield from the resources available in the urban districts.

Alberto Massavanhane spoke of the need to reactivate production of truck garden crops, fruits, grain and beans and the raising of small animal species, in order to raise the protein content of the diet of the people within the process of combatting hunger.

"On this matter, the concern of the party and the government is to raise the organizational level of the green zones such as to be able to involve all of the urban districts in our city more actively in this process of producing food to reduce hunger," this official said.

On the basis of this concern, the present priority is to guarantee that the existing potential can be realized in tangible fashion in terms of more food for the people produced by the people themselves on the basis of the urban districts, either in the cooperative, family or private sectors.

## Reorganization of the Green Zones

All of this effort is based on the reorganization of the green zones themselves, the director of this body, Jorge Tembe, stressed when he spoke at the meeting: "On the central level of the green zones' office, it has become necessary to create a strong, dynamic and functional structure capable of guaranteeing all of the support needed by the agrarian institutes," Jorge Tembe emphasized.

As a means of promoting production activity in the urban districts, following the bad weather phenomena (drought and floods) Maputo has suffered, a survey has become necessary, to be jointly coordinated with the recovery activities to be carried out immediately. Another later measure to be adopted, in coordination with the districts themselves, should be a survey of the potential to be found in each zone, in order to determine to what point rational utilization can be effected.

## New Cadres

On the basis of the new administrative division, the city of Maputo has a total of eight urban districts, covering the Inhaca, Catembe, Matola, Laulane, and Mahotas districts and others around the city.

With the exception of the urban and suburban areas, where in addition to the raising of small animal species, the type of crop production to be intensified will be studied, but not until later, the activity now being pursued is limited to the surrounding areas.

In this connection, the following directors of agrarian institutes were appointed:

Urban District No 1 (Catembe)--Agronomical Engineer Gertrudes Mavie; Urban District No 4 (Laulane and Mahotas)--Agronomical Engineer Maria do Ceu; Urban District No 4 (Jardim)--Mario Alves; Urban District No 6 (Benfica)--Dionisio Mavie; Urban District No 7 (Machava)--Agronomical Engineer Marina Pancas; and Urban District No 8 (Matola)--Liuzzi Domenico.

5157

CSO: 3442/344

# DEPARTMENT FOR TRAINING METEOROLOGICAL EXPERTS PLANNED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] A study with a view to the establishment of a vocational training department has just been drafted by the Meteorological Service of Mozambique, in order to be able to meet the qualification levels required for the sector on the international level. This project will only be viable if, because of its importance, it wins support from information bodies.

On the basis of information provided to NOTICIAS by Sergio Ferreira, an official of the Meteorological Service of Mozambique, what is wanted with the establishment of the vocational training department, the executive vehicle for the process of training meteorological technicians, is the definition of an overall and permanent training policy, duly structured.

The main concern in connection with this goal is the pursuit of training and qualification activities for cadres in this sector, while guaranteeing periodic retraining of the technical cadres for the Meteorological Service of Mozambique.

On the other hand, Sergio Ferreira said, the curricula should be oriented toward training on various vocational levels, standardizing the guidelines of the Secretariat of State for Technical Education with those of the World Meteorological Organization, so that the technicians will be trained in accordance with international standards.

"In order to improve the capacity of the Meteorological Service of Mozambique to respond to the need, this project will be oriented toward training based on the vocational profiles for the sector in terms of the curricula of the World Meteorological Organization. We also plan to introduce vocational training courses linking the technical with the practical such as to be able to train cadres with the internationally required qualification levels," Sergio Ferreira said.

NOTICIAS further learned that within this framework, only specific training for the careers of meteorology and geophysics will be provided. The training of cadres for the administrative technical support sector will be provided by other bodies pursuing activities in this field.



## Adapting Training to National Development

By the end of this decade, the Meteorological Service of Mozambique will need 200 employees at secondary level stations in the meteorological sector (elementary level) and 141 weather observers (middle level). On the higher level, the enterprise needs 50 working meteorologists (baccalaureate level) and 15 meteorologists with diplomas.

"In the geophysical sector, we need 42 geophysical observers on the middle level and 10 working geophysicists on the higher level (baccalaureate), as well as four geophysicists with diplomas," Sergio Ferreira said.

We were also informed that general training in meteorology will be provided, with orientation toward certain fields assigned priority, such as aviation meteorology, climatology, aerology and agrometeorology.

Sergio Ferreira said that, in a second phase, the possibility of some specialties will be contemplated. On the basis of the priority assigned, the training of cadres specializing in agrometeorology will be pursued. Only observers with 2 years' experience or more will qualify for the specialization courses.

According to this source, courses will be offered every 2 years between 1984 and 1988, and beginning in that latter year, regular courses will be offered in accordance with the need, not only to maintain the qualification of the cadres but also to keep up with the development of the sector.

5157

CSO: 3442/344

PRODUCTION SCHOOL PLANNED FOR SALAMANGA

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] Construction work is scheduled to begin soon on the production school planned for the Salamanga zone in the district of Matutuine. Currently, preparations are already rather well advanced, and plans call for the drilling of a well to supply the future school with water. According to Brigit Holm, the representative of the People to People Aid and Development Organization (ADPP), the institution sponsoring the project, the materials needed for the main project will be prepared simultaneous with the drilling of the well.

In a project begun about a month ago, 2 hectares for the growing of tomatoes were prepared and planted, and preparations are planned for the planting of 8 hectares of kale. Part of both the tomato and kale production will be sold since, Brigit Holm said, the school will need to purchase various materials. The money obtained from the sale of these commodities will go basically to cover these expenditures.

The preparations for the construction of the school were begun about a month ago. At that time, a team of 20 Danes from the People to People Aid and Development Organization paid a visit to the site where the school will be built. Together with another group of 20 future students, they launched the production activities.

The ADPP representative informed us that another group of 20 Danes from that organization has already arrived in Maputo. This group will remain in our country for 6 months, the period during which construction of the schools should be completed.

Meanwhile, the selection of students for the future school has been begun. This activity is being coordinated by the OJM [Mozambique Youth Organization] structures in the city of Maputo and the party committee on the city level.

"The number of students who will attend the school is 30, half of them from the OJM in the capital, while the other half will be selected by the district structures," this same source said.

## Construction Along With Study

The production school, which will be located at the Salamanga State Farm Enterprise, our interlocutor reported, will train cadres in four specialties: construction, carpentry, mechanics and agriculture.

The fact that the school will be built in connection with one of the study phases merits special mention. Brigit Holm explained that this means that "the future students--those pursuing the carpentry specialty, for example--will work alongside the teachers in this area in producing the window frames and sashes, doors, etc.

"The same will be the case with the construction students, because it is they who will do the building. Where the students in mechanics are concerned, the Salamanga Farm Enterprise has some inoperative tractors. Thus the future mechanics will work on the repair of this and other machinery, obviously," Brigit Holm said.

Also in connection with the initial work of preparation, we learned that ground is being prepared for raising tomatoes, sweet potatoes and lettuce. Some difficulties, mainly caused by the recent rains, are being encountered in the production work. In the view of the ADPP representative, "the soil is rather heavy, but despite this we are proceeding with the work."

5157

CSO: 3442/244

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS THAT FOLLOW LIBERATION VIEWED

Bloemfontein DIE VOLKSBLAD in Afrikaans 4 Mar 84 p 13

[Article by Dawid J. Vermeulen: "SWA in its Dilemma of Liberation"]

[Text] South Africa is working purposefully at beginning to extricate its hands economically from SWA. This results in heavy demands on the area's own means, and considerable development is thus of great importance. A civil engineer from SWA, Mr Dawid J. Vermeulen, looks in this article at particular stumbling blocks in the road to development.

An engineer and an architect were sitting on the same airplane, on their way to the same construction project in the backveld of SWA. The engineer was going in order to inspect the headway made in laying piping to a block of washrooms. The architect was going in order to present plans for the expansion of the complex of buildings. A part of these plans included the demolition of these very washrooms.

This type of contradiction characterizes the development of SWA rather well. Such situations arise due to the lack of coordination between the various agencies involved in the development campaigns.

On the eve of its liberation, SWA is already entrapped in the dilemma into which a number of countries fall only after independence. The development possibilities of the area are intertwined in contradictory planning campaigns which are being pursued by the multitude of second-level institutions.

Moreover, SWA has developed out of balance over a specific period of time because the emphasis has been on civil engineering work at the expense of developments in the social needs of the population. It was not until around 1980 that a turnaround took place and the emphasis began to fall on creating schools, hospitals, sewage disposal works and water purveyance, projects that are more labor intensive than the highly mechanized construction of roads and airports.

Because of the shift in emphasis, heavy engineering equipment at a value of some 24 million rands is practically unused, but the government has nonetheless budgeted for the acquisition of heavy engineering construction equipment.

By renting out the available unused equipment to the private sector, considerable savings could be effected, while this could greatly help the construction industry, which is going through a crisis.

A further problem is the lack of routine maintenance of completed projects. Black Africa is full of monumental projects which do not work because there has not been proper maintenance. Disrepair is the order of the day in Africa, even with less sophisticated assets, such as roads.

#### Overloading

In SWA, the north-south lifeline is subjected to excessive axle weight, as if its carrying capacity is unlimited. The replacement value of SWA's asphalt roads is today approximately a billion rands and it will cost approximately 300,000 rands to build one kilometer of asphalt road. Because of the overloading of the roads, large amounts will be necessary to keep the north-south lifeline in reasonable condition for use.

Better maintenance is necessary, and SWA can benefit from it greatly if the transition is made early to contract maintenance, rather than doing it through government departments. If this is not seized upon early, it may develop into the area's Achilles' heel.

#### Unemployment

The vested interest of the fragmented population in maintaining small ethnic authorities with their own administrations also provides stumbling blocks in the road to proper development, development in which use is made of labor intensive methods, not only to involve the community in development, but also to combat unemployment and to increase skills through on-the-job training.

12271

CSO: 3401/68

REPUBLIKEIN COMMENT ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Damara Departure from MPC

Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN in Afrikaans 3 Apr 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Stays Offsides"]

[Text] The more the Damara Council tries to give reasons for its withdrawal from the VPK [Multi-Party Conference], the more blurred the affair becomes.

Mr Justus Garoeb says that his party has no quarrels with the VPK, but he had to withdraw from it because the VPK has infringed upon the mandate of the Damara Council.

This may well be, but why did Mr Garoeb not issue warnings within the VPK in time? As long as he sat there agreeing, everyone must have indeed been under the impression that it was in accordance with the "mandate" of the Damara Council. Isn't it so? The VPK leaders certainly cannot read minds!

SWAPO did not attack the Damara Council, because that organization saw that the Damara Council is fighting a fair fight, Mr Garoeb said.

Is SWAPO fighting just such a "fair fight?" And is it fair to say one week that there is no talk of a breakaway from the VPK, and then the following to turn to such a step?

We are afraid that Mr Garoeb is playing out the game in an offsides position!

Savimbi Role

Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN in Afrikaans 3 Apr 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Right Note"]

[Text] Dr Jonas Savimbi unmistakably did not hit a false note when he pointed out over the weekend that the independence of SWA/Namibia is most closely connected with a settlement in Angola.

It is simply a fact that the Cubans are in Angola for ideological reasons. They form a part of the Russian attack on Angola. And in addition, SWAPO,

which is an organization connected with SWA, is likewise under the thumb of the Russians.

Where does the assertion of free will for the people of SWA enter in? And this is what is at stake since the days of the Mandate Agreement.

The exercise of South-West Africans' right to self-determination is not possible as long as there is a new colonial danger assembling at our borders. For that reason, Angola must come clean--clean of Cubans and Russians and also clean of terrorists.

The MPLA government of Angola will have to recognize quite clearly one truth, and that is that its only chance for survival is together with Savimbi, and not against Savimbi.

The MPLA is welcome to learn this lesson from the SWA people, parties and leaders.

In this country, it has long since become clear that the population groups and the political parties are one another's best allies; there can be no friends better than those tied to you by blood and soil.

But the MPLA apparently does not yet grasp this essential truth. And this is the basis of Dr Savimbi's appeal that negotiations with UNITA must be carried out for the sake of the Angolan people.

Savimbi's vision includes a double process of peaceful negotiation: one in SWA/Namibia and one in Angola. And in neither of these two countries is there room for military intervention from outside.

It is indeed crystal clear that no democracy can be achieved unless intimidation and domination through violence are done away with.

However, the irony of the matter, as has often been pointed out, is that Angola, which was an important factor in a peaceful settlement in SWA, has itself never had a free election. Wherever it talks about a free election in Namibia, it is speaking out on a matter which it fears as much as the devil.

South-West Africans cannot count on such a cloudy judgment.

#### Attitudes of Namibia Leaders

Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN in Afrikaans 26 Mar 84 p 6

[Editorial: "Leadership"]

[Text] Moses Katjiuongua and Andreas Shipanga have [word or words missing] last week as it befits political leaders, and this is to say candidly what must be said. Fearlessly. And without first looking to see whether someone else's sensitive toes are accidentally being stepped on.

As opposed to this candor, which makes politics into a rough game, there were also in SWA politics the quack politicians, who always tried to patch everything up. And that is no good.

A leader who strongly and forthrightly marks a course runs the risk that he sometimes loses some of his people. Sometimes it is necessary for him, for the sake of his convictions, to even break away from the old-established world in which he has long been living.

It was not many years ago that a certain Dirk Mudge had to take such a step. It would certainly not be easy. But it was necessary; it was for the sake of SWA/Namibia of the utmost importance.

And so there are several other leaders in our SWA politics who at a particular moment had to pursue a course different from the one on which they had long been moving.

Take, for example, the late Clemens Kapuuo.

When he saw that new circumstances bring new hope, he did not hesitate to make an adjustment and to help in the building of something that this country had never had before.

Perhaps this attitude among our political leadership is the biggest reason for the successes which have been achieved in rebuilding the political structures of the country. Perhaps this is also one of the most important reasons why changes in our community life were able to take place so quickly over the last 10 years.

It is indeed a bloodless revolution which has taken place here; things have happened that quickly.

And where the times again demand rapid progress, there is no getting around the fact that political leaders often must move quickly where other people would be afraid to even budge an inch.

What gratifies the people of SWA/Namibia the most is that their leaders are not open to bribery or threats. No political leader who is trusted by his people needs to beg from another political figure, or depend on his charity.

Sam Nujoma and company are welcome to take note of this.

We will provide for our own leaders; they need not depend on second-hand money smuggled in here by the Marxists, the World Council of Churches or the UN via Nujoma.

We know only too well that that little stream of money will very quickly dry up after the radicals have achieved their goal.

Why then have so many other African states become impoverished?



Why are Angola and Mozambique not swimming in money? Why do their leaders no longer have the foreign wealth that Nujoma has?

When poverty arrives, it hits hardest the man who has eaten out of Russia's hand.

We and our leaders would rather be, as Katuntire Kaura put it, thin and free than fat and enslaved.

Moreover, Nujoma's slaves will not be fat, nor will they be free.

As long as SWA's leaders are strong and honest, they can be sure that they have the power of the people behind them.

12271

CSO: 3401/68

PDS GENERAL SECRETARY A. WADE ON FUTURE PLANS FOR GOVERNING

Dakar WAL FADJRI in French 27 Apr-1 Jun 84 pp 12-15

[Interview with PDS General Secretary Abdoulaye Wade by Hassan Toure with the assistance of Ruben Biyick (BINGO) and Sidi Lamine Niasse (WAL FADJRI); date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] The political climate of today's Senegal is highly agitated. With the balance of trade still showing a large deficit, plus the drought, the keenest anxieties have gripped every Senegalese. All opposition political groups agree that a change is necessary, but what kind of a change?

To learn more about what these various parties propose, we are starting a new section: "It Is up to You, Gentlemen, To Govern." The purpose of this new section is to establish the policy of the party invited to express its views, if its leader were elected president of the Republic of Senegal.

In this setting, we interviewed Mr Abdoulaye Wade, national general secretary of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), as he was the first to respond to our invitation.

[Question] Abdoulaye Wade, if you were elected president, what would be the primary concerns of your government?

[Answer] Feeding the people, thus bringing in rice and selling it much cheaper, and at the same price in both Dakar and the interior of the country. I will eliminate the 20 percent tax per kilogram of peanuts formerly levied on farmers. I will also abolish the poll tax on farmers, since the farmer's real income should be taxed. My government will implement these measures within 2 months.

[Question] Can we expect a major change from the present government's domestic policy and the one that you will establish?

[Answer] First of all, the conditions should be created for the recovery of Senegal, which is on its knees and overindebted; we have had to make a third rescheduling of payments within the Club of Paris and another rescheduling of the private debt of the Club of London.

I will assemble all political parties for a roundtable discussion, for above all, my government's recovery plan is political rather than economic, in view of the fact that 40 percent of annual export revenues must be spent for the foreign debt, which is 650 billion CFA francs.

I should nevertheless tell you that the criterion for a political party is not only the people, but the nature of the party and what it wishes to do. Discussion with other parties does not mean that my government does not have the solution; on the contrary.

I will establish a national commission for recovery, which will have the mission of providing all of the parties participating in the discussion with a recovery plan, which shall lead to a government program affecting all sectors.

I will appeal to some political parties in my future government, and to others, to support the overall program. Indispensable measures include those having to do with the life of political parties and trade unions.

I intend to reestablish the conditions of democracy. Thus a national commission for formulating an election code will be established so that there will be no more election disputes.

In the process, I will help the political parties contributing to the expression of national opinion and which are liaisons between the government and the people. Political practices must be cleaned up.

I have no intention at all, for example, of imprisoning those who have diverted public funds, quite simply because circumstances must be taken into account. On the other hand, I will take future measures for administrative control, which will make such diversions of funds impossible.

[Question] You plan to work together with all parties and even with the current government's party. Considering the famous plan of the Front of Rejection, however, don't you think that could revive that unsuccessful situation?

[Answer] As I see it, it is my party's duty to call on others to support my government's policy, although with the agreement that we will have formulated the government's program together. And in doing so, my government will be obliged to apply that program strictly, otherwise the endorsing parties will be free to withdraw.

The Front of Rejection was comprised of 11 parties right after the elections and they made postelection political demands; this is in no way comparable to the present situation.

[Question] Does this mean that you are going to establish a government of national union?

[Answer] Absolutely.

[Question] In exactly what context are you going to appeal to the other parties? Isn't that a sign of weakness?

[Answer] When you ask a nation to sacrifice, you have to come to terms with the largest possible number of citizens.

Let us suppose that I form a homogeneous government and we make decisions, of course, but we cannot expect those decisions to be supported by other parties which could oppose us.

But since we have assured all political parties of a fair and democratic fight, I think that we can obtain some sort of consensus, some sort of social peace (social contract). The problem is that we have to make sacrifices to pay our debts.

[Question] Will the constitution remain unchanged, in particular with the defunct Article 35 and the law reducing the term of office of the president of the assembly?

[Answer] In this regard, we have included a constitutional revision in my government's plans. I will have to again consult with the other parties and submit this new constitution to a public referendum. There are fundamental issues on which Senegalese do not agree, just to mention Article 35 as an example. Consultation with the people on a number of problems is necessary.

[Question] Do you plan to change the law on the secularity of the government?

[Answer] There is a great deal of confusion surrounding the notion of secularism. Secularism is a christian notion: that is, the government must not be dependent on religion. Today, separation of church and state is what is meant by secularism.

Secularism is not an antireligious concept. Nor is it a concept that is totally neutral on religion. It is a notion that evolved from a religious and sectarian concept. If we have gotten to the point of secularity, it is because it was demanded by an historic evolution (the Revolution of 1789).

This does not mean that the theoretical existence of an Islamic state must be rejected: that is, ruling out the possibility for Moslems to arrive at a notion of secularity by starting out from an Islamic concept, a notion of secularity that is comparable to the secularity derived from christianity, that is, comparable to the concept of a state that is dependent on a religious denomination.

However, christian secularism must not be carried over to the level of an Islamic state, but it must be acknowledged that the concept of an Islamic state could evolve to arrive at that notion. As for me, I share that philosophy.

Otherwise we will arrive at a situation in which the marabout will necessarily be the "chief of state" because his conduct is necessarily preferable as a chief of state. If that situation occurs in Senegal, the chief of state will be the one who interprets the religion best.

As for me, my government and I will construct a secular state guaranteeing the independence of the state and religion. Of course, that will not prevent me from giving my children a religious education, just as others will do.

[Question] [by] BINGO (a monthly published in Paris): What do you think about the rise of religious fundamentalism, especially in Senegal?

[Answer] I draw a distinction between mysticism and fundamentalism. I have a lot of respect for mysticism, which is a valid refuge with God. All of the Senegalese people's current problems are favorable to the development of mysticism. As for fundamentalism ... I ask myself this question: does fundamentalism really exist in Senegal? The more I note that there is a development of mysticism, the more uncertain I am that fundamentalism, as it is defined, exists in Senegal.

[Question] Isn't it time to establish a reconciliation with the people on whom secularity has been imposed and who firmly believe in Islam as a plan of society?

[Answer] I wasn't elected on the basis of an Islamic platform, but rather on the platform of the PDS. I was elected because I am a layman and that is very significant. A distinction must be made between Islam and the "Islamic church," that is, a distinction between Islam as a religion and as a philosophy, which, in its pure state, is a repository of fundamental, reliable values, of certain social institutions that are very debatable, as are their sociological features in the Islam of Senegal or elsewhere. Islam's sociopolitical trappings vary according to the country.

[Question] Islam is not only a collection of cultural practices: it is also a plan of society, the best suited for mobilizing the masses in Senegal and in strongly Islamicized countries. It has rigid rules, on one hand, and on the other it has others that are flexible and change according to time and space. But if we understand you correctly, it is this Islamic plan of society which you question, as does the current president, who has his own definition of secularity. Yet your concerns with regard to a multidenominational society in Senegal are resolved by Islam, which is a tolerant religion by nature. In view of all that, what is your idea of secularity and do you think that institutions can be Islamicized in order to conform to the will of the people?

[Answer] I don't believe that it is necessary to Islamicize institutions. I am the first one in all of Africa to have tried to draw inspiration from religion as a philosophy of development. I wrote an economic brochure on Mouridism, being a member of that religious brotherhood and a believer in its values ... thus I am obliged to draw inspiration from religion.

The peoples who are mainly Moslem must be mobilized, but going from there to the Islamicization of institutions is a big step! And then Senegal is a multi-denominational country; there aren't only Moslems, even if they are the most numerous--we represent 95 percent, perhaps more--but I don't believe that is a reason....

I still adhere to Bamba's message, that people must be convinced through persuasion rather than imposing a religion on them from above! Setting up an Islamic state and obliging the christians, the animists and all the rest to conform isn't right, first of all, I think....

[Question] I think that you are well aware of Islam's view on this issue. Your secularity does not differ from that of the present government, which has its own concept of it.

[Answer] Listen, it's possible that I agree with or that I support the same view of secularity as the government of Abdou Diouf or of Senghor. It's also possible that my views coincide with their on other issues ... since these are things that they did not invent. All that dates back very far, to the 18th and 19th centuries.

[Question] What are the main features of your foreign policy?

[Answer] In the case of foreign policy, my government will support African nationalist policy. For us, nationalism and pan-Africanism mean belief in and priority for African values. We must first rely on our own resources, on what we have, on our people and on Africa. In our foreign policy, there are priorities, the first of which remains African unity, for which we will sacrifice everything.

We want a confederation of united African states and from today on I will strive to convince my counterparts in West Africa to bring this about. It won't be like the Malian Federation, either in form or composition.

The presidency of this federation will be filled in an alternating fashion in its initial stage and we will establish three or four joint ministries. Among others, a ministry of information, telecommunications and education.

This is the only reliable foundation that we can leave to our children. I will recommend to the OAU chairman the creation of a number of structures on the continental scale, in particular certain professional schools or certain services of a continental nature.

I will make everything subordinate to strengthening the CEAO and ECOWAS. With regard to Europe, my government will seek to reduce dependence on all countries that dominate us politically or economically.

Of course, we can be independent only by paying our debts. My government is in favor of increasing trade on a basis of respect and equality with all countries of Europe, America and elsewhere.

[Question] Do you plan to revise your policy concerning Europe?

[Answer] The government that I will establish will be a regime whose main aim in foreign affairs will be independence and control of our economy and our resources.

[Question] What will happen to bilateral relations between Dakar and Paris?

[Answer] It is essential that we stop thinking of Paris as the capital of Senegal or of Africa. Progress toward African unity requires the construction of road infrastructures and the development of telecommunications.

It is misleading to talk about African unity when you can't get in a car and travel to Bamako, Conakry or elsewhere in Africa. I urge all African chiefs of state to build roads up to the border of each of our adjacent countries and to develop trade.

[Question] What are the main axes on which your economic program will hinge?

[Answer] My government will carry out a revolution in this regard. Senegal's development has been based on industry that encourages further borrowing and, naturally, creates some jobs. Full employment for Senegalese lies in agriculture. My government will tackle the problem of finding enough water for irrigation and to enable farmers to grow crops at all times, which will make it possible to assure food self-sufficiency as well as food independence.

Only agricultural development can reduce economic dependence. We will create national industries. We will deliberately give preference to national corporations. We will take measures so that 80 percent of our capital is held in Senegal and by Senegalese.

[Question] What solution do you recommend concerning Senegal's indebtedness?

[Answer] There aren't several ways to pay off the foreign debt; it can only be paid by producing and exporting. We must develop export crops.

[Question] What would be the best strategy?

[Answer] The foreign debt must be reduced. My government will simply halt foreign borrowing. We import 400,000 tons of rice from abroad; by promoting this crop, we can reduce our rice imports by 25 to 75 percent, which will save us money. We will also have to vary our diet, which is based particularly on rice.

We will take the country's trade balance and reduce all major imports. We will terminate relations with the IMF.

PDS Press Conference: Four PDS Proposals Concerning Situation in Casamance

On 18 April at the party's headquarters in Dakar, Mr Abdoulaye Wade met with the domestic and international press. Once again the Casamance problem was brought up, this time with the proposals of the PDS, which believes it can restore peace in Casamance.

The party's proposals hinge on four points: the surrender of arms to authorities by independence advocates, total amnesty, the withdrawal of law enforcement forces and maintaining them at a normal level, and guarantees that the will of the majority will be respected in parties and on the national level.

DETENTION DEATHS; EDITORIAL POLICY DISCUSSED

Johannesburg SASH in English Feb 84 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text]

Since Dr Neil Aggett died on February 5, 1982, four others have died in detention: Ernest Dipale, Simon Tembuise Mndawa, Paris Malatje and Samuel Tshikudo.

Public outrage is minimal when little-known people die in detention and when this happens it is our duty to protest that much more vigorously.

Already there are different lists, all over the place, of those who died in detention. This would not be so if proper attention, and, may we say, proper respect, had followed each eerie and horrible detention death. We have all been remiss in that there are no published photographs or biographies of many of the 56 men who have died since the 1962 amendment to the General Laws Amendment Act.

We are grateful to the Rand Daily Mail for sending a reporter to Venda to interview the family of Samuel Tshikudo who died there in January. We hope other newspapers will in future follow this example; for as long as detention exists there will be death in detention and those who are thus martyred should never be insulted with the kind of negligence which turns them into mere statistics.

While remembering those who died in detention, let us never forget those who are currently in detention, and therefore at risk.

Towards the end of last year an American professor wrote to Sash to say that he had been worried for some time about the direction the Black Sash was taking; that he thought Solveig Piper's article 'Recession: capitalism to blame' (vol 26 no 1, May 1983) should never have been published in our magazine; true, there had been a replying article but this had only been perfunctory: surely there was an editorial board which vetted Sash articles, and would we take his name off our subscription list.

We believe the Professor's criticism would have been more valid had he stood it on its head, for we should be publishing much more of this sort of controversy.

The capitalist/socialist debate has many permutations and perhaps the greatest and most significant point of stress is between social democrat and neo marxist. It has debilitated political parties and human rights organizations all over the world and we would be a poor and half-dead lot if it didn't affect us too. But it is unlikely to debilitate us. Fortunately we don't have the time to waste trying to resolve a possibly unresolvable argument (have a look at Koestler's theory of the 'withering away of the dilemma' on page 19) and in any case we have become quite amiably expert at consensus over the years — by *not* concealing disagreements within our ranks.



We haven't got an editorial board and only the editorial has to be approved by the national committee. Most articles flow directly from Black Sash activities but there are often others which we believe will interest our readers but which by no means reflect 'Black Sash thinking'.

Recently we have encouraged debate in our columns, believing this should re-enforce our habit of consensus: and although the more thoughtful articles are obviously the most valuable, the present editor has a weakness for the odd slanging match, which she doesn't think does any harm but rather liven up the magazine.

There is, however, one issue that we do have to resolve at this year's conference from March 15—18 in Johannesburg. We shall have to define our relationship with the United Democratic Front. Helen Zille has outlined the arguments for and against affiliation in a careful article on page 21. Please read it before the conference.

Inevitably, whatever conference decides, many members will disagree. We ask of them neither silence nor acquiescence, but just the usual hard work.

CSO: 3400/978

RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES TO RESERVE, ALLOCATE LABOR ANALYZED

Johannesburg SASH in English Feb 84 pp 7-13

[Article by Marian Lacey: "Feudalism in the Age of Computers"]

[Text]

*There are no jobs here. What must we do? Our children are starving... before we could look for work for ourselves and then come back and join. We can't do this anymore since this independence thing. Some of us have been waiting now for over a year... Things are getting worse and worse... the only hope is for work on the farms, not even the mines want us now.*

(Interview: workseeker, Herschel district, October 1981)

In October 1981, when this interview was conducted, South Africa was experiencing an unprecedented, but short-lived boom, a boom which barely affected recruitment in the bantustans. If anything the position had worsened. In the space of five years recruitment had dropped by well over 850 000 registrations.

By mid 1982 a recession had set in leading to the retrenchment of tens of thousands of workers. An inestimable number found that when their contracts ended these were not renewed. Retrenchments and dismissals became the order of the day across the country and in almost all sectors.

Particular sectors hit were those employing large numbers of contract workers. A brief survey of selected headlines in 1982 gives a stark picture: Slump hits metal workers; Sats (South African Travel Services) cuts no of workers by 7 000 — thousands will lose jobs as recession takes its toll; Sats cutback on 20 000 jobs; East Rand foundry to retrench 200; Benoni plant retrenches 600 workers; Lay offs sweep East Rand industry; 2 000 affected in Anglo American coal mines; Iscor's cream souring — 10 000 workers to be slashed; 5 000 reduction in Metal industry — unions fighting lay-offs; 1 000 workers at Highveld steel; Union lashes motor plant over retrenchments — 800 Sigma men sacked; 39 workers retrenched Good-Year, Ford 507 workers in June, 1982;

Volkswagen retrench 315 workers — April 1982; 250 Leyland workers laid-off; Giant Chemical Group to retrench 500; 10 500 textile workers soon jobless; Garment workers unite; Employees sacrifice jobs to save colleagues.

Add to this, the massive crackdown on 'illegals', the continued and rising number of pass law arrests since the moratorium in 1979; and the ruthless brutality used against people said to be squatting illegally in urban areas and a picture very different from the much heralded 'liberal reform era' can be painted.

Essentially, what I hope to show in this paper, is that Riekert's proposed reforms with regard to urban blacks, which occur alongside the continued mass relocation scheme and the present tightening-up of labour recruitment and control of bantustan residents, are not contradictory, but part of a process of adapting the system of labour control to meet specific interests and changing economic, political and ideological circumstances.

Furthermore, I hope to show that the large reservoir or reserve army of labour, which has been built up in the bantustans, is and must be seen as an integral part of the workforce and not a marginal category of unemployable people beyond it. The streamlining and tightening-up of the labour allocation and recruitment system, as described in this paper, must therefore be seen as part of the State's present concern to incorporate *all* workers into a single integrated system of control.

The Riekert commission was appointed to carry out this task. As Riekert in his Report has shown in great detail and as subsequent steps taken have proved, what is required is a far more complex and coercive system of allocating and *reserving* a supply of labour to different categories of employer — defined variously by sector, industry and location.

## **THE CONTRACTION AND RELOCATION OF TRADITIONAL LABOUR POOLS**

In the past decade an urgent need to devise new labour strategies arose in response to increasing labour militancy and changed conditions for capital expansion in South Africa. This, along with both a massive cutback in recruitment from South Africa's neighbouring states and the uprootal and removal of some 3½ million Africans (SPP estimate) from so-called 'white' rural areas and towns, served to disorganise capital's traditional reserve army of labour. All sectors were equally affected by the contraction and relocation of their traditional labour pools as the following discussion makes clear.

### **a) Revised recruitment strategies in the mining sector**

The mines, in the wake of the withdrawal of 100 000 mineworkers by the Malawian government after the air-crash in 1974 and the establishment of an avowedly Marxist government in Mozambique the following year, saw

a massive reduction in their recruitment of foreign indentured workers. Recruitment of foreign workers for all sectors in 1974 dropped from a total of 763 674, of whom 231 666 and 227 619 were from Malawi and Mozambique respectively, to 301 758 in 1981, of whom only 30 602 were Malawians and 59 391 Mozambicans. The Chamber of Mines recruitment statistics for the period 1973-1979 illustrate the cutback in recruitment of foreign indentured mineworkers, and the urgent need, particularly between 1974 and 77, to replace those lost, with local workers. The number of foreign workers on the mines fell from just over 80% of the workforce in 1973 to barely 40% in 1979.

The urgency of the mines' position was realised in 1976, when, despite the substantial wage increases after 1973 and accelerated unemployment in the wake of the world-wide recession in 1974/75, the mines found they were unable to attract local workers. Only 4 000 novices presented themselves in 1974 to replace the 100 000 Malawians ordered to leave by Banda in that year, while overall recruitment suffered a shortfall of over 58 000 workers.

To break down traditional resistance of local workers to minework, state intervention was essential. This took various forms, the principal ones being: manipulation of nationality, citizenship and immigration laws so as to create an internal reserve of legally designated 'foreign' workers. As 'foreigners' they could be denied free access to certain categories of work and so be channelled into mining. In addition to this the state could also zone labour supply areas from mine recruitment only, and in so doing, build-up a reservoir of labour for the mines to draw on. Once a district was unofficially zoned in this way, categorization of workers in zoned districts became possible and overtime, wastage, associated with the training of novices, would be greatly reduced.

A variation on this method in use was through the selective distribution of requisitions. Areas where the mines recruited heavily were by-passed in the distribution of requisitions on the grounds, as one labour officer in the Transkei put it, that, 'we have to give all districts a fair chance, so as requisitions are short we leave out mining areas'. (Interview: labour officer Butterworth October 1981).

Over and above these measures, the Chamber of Mines has also tightened-up on its own recruitment practices. In a bid to stabilize the local workforce, 'bonus cards', pioneered by the Anglo American Group in the 60s, have been extended throughout the industry; all mineworkers have been brought under a highly centralized system of computerized control enabling the mines to determine the level of skill, experience and work record of every worker in its employ.

With the steady implementation of these revised strategies, Theba officials report that today they have more than a 101% compliment and more in reserve. 'Fences are being flattened' and 'gates are kept locked' to keep out the hundreds of workers clamouring for minework. (Giliomee 1982). As one senior Theba official described the position:

*Gone are the days of hectic active recruitment still seen in '76. We are building up our local reservoir of workers. They are accepting longer contracts, with shorter rest periods between.... In fact to be a mine worker in the Transkei today, you are considered a privileged person.*

(Interview: Theba official Butterworth October 1981)

There is little doubt that the destitute conditions in the bantustans, accelerated unemployment and better wages on the mines, have helped to break down earlier resistance to minework. But above all, it is argued, it is the real absence of any choice, even in boom times, which acts to secure an inexhaustible supply of labour for the mines.

#### **b) Revised recruitment strategies in the farming sector**

Not only the mines' foreign reserve army was disorganised by these events. In 1970, farmers were still recruiting 45 000 workers from outside South Africa. By 1977 this number had dropped to 16 000 and with stepped-up security in the wake of increased ANC activity, at the end of 1982 only 9 000 Mozambicans were given permission to return to work on the farms.

Within South Africa itself, the mass resettlement scheme executed over the past two decades, has resulted in the removal of an estimated 660 000 Africans from white farms, while steady expropriation of 'black-spot' and 'badly situated areas', has resulted in the relocation of a further 450 000 people from the 'white' areas. With this mass relocation of former labour and cash tenants and their families, farmers have had to shift from maintaining the largest possible labour supply on the farm to meet their variable labour requirements, to one of relying on a smaller core of permanently settled skilled workers, supplemented by extensive recruitment of casual/seasonal labour from the bantustans.

With the present oversupply of unskilled workers in the bantustans, the farmers too have an inexhaustible supply from which to draw on. If given the choice however, workseekers from the bantustans continue to resist farm work. Resistance to low wages still paid by many farmers and the fear of permanent classification in the farm worker category were suggested as reasons why some farmers still experience difficulty in securing a steady supply of seasonal workers.

But many thousands more are gradually being denied this choice. Evidence collected during extensive research in the eastern Cape and Transvaal bantustans revealed that a high correlation exists between the level of destitution in a particular area and the type, and often the absence of requisitions sent to those areas. In some instances, areas remote from either the labour bureau or town were declared unofficially 'closed' to all recruitment bar farming. The farmers have a field day in such areas. They, or their private recruiting agents, are able to move into such areas to pick up men, women and children, and are assured of their supply. A worker whose reference book was still endorsed 'farm labour only', despite the fact that he had been relocated 10 years earlier to Sada, described his position thus:

*Before some of us here always worked on farms in this area (Queenstown-Whittlesea)... then we were moved here over ten years ago. We were forced to sell our cattle and land to plough... In the first few years after the farmers were finished with us, many of us would get work for cash on the roads or the government... now not even those jobs are for us... we must just starve for the six months after they throw us back here.*

(Interview: Hewu labour office, February 1980)

Even workers relocated from the farms find themselves still tied to farm work, but immeasurably worse off. Dispossessed of land, stock and wage contributions from more than one member of the household under the former labour tenancy system, once relocated, they return to the farms as 'single' workers and become separated from their families, trapped as they are in the migrant labour system. Seasonal work lasts only from a three to six month period, so casual farm employees remain severely under-employed. Those who commute daily to farms, as an ever increasing number do, are no better off. Competition for jobs is intense in many areas so wages are low, some are even being forced to accept payment in kind for their services. As one woman who commutes daily to a tomato farm bordering the Lebowa bantustan explained:

*We women here and even our children are forced to go and pick tomatoes on the farms nearby. What can we do, there is no other work for our men and even the farmer doesn't want them. If we work on the farms we will maybe get some food and then we can sell the tomatoes that the farmer uses to pay us. Without this little bit our children will starve.*

(Interview Moketsi district, Lomondokop resettlement area April 1982)

The Farm Labour Project in their submission to the Manpower Commission reported conditions similar to this in other commuter farm areas. As found elsewhere

casual workers were being paid a derisory wage of anything from 50c to R1 a day. Men on the whole continue to resist being forced into farm work, but for women, trapped in the bantustans, who in the majority of instances have no other source of income, there is no other option but farm work.

Clearly farmers have benefitted from the creation of resettlement areas remote from towns or border industrial growth points. This, alongside the trend to zone labour supply areas for farm recruitment only, and the more recent practice of setting up assembly points run by administration board officials in mobile vans, rather than widely dispersed tribal labour bureaux, has meant that even fewer requisitions than in the past will ever reach remote bantustan districts. In time, the farmers too will be assured a steady stream of seasonal workers.

Attempts however, to secure a permanent core of fulltime wage labourers on the farms has proved far more difficult. Although desertion to the towns has all but stopped as a result of strict influx controls which prevent farm workers from moving from non-prescribed (ie rural) to prescribed urban areas, farmers complain that many thousands more eventually get to the towns by first relocating themselves to the bantustans. As early as 1964 attempts were made to solve this problem by creating a separate rural and industrial stream along a non-prescribed/prescribed divide. But as the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development made clear in 1968, it was not the solution that was at fault, but the farmers' failure to register all their employees. Opening the Agricultural show at Middleburg he stated:

*It is not only government policy that Bantu labourers may not move from the farms to the urban areas to work there, it is also clearly laid down in the relevant regulations. The greatest difficulty, however, lies in the execution of these regulations and here I fear large sections of the farming community are making their own labour positions more difficult as well as complicating our task to prevent illegal infiltration into the cities.*

He then went on to detail how the system operates in practice:

*A record of every registered Bantu farm labourer in your service is kept in a central register in Pretoria, and the position is that the labourer cannot be employed in the urban areas, because as soon as his service contract must be registered, it will be established that he is a farm labourer, and then he cannot legally be taken into service. The whole control machinery with reference to Bantu farm labourers revolves therefore around the single cog of the registration of each labourer in your service at your local Bantu Affairs Commissioners' office.*

This exact system is still in operation today, but far more efficiently run. Not only have farmers been compelled to expel all surplus workers, labour tenant and squatters thus simplifying the registration procedure, but all workers have now been brought under computerized control. So even farm workers who try to get to the towns via the bantustan escape route could find in the future that their former 'farm labour only' classification is a bar to other work. Far more research in this area will have to be done to establish this trend with any certainty, but as far as fulltime farm workers are concerned, it is suggested that with their numbers rapidly shrinking attempts will be made to 'Riekertize' their position in a bid to stabilize a permanently settled core of more skilled farm workers needed on highly mechanized and agribusiness farms.

**c) Revised recruitment strategies in the manufacturing sector**

Revisions in the labour system have also been demanded by the manufacturing sector — especially its most capital intensive multi-national component with its growing demand for a skilled and stabilized workforce.

This, combined with growing worker militancy and popular struggles against the degraded living and working conditions of urban workers, necessitated a revised strategy towards Africans who qualify for permanent residence rights.

The revised strategy, embodied in Riekert's proposals, aimed firstly to reduce rigidities in the labour supply by allowing section 10 rights to be exercised throughout urban areas *as long as* employment and housing are available and secondly to move away from a system based on race and control via the police, blackjacks and prosecution of pass offenders, to one based on citizenship and control by employers and registered house owners/tenants. An extension of these controls will be the continued deprivation of citizenship via 'independence' of the bantustans; and critical to these moves is the need to bring *all* workers under computerized control. Hence the crackdown on 'illegals' through the 1979 moratorium which put the onus on employers to 'register' workers as section 10d workers on contract under threat of a R500 fine.

Similarly the Crossroads 'concessions' brought people under control since they had to register to claim entitlement to jobs and housing. Nyanga shows the other side of the coin, as immigration laws were invoked to expel those who were said to be 'foreigners' from the 'independent' bantustan in the Transkei.

Further, the use of housing as an instrument of control has been refined by the decision to make house-ownership under 99-year leasehold a condition of urban security. Proof of approved accommodation is thus being



*selectively* used in various ways: first to shunt the poor and the economically inactive (in state parlance the 'superfluous appendages') out of the urban areas; second as a means to further reduce social costs by shifting the cost of reproducing labour-power away from the wage packet to workers and their families living in the bantustans. Third, to further reduce the number qualifying for section 10 rights by transforming as many people as possible into 'frontier commuters'; and last, by encouraging house-ownership. Not only is the state trying to foster the growth of a stable 'middle class', but a docile working class as well. In the case of the latter, once in occupation of houses built, subsidized or financed by loans by their employers, their dismissal could mean eviction and then endorsement out of town. The government's current programme to sell off 500 000 housing units, will win much sought-after security for the more affluent urban resident, but for the homeless and poor the consequences will be disastrous.

These proposed reforms are to be extended to a mere 5 300 000 urban Africans who qualify for section 10 rights and who can afford to maintain them. Equally important, they must be seen as being inextricably linked to measures geared to ensure the efficient exploitation and control of bantustan dwellers who have been denied even these few concessions. Urban gains are thus at the expense of the majority of Africans condemned to live in destitute bantustans.

### **The manipulation of citizenship and immigration laws as an instrument for allocating and reserving labour**

By December 1981, with the granting of 'independence' to the Ciskei bantustan, all Xhosa-Tswana and Venda-speaking people had been deprived of their South African citizenship. In the space of five years, eight million South African were declared legal 'foreigners' — aliens in the country of their birth.

The numbers game has undoubted political and ideological advantages for the white minority in South Africa, whose fear of black majority rule is legion. This deprivation of millions of South Africans of their citizenship must also be seen as a 'non-negotiable' aspect of South Africa's present policy which aims to create an ethnically based political partition of South Africa along either federal or confederal lines. (H Zille, Sars, 1982). Connie Mulders' classic formulation in 1978 spells out the ultimate fate of all Africans in South Africa. In this he stated: 'If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as black people are concerned there will be not one black man with South African citizenship... Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation in this Parliament to accommodate these people politically.' (quoted in Zille *ibid.*)

But what of the State's economic and social obligations? How does the loss of citizenship and the manipulation of immigration laws have any bearing on the revised system of labour reservation and allocation?

Winterveld may be characterised as a squatter/commuter camp housing more than half a million 'internal refugees' of the apartheid system. Sited within the 'independent' Bophuthatswana border these refugees have been deprived of their South African citizenship. But the majority living there are non-Tswanas who have rejected that bantustan's 'citizenship'. This renders them 'stateless' in the legal non-sense.

Their removal to their putative ethnically appropriate bantustan has been stalled, as most families living there have one person or more in their household working and commuting daily to the PWV and surrounding areas. Between the South African state and the Bophuthatswana bantustan administration a conflictual, but still happy marriage of convenience has been consummated. In this, neither partner will take responsibility for the health, welfare, education or housing of the Winterveld refugees spawned by the system. While both sides drag their feet millions of rand are being saved the taxpayer. But the real and immediate beneficiaries of this partnership are the profit-minded capitalists who at present reap enormous benefits from having a highly vulnerable and docile reservoir of commuter labour to draw from — without the social costs involved in reproducing labour power.

The mushrooming of similar squatter camps on the borders of all bantustans within commuting distance of towns and growth points is significant in another way: it proves the success of influx control via the bantustan 'independence' policy. In the long term, these vast squatter slums could become potential hotbeds for political violence. But segregated far out of sight and mind of whites in South Africa, they can be effectively and easily policed and controlled. Ironically, even apartheid's most virulent critics ignore the plight of these 'internal refugees' — because they happen to be living in an 'independent' bantustan which the international community refuses to recognise.

As declared 'foreigners' they are subject to new controls. Entry into 'white' South Africa of 'foreigners' will be more strictly policed. Freedom of 'foreign' workers to choose jobs or mines on which they wish to work can be severely restricted. As 'foreign' workers they can be forced to accept jobs shunned by local workers — these are usually the lowest paid menial tasks for which safety and health conditions are poor and often dangerous; where hours, especially in the case of shift work, are not congenial for men settled with their families in the towns. Similarly, industries such as agriculture, clothing, textiles, building etc, highly vulnerable to cyclical and seasonal demands, will benefit from this system.

They will be able to recruit workers as 'foreigners', then hire and fire them at will.

A policy of assimilation or integration would destroy this mobility — ie the workers' re-exportability and dispensability. To sum up then, the ruthlessness with which workers from the Transkei were deported from the Nyanga bush site in Cape Town; the abrogation of financial responsibility towards squatters living within bantustan borders; the massive reductions of the migratory labour force during the present economic down-swing and the crackdown and expulsion of 'illegals', is proof that the influx control system, refined via the logic of bantustan 'independence', functions as it is meant to.

As the remaining 'self-governing' bantustans are forced to take 'independence', so the state's capacity to control and police the entry and repatriation of migrants will become easier. In the meantime, the state has resorted to other mechanisms of controlling and allocating labour to which we now turn.

#### **Job categorization and the zoning of labour supply areas**

In the pre-Riekert era, it was the workseeker from the bantustan who had a far wider choice of jobs than the urban dweller. The latter was tied to jobs within the administration board area in which he resided. Employers moreover were encouraged to recruit widely for their additional labour needs.

This position is now being reversed. Today, with the greater mobility of urban workers, combined with the enforced local labour preference policy and the zoning of labour supply areas, the numbers of workers recruited from the bantustans is being massively reduced. In addition the category of jobs open to bantustan workers is being steadily narrowed.

As a direct consequence of these strategies, the urban unemployed countrywide have become the principal source of industries reserve army. Hence the massive cutback in bantustan recruitment. Once the computers in the 14 Administration Board areas are aligned to one another, greater mobility of this urban reservoir will be effected. The local labour preference option will operate more efficiently, and the number of bantustan requisitions for urban employment can be expected to drop even more dramatically.

To enforce the local labour preference policy, the power of ABs to decide who, and for whom a workseeker may or may not work has been greatly enhanced. This, together with the high unemployment and deepening recession have made it easier for ABs to push through their plans to restructure the workforce along an urban/bantustan divide.

Their first step in this process, was to crackdown on 'illegals' through the moratorium in 1979. This brought all unregistered workers under computerized control.

Once this was achieved, the ABs moved to close certain jobs to contract workers. Local workers in turn were coerced into taking jobs normally shunned by them, by the soaring costs of basic necessities, transport and services — just as Riekert in his report predicted would happen.

On top of this, the housing shortage is being used as one of the chief instruments of control to enforce the local labour preference policy. ABs, on the grounds that no 'suitable' accommodation is available, have instructed employers to recruit locally. As a result, some workers recruited annually under the automatically renewable call-in-card system have reported that their contracts have been cancelled. This accounts for some of the cutbacks in bantustan recruitment.

The key to efficient computerized control of all workers is their registration. The R500 imposed on employers of 'illegals' has undoubtedly curbed the practice of engaging unregistered workers. As a consequence more and more workers are being forced back to the bantustans where they have to wait to be officially recruited, attested and computerized.

This crackdown on 'illegals' and the containment of workseekers within the bantustan boundaries has, moreover, opened the way for a far more efficient system of zoning labour supply areas. Workers in the remote bantustan areas are being shored-up to be channelled into the mining and farming sectors.

A more recent and sophisticated trend in zoning labour supply areas is emerging however. This appears to be based on the strategy that ethnicity will eventually become a fundamental organising principle in the canalisation of labour. Such a trend is well illustrated in the emerging pattern of recruitment by the Drakensburg and Port Natal ABs over a three-year period.

As the table below shows, there has been a steady cut-back of workers from beyond Natal.

Seen in a political context, this rezoning of labour supply areas along ethnic lines fits in well with Prof Lombard's belief, that the successful launching of a federal scheme will depend on the state's ability to regulate the demographic distribution of its workers. He argues, that labour must be allocated in a way that would 'keep the descendants of the different major African chiefdoms living in and around their original areas of settlement.' (Zille, Sars, 1982)

Moreover, as the regional decentralization programme, foreshadowed in both the Carlton and Cape of Good Hope Conferences, is elaborated to coincide with the political decentralization of metropolitan areas, so the trend to channel labour within zoned AB areas could be extended further.

The zoning of labour supply areas was however first used to stabilise the labour supply in border areas. The relocation of entire urban communities to dormitory towns within bantustan borders was one of the main mechanisms used to reduce the number of people qualifying for section 10 rights. The scale of such relocation can be seen from the rapid growth of bantustan towns and the concomitant increase in the number of 'frontier commuters'. According to Smit and Booysen, there were only three towns within the bantustan borders in 1960. These had a total population of 33 468. By 1970 this number had grown to 594 420. Eight years later in 1978, the population had more than doubled reaching an estimated 1,5 million people.

Alongside the growth of these towns the number of people commuting daily to work also grew phenomenally. Mastouroudes, in his report commissioned for Unit for Futures Research, estimated that in 1981 almost 740 000 people commuted daily to work. Assuming all these commuters were in registered employment it would mean that out of a total of 1 161 494 jobs registered in 1981, less than half, viz 420 794 were for non-commuter labour. In both the Ciskei and KaNgwane there were proportionately a far higher number of commuters than migrant workers — 37 100 commuters and only 9 288 registrations for Ciskeians countrywide. In KaNgwane more than half the number of registered workers were commuters, while KwaZulu was able to boast a commuter population of 400 600 out of a total of 492 131 recruited (from an analysis of figures supplied by Sheena Duncan: HAD May 1983).

<b>Drakensburg</b>	<b>1979</b>	<b>1980</b>	<b>1981</b>	<b>Port Natal</b>	<b>1979</b>	<b>1980</b>	<b>1981</b>
Lebowa .....				712	766	18	
Gazankulu .....				642	625	41	
Qwa Qwa .....	1 168	283	503	2 518	2 904	113	
Ka Ngwane .....	703	366	302	1 020	1 144	96	
Kwa Zulu .....	172 154	225 372	255 120	282 220	303 297	348 285	
Kwa Ndebele .....	419	114	165	68	47	16	
Venda .....	34	18	79	24	20	8	
Bophuthatswana .....	24	388	501	84	59	12	
Ciskei .....	379	1 752	1 526	573	460	16	
Transkei .....	14 310	20 026	25 807	47 980	34 358	21 731	
	189 191	248 319	284 003	335 841	348 680	368 336	

When dormitory towns were first created to serve border industrial growth points, workers relocated were guaranteed a preferential access to jobs in the towns from which they were removed. This guarantee has back-fired. Today, with the more sophisticated and systematic zoning system, these same workers are immobilized as trapped pools of labour to serve the needs of employers zoned in their area. The example of Itsoseng illustrates the fate of these workers.

Itsoseng was established as a commuter area for towns in the western Transvaal. It lies 40km west of Lichtenburg on the main Mafikeng road. Population estimates vary between 30 and 50 thousand and unemployment stands at over 50 per cent. Competition for jobs is intense, and wages, traditionally low in platteland towns, are depressed even further. As Itsoseng is zoned to supply labour to towns and farms which fall within the western Transvaal ABs area only, workseekers are tied to jobs in these towns. There is no escape as requisitions for other areas are not distributed in Itsoseng. Employers in turn stand to reap enormous benefits, to say nothing of profits, from having an inexhaustible, but stabilized reservoir of labour to draw from. The creation of these zoned pools is being duplicated throughout the country.

**To sum up then.** In the post-Riekert era, a far more complex and coercive system of allocating and reserving a supply of labour has been devised. This has ensured a steady supply of low-cost labour to different categories of employer — defined variously by sector, industry and location. In devising various strategies, the state's priority has been to incorporate all workers into a single computerized system of labour allocation and control.

What the above analysis has shown is, that, despite the declarations made by apartheid apologists that South Africa has entered into a new era of 'liberal reforms', there is little doubt that workers from the bantustans and the associated reserve army, are being far more effectively manipulated and controlled. So much so, that it can be argued instead, that South African racial capitalism can still be characterized as a forced labour system — a new 'feudalism' in the age of the computer.

SASH SEEN FACING MOUNTING PRESSURES, CHALLENGES

Johannesburg SASH in English Feb 84 pp 18-19

[Article by Jill Wentzel: "Avoiding Intellectual Fascism--The Dream of Orwell and His Contemporaries"]

[Text]

**A**s we prepare for our 1984 National Conference in Johannesburg on March 15 facing the same issues which worried George Orwell and his contemporaries, we might in many ways be guided by them. Some of us might be heartily sick of *Animal Farm* and 1984, for allegory can be tedious, once it has made its point. We should now look at the rest of Orwell's most delightful writing, and the works of men like Kafka, Thomas Mann, Huxley, Malraux, Koestler, Camus.

Their warnings, their misery and their tentative hope for humanity were spawned by circumstances similar to ours and we as a human rights organization can learn perhaps some wisdom from this intensely humanist generation of authors. Writing in the aftermath of the Russian revolution they saw human freedom diminished and threatened on two fronts: by the post revolutionary terror in Russia and by the menace of fascism in Spain, Italy and Germany. Similarly, while living with the Orwellian controls of the Nationalist Government, particularly in relation to labour manipulation (see Marian Lacey's article on page 7) we are already, on the other hand, bombarded by the liberatory language of *Animal Farm*.

Especially relevant to us, now, as we find ourselves in the midst of the capitalist/socialist debate in all its permutations, and as we face the problem of having to define our relationship with the United Democratic Front and the rest of the liberatory movement, is Camus' *The Rebel* and Koestler's essay, *The Right to say No*.

Camus in *The Rebel* expounds the contradiction at the core of our work, the point at which we feel restless about simple protest, somehow static and isolated and incomplete unless we move towards a closer association with the liberatory movement.

Camus explains that within our NO to injustice is a YES to a better order of things. The authoritarian danger lurks in the YES. Within the highly individualistic act of rebellion against an unjust order is contained a conforming affirmation of an alternative and perfect scheme of things, carrying with it the desire to subject, and compel others to subject, all individuality to the needs of the new order.\*

We cannot avoid this dilemma, for it is a schizophrenic contradiction at the core of our work and our thinking, but by recognizing it we can with rationality control the excesses to which it might otherwise lead us. The solu-

tion, Camus believes, is consciously to chose *rebellion*, which he connects with outrage, protest and a limitation of objective in order to keep in touch with reality, moderation and ordinary life, and shun *revolution*, which he connects with romanticism, utopianism and ultimately the feeling that one is justified in killing some and forcing the rest into an ideological framework for their own future good.

Camus' injunction, his theory of limitation, is to settle for imperfection and limited objectives and not to lose touch with ordinary people. The Black Sash is well placed to do this, for our work in the advice offices and among rural communities is grounded in individual suffering and anxiety. Also, because the Black Sash, as well as the UDF, manages to accommodate people with different political ideas, it may be said that a significant number of people seek to avoid the pitfalls of blind ideology.

There is another sense in which progressive organizations in South Africa practice the discipline of limitation — and that is by means of an almost fanatical insistence on internal democracy, especially within their educational programmes. (And one might argue that Samora Machel has done the same thing by seeking some kind of accommodation with South Africa for the sake of the economic well-being of his people).

***To the totalitarian threat and its fanatical creed we oppose an absolute and unconditional No. But our Yes to the civilisation which we are defending leaves full scope for nuances, divergent opinions, social theories and experiment.***

***Koestler, The Right to Say No.***

---

\*The Freedom Charter represents this yearning for affirmation, and criticism of 'bourgeois individuality' the yearning for conformity.



The great question is, can this sober discipline survive the pressures already generated by our society? The Black Sash will be increasingly subjected to these pressures. We are used to confronting white South Africa with the effects of apartheid. Can we confront liberatory South Africa, including the much fiercer overseas liberatory movement, with the possible effects of its ideology on ordinary people? Are we prepared to examine critically the effects of sanctions and boycott in all its forms? Are those leaders who over-use 'the oppressed masses' running the risk of turning people into proles? Do ordinary people really believe their best interests are served by boycotting elections? Do they properly discuss the al-

ternatives or are they increasingly afraid to do so? Does the Freedom Charter express the will of the people or seek to entrap the will of the people (so that one day they will be told, 'this is your will, now you've got it and it must be consolidated within a one-party state, so no more of the kind of elections that will allow you to change your mind')? If we don't know the answers, or if we think we do know some of the answers, will we insist on the discipline of continuously reassessing strategies? Or will we, through romanticism on the part of some members and fear of opprobrium on the part of others, fail to do so?

*Far from being a form of romanticism, rebellion on the contrary, takes the part of true realism. If it wants a revolution, it wants it on behalf of life and not in defiance of it. That is why it relies primarily on the most concrete realities — on occupation, on the country village, where the living heart of things and of men are to be found. Politics, to satisfy the demands of rebellion, must submit to the eternal verities. Finally, when it causes history to advance and alleviates the sufferings of mankind, it does so without terror, if not without violence, and in the most dissimilar political conditions.*

*Camus, The Rebel*

Are we prepared to acknowledge the integrity of men like Alan Paton, Dennis Beckett and John Kane-Berman together with many of our leader-writers and journalists who, like the Orwellian writers, are prepared to face the opprobrium of orthodox leftist opinion by acknowledging limitation and reality, and who are not afraid to explore the unspectacular, imperfect yet possibly significant advantages of piecemeal reform? Or would we prefer to keep such people at arms length?

Camus wrote, 'The logic of the rebel is to want to serve justice so as not to add to the injustice of the

***If the limit discovered by rebellion transfigures everything; if every thought, every action which goes beyond a certain point negates itself, there is in effect a measure by which to judge events and men.***

***Camus, The Rebel***

human condition, to insist on plain language so as not to increase the universal falsehood, and to wager, in spite of human misery, for happiness.' Are we in the Black Sash, sitting on platforms at mass meetings, going to insist on plain language so as not to increase the universal falsehood?

The Black Sash cannot ignore the economic debate in all its forms, from capitalist/socialist through to socialist/marxist. It might be, as Koestler claimed, anachronistic, but it is nevertheless still alive in the conflict between west and east and the third world, and within the western world of Thatcher, Reagan and Tony Benn. The significant point of stress seems to be between social democrat and neo-marxist, which is most vividly played out in the British labour party and which debilitates political parties, civil rights and protest organizations all over the world. Within the Black Sash we might guard against getting bogged down by it, remembering Koestler's theory of the withering away of the dilemma:

*'It is a further fact that some of these great ideological conflicts are never decided; they end in a stalemate. In successive centuries it looked as if the whole world would either become Islamic or Christian, either Catholic or Protestant, either republican or monarchist, either capitalist or socialist. But instead of a decision there came a deadlock and a process which one might call the withering away of the dilemma. The withering or draining of meaning always seems to be the result of some mutation in human consciousness accompanied by a shift of emphasis to an entirely different set of values — from religious consciousness to national consciousness to economic consciousness and so on.'*

In the meantime, the great question is, can both sides reacting on each other mutate creatively? That this is possible, and that the results will be vastly important for mankind, was the great prophetic hope of the Orwellian writers. This is what Koestler was talking about when he wrote:

*'The real content of this conflict can be summed up in one phrase: total tyranny against relative freedom. Sometimes I have a feeling in my bones that the terrible pressure which this conflict exerts on all humanity might perhaps represent a challenge, a biological stimulus as it were, which will release the new mutation of human consciousness; and that its content might be a new spiritual awareness, born of anguish and suffering. If that is the case, then we are indeed living in an interesting time.'*

And Camus had the same dream:

*'Then, when revolution in the name of power and of history becomes that immoderate and mechanical murderer, a new rebellion is consecrated in the name of moderation and of life. We are at the extremity now. However, at the end of this tunnel of darkness, there is inevitably a light, which we already divine and for which we only have to fight to ensure its coming. All of us, among the ruins, are preparing a renaissance beyond the limits of nihilism. But few of us know it.'*

If the Black Sash can hold on to its consensus during the coming conference and the challenges of the next few years we might find by muddling through somehow we might have made some contribution, and maybe even a unique one, to that light at the end of the tunnel.

*Authentic acts of rebellion will only consent to take up arms for institutions which limit violence, not for those which codify it. A revolution is not worth dying for unless it assures the immediate suppression of the death penalty...*

*Camus, The Rebel*

●  
This is an individual article. It does not represent Black Sash thinking.

CSO: 3400/978

BLACK SASH AFFILIATION WITH UDF MOOTED

Johannesburg SASH in English Feb 84 pp 21-24

[Article by Helen Zille: "UDF--Affiliate or Cooperate?"]

[Text]

**S**hould the Black Sash affiliate to the UDF? This is one of the 'cutting-edge' issues in the Sash at present — and has been for the best part of eight months.

This is not particularly remarkable. Much the same debate has taken place within several other organisations opposed to the government's attempted restructuring of apartheid through the new constitution and 'Koornhof Bills'.

And they have reached widely divergent conclusions. Some believe it is time to pool their strength and resources with other groups under the umbrella of the broadest anti-apartheid front since the nationalists came to power. Others believe their effectiveness lies in their independence, without which they cannot fulfill their organisational objectives.

Within the Sash, the 'UDF debate' has been particularly long and intense. It has sparked off deep feeling on both sides in what has become one of the most controversial issues in the Sash's history.

This article is an attempt to draw out the arguments on both sides, to air and circulate the issues before the national conference in March when a decision is likely to be made. (According to the Sash constitution a two-thirds majority is needed for the Sash to affiliate to the UDF.)

No doubt by that time fresh arguments and considerations will have arisen and new compromises forged. Indeed, it is the purpose of this article to stimulate further debate, as the lengthy, healthy and sometimes painful process of internal democracy runs its course.

## Arguments for affiliation

Many Sash members are strong proponents of affiliation. The Natal Coastal region has already made the move — with the majority support of its regional members.

Many supporters of affiliation make the following points:

South Africa has reached a political watershed. Over the past decade, the National Party, sensing an impending political crisis on all fronts, devised a sophisticated plan to restructure apartheid, drawing in coloureds and Indians as its junior partners while entrenching the political exclusion of Africans.

At the same time, through the three Koornhof Bills, it is attempting to divide a relatively privileged group of African urban 'insiders' from the majority in the homelands who will face tightened influx control and increasing unemployment.

This political strategy demands an effective and organised counter strategy. Indeed, it has made such an organisation a pressing necessity — now, while the government is still trying to win legitimacy for its plans and implement them bit by bit. Individuals are isolated, vulnerable and incapable of effective opposition on their own, and so are organisations. Unless a unified front can mobilise its forces and pool its resources to oppose the implementation of restructured apartheid, the government will have a clear run, assisted by isolated and divided opposition groupings each doing its own thing.

The Sash has a unique opportunity to become part of a non-racial opposition movement that could influence the government's attempts at restructuring apartheid, simultaneously symbolising the alternative to apartheid: a process of non-racial, democratic co-operation and decision-making.

Indeed, this would be a logical step for the Sash to take, having played a pivotal role in analysing the shift from traditional to neo-apartheid, exposing the myths of reform, teasing out the real intentions of constitutional change and the Koornhof Bills.

Nor need the Sash sacrifice its autonomy and internal democracy. It is part of the very nature of the Front that affiliated organisations retain their own identity, policy and objectives — while co-operating on a limited number of issues of mutual concern. If this were not the case, the Front would collapse within a very short time because many organisations besides Sash would not tolerate interference in their internal affairs.

Mindful of the dynamics within its affiliate organisations, the UDF attempts to take decisions by consensus — and if consensus cannot be reached the issue is referred again to the individual organisations for discussion. This is what happened at the recent National General Council where the UDF failed to reach consensus on whether to participate in a possible referendum to test

'coloured' and 'Indian' opinion of the new constitution.

Of course, absolute unanimity may be unattainable, and there are times when decisions must be taken on common objectives. It is also conceivable that the Sash may not concur with the position adopted. But the very nature of democracy means abiding by a majority decision.

Nor is it valid to argue that the UDF has no specific constitutional and economic policy. As a Front, it shouldn't have. It consists in a number of different organisations with a range of policies, supporting a shared set of principles embodied in the UDF declaration. Yet it is inevitable that economic and constitutional issues will be discussed by the UDF in pursuing common objectives. If the Sash wishes to make an input into the development and growth of the non-racial opposition movement, it can best do so from within. Moreover, affiliation would bring to a wider circle of Sash members a heightened awareness of (and participation in) the ongoing debate on economic and constitutional issues beyond the confined circle of white, middle-class women. This is an essential complement to the Sash's service role — particularly as the initiative of political opposition is increasingly centred in the organisations of the oppressed.

Finally, at a time when many young people have left the country, seeing armed struggle as the only remaining option for change in South Africa, it is remarkable that so broad an organisation could be launched committed to peaceful, non-racial methods of working for political transformation. As the Sash's primary objective is the non-violent struggle against apartheid, its logical place is in the UDF.

### **Arguments against affiliation**

Many Sash members have indicated their opposition to affiliation — for a wide variety of reasons. They do not all necessarily subscribe to every reason listed below. But they all believe that the disadvantages of affiliation will outweigh the advantages.

The arguments run as follows:

The Black Sash's effectiveness is rooted in its independence. It has jealously guarded this independence since its inception, refusing to become tied to any political organisation or movement. This has given the Sash the freedom to co-operate with any political grouping on specific projects; to criticise their decisions and actions when necessary; and to serve as an independent catalyst for people of differing political views. Most significantly it has given Sash a high level of credibility in performing its essential service functions through its advice offices and its analysis of legislation and political trends.

During the past years this independence has become all the more important due to the deepening differences between Black opposition movements. The Sash would

jeopardise its role and its credibility if it sided with one of them — particularly as some (such as Inkatha) are excluded from affiliation even though they also oppose the constitution and Koornhof Bills. Such exclusivism prevents the UDF from being a genuine Front of organisations with differing policies and strategies. It indicates that the UDF is not primarily concerned with promoting unity around common principles, but of laying down the line on the goals and tactics of different organisations.

Nor has it been necessary to affiliate to the UDF to support particular campaigns and objectives. During the referendum the Sash played a leading role in the 'No' vote campaign — as did Nusas, a prominent affiliate of the UDF, to the mutual benefit of both organisations. However, had the UDF advocated abstention (as initially seemed likely) the Sash, following its own internal democratic decision, would have found itself advocating a different strategy. Had it been a UDF affiliate, severe problems would have arisen.

It is entirely probable that similar situations could arise in the future. The UDF has its own internal structures and office bearers through which decisions are taken, implemented and announced via the Press. This process may well take place democratically — but this cannot prevent a contradiction arising between the internal democracy of Sash and that of the UDF. If Sash were to affiliate, it could easily find itself unable to identify with a UDF decision or statement. This would give rise to an untenable position: either Sash would have to publicly dissociate itself, to the severe detriment of both organisations, or remain silent, risking the loss of a substantial number of members. While Sash, as a small organisation, could not hope to influence the decision-making process in the UDF it would run the risk of impairing its own internal democracy.

Another problem concerning the UDF is its lack of a clearly defined constitutional and economic policy (beyond its widely worded declaration.) Inevitably in the course of time, UDF congresses will adopt more detailed resolutions on these issues. As a UDF affiliate, the Sash would automatically be associated with these decisions and statements, whether or not it supported them or had any part in their formulation. To rush into a political organisation without a clearly defined constitutional and economic policy would be as naive as signing a contract without reading it.

It is no secret that many of the UDF's leading affiliates subscribe to the Freedom Charter, giving the organisation strong Charterist leanings. This has unavoidably resulted in symbolic associations with the African National Congress. It also gives the movement a socialist flavour, as the Charter advocates the nationalisation of certain industries and banks as well as the transfer of agricultural land to public ownership. This identification by association could cause internal problems for Sash — particularly amongst its liberal members who would resist such implications.

In short, by affiliating to the UDF, Sash would run the severe risk of undermining its own membership base, independence and credibility. As a crippled organisation, it could add little to the strength of the UDF.

### **The compromise position**

A compromise position is rapidly developing on both sides of the debate. There are proponents of affiliation who baulk at the possibility of splitting Sash or evoking mass resignations. They are working for a compromise that would involve endorsing the UDF's declaration of principles, and pledging co-operation in fighting the constitution and Koornhof Bills — but stopping short of affiliation.

On the other side there are opponents of affiliation who don't want to place themselves in opposition to the UDF. They believe a straight YES/NO answer on affiliation would have the same implications as the 'Do-you-still-beat-your-wife' question. They also favour a compromise that would involve endorsing the UDF declaration and pledging co-operation, while maintaining Sash's independence.

Then there are those who don't fall into either camp. They are genuinely convinced by certain arguments on both sides and believe that only time can provide the right answer. This group also favours a compromise for the present.

Sure, it's an attempt at having your cake and eating it. But then, as someone put it: 'Who would want to have a cake and not eat it?'

### **What is the United Democratic Front?**

It is a Front of some 400 widely divergent organisations (ranging from trade unions and community organisations to sports clubs) that have come together in a common commitment to resist the implementation of the new constitution and the 'Koornhof Bills.'

The most notorious of these Bills is the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Person's Bill, currently undergoing revision, that seeks to intensify influx control.

According to Mr Popo Molefe, national secretary of the UDF, there are two conditions for an organisation to affiliate to the Front.

It must:

- \* Support the UDF declaration
- \* Work outside government created structures



**The UDF declaration:**

This is a widely-worded document consisting primarily of a rejection of apartheid in its traditional and restructured forms. It commits the UDF to work towards unity in opposing restructured apartheid, particularly as it is manifest in the constitution and Koornhof Bills. The declaration sets as its goal a 'united, democratic South Africa based on the will of the people' and an end to 'economic and other forms of exploitation.'

The UDF has not formulated a detailed constitutional and economic policy.

**Working outside government-created structures:**

The phrase 'Government-created structures' refers to homeland governments, community councils, Parliament etc. UDF officials have described this condition as 'flexible.' It is not a hard and fast rule that would be used to exclude, for example, community leaders in rural areas who had traditionally used official structures, such as village councils, to resist forced removals.

'Our criteria are that an organisation must not, in its use of platforms and structures, become part of the oppressive system,' said Mr Molefe. Each case, he said, would have to be evaluated on its merits.

However it seems clear that the UDF will not accept participation in homeland governments or in central government structures created under the new constitution.

**The structure of the UDF**

The UDF has a decentralised federal structure with five established Regions: Transvaal, Natal, Border, Western and Eastern Cape. Plans are also afoot to establish regional structures in the Northern Cape and Orange Free State.

Affiliation to the UDF is open to organisations only. Individuals who wish to join can only do so by becoming involved in 'area committees,' which, together with organisations, are represented on a Regional General Council.

All regions are linked by a National General Council consisting of representatives from different regional organisations. Area Committees are not represented on the NGC, giving organisations a significantly stronger role in the highest decision-making structures.

It is also the stated intention of the UDF to give greater weight to larger affiliated organisations, known as 'main-line' organisations. However a formula to give effect to this decision is still to be finalised.

A national conference will be held every two years at which executive members will be elected. The first national conference co-incided with the official launching of the UDF on August 20, 1983.

**Would the Black Sash be welcome in the UDF?**

There has been some debate within the UDF, particularly in the Western Cape, over whether the Sash, 'a middle-class organisation of white women' should be accepted as an affiliate. However it appears likely that a majority of regions would support Sash's affiliation.

Said Mr Molefe: The history of the Black Sash shows that it is an organisation that has played a significant role in the struggle against injustice in South Africa. It has been shown to have a very profound insight into legislation affecting black people, and has demonstrated a strong commitment in defending the victims of these laws. The Black Sash has also played a significant role in squatter and relocation issues. We regard the Black Sash as one of the most informed organisations and it has won itself a place in the hearts and minds of the majority of South Africans opposed to injustice.'

Mr Molefe was well aware of the present debate within Sash on affiliation to the UDF.

He said the UDF had been formed as a wide Front to oppose the constitution and Koornhof Bills as effectively as possible. 'Of course we would like organisations to affiliate to strengthen this objective. But we understand that different organisations have different internal dynamics and that for this reason they may not see their way clear to affiliating at this stage.'

Affiliation, he said, was not a pre-requisite for participation in UDF campaigns. 'While affiliation would be an advantage, the UDF does not regard it as a priority. Our major priority is co-operation with various organisations in our campaigns.'

CSO: 3400/978

## SIGNIFICANCE OF NKOMATI ACCORD DISCUSSED

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Apr 84 p 11

[Text]

**S**HOTGUN or not, and no matter how unequal the contracting parties, it is unequivocally in the interests of all in Southern Africa that none of its states be prey to bands of marauding saboteurs. Nkomati is good.

However, this apparently platitudinous observation is less representative of South African opinion than a reading of the media would suggest.

The Accord, we are told, is a great political triumph for Mr P.W. Botha. In the broad view, yes. And perhaps also in the judgement of the history books, even though more detached analyses are likely to view the way the Accord was achieved more harshly than is common here and now. The principle that clandestinely destabilising a puny neighbour into despair will make him come forth with the olive branch may be tactically excellent, but it does not promote ideal international relationships.

But it is worth noting that in hard electoral terms Nkomati does not hold out roses all the way for Mr Botha. In his own party, as well as among the Conservatives who also officially supported the Accord, let alone the HNP which did not, there are rumblings. All three parties contain people who quite seriously see "communists" as irredeemably villainous and as virtually a separate species from the human race, with whom no dealings other than outright combat can be entertained. Some senior Nationalist office-bearers have evidently been taken aback by the extent of grassroots disaffection.

Confident after having run into less of this than they expected over the constitution, here they anticipated hardly any and have encountered much. One possible explanation of this is that white South Africa's level of private gut racism is not as high as the public structure suggests, whereas the assiduously inculcated anti-communist hysteria of many years has sunk in deeper than some of its architects thought.

This disaffection has hardly been exposed to the light of day, but this may say more about the attitude of the media towards recognising a groundswell opinion which none of its members have an interest in promoting than about the significance of the groundswell itself.

Then there is the reaction of many blacks. It is rare to hear black people speak in favour of the agreement, and even then it is usually in a tone of regret. Machel had to do it, they'll say sorrowfully, because Mozambique was being beaten into a pulp.

Far more common is the attitude that this is a betrayal of the liberation movements. As Azapo has put it: "We admit that Mozambique had big problems with destabilisation, but the liberation of the sub-continent is a major priority which should not be jeopardised." This line finds a firm echo in the attitudes of the ordinary black people in the street, and any white South African who cares to inquire as to those attitudes is likely to be taken aback by the extent to which the euphoria in verligte/opposition circles

is matched by upset in black ones.

Which raises questions. First; how realistic is this upset?

Very little. The "liberation movements" may provide psychological solace to blacks, but stand no chance of actually achieving their aims for a very long time to come. White respect for a viable, successful, Mozambique will do more to facilitate liberation here than any amount of ANC forays. Angry blacks need to draw a distinction between what serves the interests of the liberation movements as such and the more modest processes which serve the cause of real liberation.

Second; if blacks reject a development which moderate whites take as self-evidently beneficial, are they being simply bloody-minded?

Not at all. It is natural that blacks should pin their faith on the hope of a sudden transformation. The white people

who see this as despicable treason would do the same in the same circumstances.

To SA blacks Frelimo meant a neighbour committed to the principle of undiluted black citizenship. Children were named after Machel. A rally to welcome his accession precipitated the arrest and lengthy imprisonment of several people. Now those people see their erstwhile hero signing treaties with the government which took such offence at their supporting him; a government from which they are as far excluded as ever. The disappointment is understandable. It should not be misread by whites as grounds for abandoning hope of rapport. The prospects of achieving effective rapport are fine, once we surmount our fixation with the idea of our security depending on denying democracy. ●

CSO: 3400/978

REALISTIC VIEW OF BOPHUTHATSWANA, MANGOPE ADVANCED

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Apr 84 pp 22-23

[Article by Johann Graff: "Outgrowing the Pigeon-holes"]

[Text]

**B**OPHUTHATSWANA gets widely varying reactions these days. To some BophuthaTswana's president, L.M. Mangope, is a man who has sold his (and his countrymen's) birthright for a mess of pottage. He is a sell-out, a corrupt puppet of the Pretoria regime, a traitor to his people. To others BophuthaTswana is an island of racial peace, economic development and democratic justice in a sea of oppression, exploitation and a string of other no-no's for which SA has become famous.

To others still, BophuthaTswana is puzzling. It seems to be dislodging some important cornerstones of the apartheid system. The *New York Times* correspondent, for example, was surprised to find six copies of Frantz Fanon's "Wretched of the Earth" in the University of BophuthaTswana's library - on open shelf. (There are a lot more suprising things than that in the library if he had only cared to look.) In 1982 the BophuthaTswana courts threw out Section 6 of SA's Terrorism Act as being incompatible with its Bill of Human Rights. The constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour or creed. An ombudsman has been appointed to investigate bureaucratic irregularities in the government service. (People actually do get dismissed for corruption and inefficiency as a result of his activities.) Group Areas,

Immorality, Prohibition of Mixed Marriages and Separate Amenities are all SA horrors that have been eliminated. The number of appointed (as opposed to elected) chiefs sitting in parliament has been halved. At Mafikeng and Sun City casinos and pale blue movies run even on Sundays. And so the list could continue.

And it is not only Eugene Terre Blanche's AWB who are traumatised by such developments. The farmers, mine-workers and dominees of the Western Transvaal along BophuthaTswana's borders are also finding their necks getting red and itchy at the thought. Can Mangope be a puppet if he is irritating such bastions of the "system"?

The truth is that Mangope is a shrewd man who plays his cards cautiously (some would say, far too cautiously). Within the present SA context he has delivered tangible goods for his people which few others, Black or White, can match. Without being a Tutu on the one hand, nor a Sebe, on the other, he is playing off one part of the "system" against the others and making patient but remarkable headway.

But let's start from the beginning. There is no denying that BophuthaTswana is a creation of the apartheid system. It is intended to make so many million Blacks political foreigners i.e. non-voters, in the land of their birth, and

it does. It is intended to be a dumping ground for the unemployed, the "idle", "surplus appendages" and residents of "Black spots", and it is. It is intended to be a labour reservoir for the PWV-complex, and it is.

At the same time, it is not very helpful to call Mangope a puppet of the SA regime. Machel is also a puppet. So is Quett Masire. Their freedom of decision is substantially limited by Pretoria's wishes. What is interesting is how Bophutha-Tswana's position has changed since independence, how a puppet has become less of a puppet (and done a whole lot of things that *weren't* intended). Before independence, Mangope and his Tswana Territorial Authority were faced with the notoriously verkrampte Department of Bantu Administration (BAD). Today, Mangope flanked by some very shrewd advisers, negotiates with the notoriously verligte Department of Foreign Affairs. Given the distance between these two wings of the National Party, that is no small gain.

The same explanation lies behind BophuthaTswana's agricultural, industrial and TV enterprises. In the bad old days of BAD, these things would simply not have been permitted. In short, Mangope has been using the verligte wing of the National Party plus certain sectors of private enterprise to by-pass the verkrampes.

Now that doesn't get him to Utopia or Azania. But it puts him three lengths ahead of most Black leaders and about 2½ ahead of van Zyl Slabbert. It does a lot more than waiting in the sidelines developing ulcers of frustration (like Motlana), getting shot by SA police (Saul Mkhize), being blown up by letter-bombs (Abram Tiro, Ruth First), dying of "natural causes" in Security Branch cells (too many to name), or being raided by SA paratroops. It is difficult to think of anyone, Black or White, who has achieved as much for his people in concrete tangible terms as Mangope.

It is, of course, not only Mangope who gets accused of being a sell-out, of helping the "boere" (maburu) to oppress the Blacks. Anyone living and working in a homeland today is liable to be attacked. Students at some Black universities refuse to have contact with those at the University of BophuthaTswana (UNIBO), because UNIBO students, so they say, are part of the apartheid system (while,

amazingly, Turfloop is not, so they say!!). Staff at the university have also been refused access to overseas universities on the same grounds. "You are part of the formal state structure of apartheid," so they said.

The irony of it (and the frustration) is that the University of BophuthaTswana is the only Black university in the country which is *not* directly or indirectly connected to Bantu Education. A great number of the staff are there precisely to escape the apartheid system — some because their marriages are mixed, some (Whites) because they have adopted Black children, some because they have been refused entry to SA, most of them simply because they detest the whole "formal state structure of apartheid". Sure, you could say UNIBO is an institution put there by an institution (the Bophutha-Tswana government) which was put there by Pretoria. But that is two steps removed from Pretoria. You couldn't say as much for Wits, UCT or even FOSATU.

Look at it another way, radicals from Soweto are scathing about Mangope and BophuthaTswana. But Soweto has no political say and no tax-base. Mangope has quite a bit of both. Soweto falls under WRAB and Bantu Education and, to date, has a say over only the most mundane affairs. BophuthaTswana has re-designed its whole education system and exclusively controls the allocation of funds for its own development. (In 1983 it relied on Pretoria for only 6% of its funds.) In Soweto you can buy a house only on 99-year lease, but not the land. You can get arrested for not carrying a dompas, etc. etc. Coming into Pretoria/Johannesburg from Mafikeng is quite a shock, even for a White.

And if, one day, the charade of sovereign independent "national states" becomes too ponderous even for Pretoria to sustain, (and to me, that seems inevitable) and homelands are re-integrated into the SA political system in some federal form, in other words, if "foreigners" become SA citizens again, what will have been the use, then, of waiting in the wings?

Of course, there are problems. One might have liked to see far more public sympathy from Mmabatho for the Black opposition cause in SA. One hears too often of people dismissed or promoted sideways for belonging to the wrong political party or for other doubtful

reasons (the Ombudsman notwithstanding). Also Mercedes Benz and BMW are thriving companies in Mmabatho.

At the same time, one hears other stories of Mangope personally intervening on behalf of the little man, even down to government drivers.

One personal experience of mine shows some of the complexity, the humanity of the man. The university course which I teach offered a block of lectures on Black Consciousness during the 1980 academic year, the first year of the university's existence. A number of more conservative government members reacted strongly to this. After all, the BophuthaTswana government buildings had been burnt down during the 1976 riots. Many felt this topic, even the whole department, should be excised from the university. Mangope's reaction was intriguing. He invited a number of university staff (myself included) and government members to his house for dinner where he initiated a round-table discussion on the topic of Black Consciousness and the relevant department, Development Studies.

When, towards the end of the evening, someone remarked, "But, Mr President, you can't stop a department from being critical. That is in the nature of a university," Mangope turned on him quite abruptly. "If that is the case, we'll close the university," he replied. On that ominous note we all left, not knowing whether we were due for dismissal or what. Two weeks later, however, we were again invited for dinner and further round-table discussion. After a long evening in which views of quite astonishing frankness were aired, Mangope signalled to bring the meeting to a close. He had hardly spoken all evening. Just sat and listened intently.

He explained in a quiet voice how some of his own children had rejected him on the grounds of the Black Consciousness ideology. That had affected him deeply "as a father". But, he said, he had been convinced by the arguments put

in favour of Development Studies. They should continue with what they were doing. And, anyway, this was a university matter. It had nothing to do with the government.

As an expression of the principles and practice of democracy and academic freedom, the whole episode was an impressive one. It made us forget that Mangope had intervened in the first place although probably under pressures that we were unaware of.

Some critics say Mangope has abandoned his Black brothers to suffer alone the humiliations and violence of apartheid. But, then, suffering in itself never changed anything — much less an oppressive regime. Others say, homelands entrench ethnic identity, put Black against Black, and play into the Whites' divide-and-rule strategy. The available research does not support this. Blacks don't forget their brothers so easily. Others again would say, by taking independence Mangope threw away the one major bargaining card left to a Black leader. A man who holds out longer against independence could negotiate a far better deal for his people. Past experience shows, however, that Pretoria quite easily forgets, breaks or sidesteps promises made at independence. (Remember that the Minister of Plural Affairs at the time of BophuthaTswana's independence, Dr Connie Mulder, was himself unaware of what his own civil servants were up to.) Mangope's negotiating power has been increased *far more* by the competence and efficiency of his own advisers and by the fact that CAD has been replaced by Foreign Affairs. Refusing to take independence has, in fact, meant peanuts to the Pathudis and Buthelezis of the world. Relocation, harassment and influx control have all continued unabated.

To repeat, all this does not mean that BophuthaTswana and Mangope are without faults. It does mean they are not as easy to write off or pigeon-hole as some people would have liked. ●

## ANALYSIS OF AFRIKANERDOM SPLIT OFFERED

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Apr 84 pp 28-31

[Article by David Williams: "North and South Are Poles Apart"]

[Text]

**A**FRIKANERS like to think the volk is classless. They have skilfully put it about over the years that no member of the tribe regards himself as better or worse than any other. And we English, consistently ignorant of the ways of other South Africans, believe them.

I abruptly stopped believing them when I was up in the Soutpansberg, listening to the Conservative Party victory chants on polling night. Standing next to me was a top Cape Nat who'd been imported for the campaign. He was appalled at the crowd's behaviour – appalled, I realised, because of a *class* difference, not merely one of opinion. Perhaps it was the old Cape/Transvaal rivalry; maybe he thought he was better dressed (he was): the point is that he simply felt superior to other Afrikaners.

This set me thinking. In fact, the Afrikaners display considerable class awareness. The differences between them are just as great as those found amongst the English – only more subtle. For a start, spoken Afrikaans is not all the same.

Cape Afrikaans is the sparkling white wine, Northern Afrikaans is the Castle Milk Stout, and in Bloemfontein they speak brandy-and-coke. The voice slips deeper and deeper the further north you go. The Cape Afrikaner speaks from the front of his mouth: this makes the voice high-pitched, seldom going below a light tenor. The lips are tight, and the jaw is mobile because it does all the work. The throat and chest are hardly used. Words

don't come from far down, so they flow quickly. This gives the impression that Cape Afrikaners think faster, which is why the Transvalers resent them.

At the other extreme, up in the Bosveld, all expression starts below the ribcage. Perfect exponents are ex-Minister Fanie Botha and newsreader Nic Swane-poel. The words have a long way to travel, so they pick up richness and body on the way. Just before ejection, they rumble the jowls with their weight, and then roll off the lips, which are well-developed to weather the force. Northern sentences are full of moss and boulders. Up there, they say things like *Soutpansberg* in a way that makes broody crags loom before you.

This is why the far-northerners frown so much: their eyes crinkle and their brows furrow with the gravity of the utterance. Cape Afrikaners have clear faces because they don't have to delve about in the chest, disturbing the dust of the Great Trek; Cape Afrikaners also have less manly maturity, because they never had to get ox-wagons over the mountains. Fanie Botha looks like your uncle; Dawie De Villiers like a nephew.

So much for the general trend. On the local level, language is closely linked with social habit and status, especially in the Cape peninsula which has been lived on so long that things have had time to settle.

Uppercrust suburbs like Oranjezicht and Tamboerskloof encourage a very refined accent. French and Dutch influence has disappeared, of course, but



it's nice to remember and pretend. The vowel sounds are light and airy, and when they clear the palate for the scrape in words like *gaan*, it's quite gentle – more like *kaan* with a tickle in the K. Take a sentence like “Ons gaan hardloop by die see”. *Ons* avoids the northern weight of *Oaarns!*, and *hardloop* has no vigorous rolls. In the north, they say *harrhdloerpl!* but in the Cape it's more like *haadloep* – light and whippy. *By die* becomes *bayrie*, and *see* is pronounced *sie*, unlike the northerners who buck and veer through their words – *see-yeer!* So: “O's karn haadloep bayrie sie.” Dis gawrf, ne!

The man you hear speaking like this is probably a well-educated professional of 18th Century stock, or thinks he is. He spells his name Pierre De Villiers and pronounces it Pee-yeah Diffelyeer – never Pierrie, as in boxers. The Diffelyeer sons go to the Paul Roos Gimnasium, the daughters to the wine belt to be married off. The whole family is found chatting to the Province players after matches at Newlands. Diffelyeer drives an avocado-green Mercedes. His wife Susan(ne) looks after the bulbs she found at Kirstenbosch and pampers the twin German watchdogs (Hans and Fritz) and the Jack Russell terrier (Jack). Susan(ne) also prepares terribly elegant dinner parties, where she displays rare Estate reds – the kind that don't get the three thin stripes on the bottleneck because they're too good. Good names to have on the invitation list are Graaff and Barnard; possibly a Botha from the Transvaal if he's a Deputy Minister. This is what is left of the Cape liberal tradition, whatever that's worth.

The Diffelyeers have their counterparts in Waterkloof and Randburg, of course but these are less easily identified – all Transvaal Afrikaners sound the same. Refinement is not achieved simply by speaking correctly, so the posh Transvaal Afrikaners try harder. To get class you need: a doctorate from UNISA; a son who's got a BA from UNISA and is a rising star in Foreign Affairs; and a daughter whose idea of liberation is her job at Navy headquarters. (Only in South Africa could Navy HQ be 60 km from the sea.)

Status in Pretoria is complicated and subtle, and depends very much on your uniform. The trouble is that the status accorded by the uniform to its wearer is evident only to others who wear it. Navy officers really swank it up, proud of their

individuality and tradition; everyone else thinks their white shorts and bare knees rather immature – apart from resentment at the way Navy officers insist on confusing the rest in winter by wearing their rank at the end of the sleeve instead of on top of the shoulder. Below the Navy men come the rest of the SADF, and the SAP; and in third place the green of the Railway Police and the khaki of the Prison Officers. A long way behind them are the men who wear the green suit/yellow tie combination which identifies the Civil Service. In some cases, the suit is not green, but it is invariably shiny. No-one is quite sure where the traffic cops fit in, but they are more powerful and more macho than the rest put together.

A house in Waterkloof is a guarantee of status, unless it's on the air base side. True distinction is if your address book includes an ambassador's unlisted number.

Another Pretoria residential rule is to be somewhere where you cannot smell or see the pollution from Iscor. There is a massive shortage of accommodation. This is because young professional Pretorians have become liberated enough to move out of their parents' homes but not liberated enough to live with their girlfriends, which would halve the demand. So a flat of your own in the city centre is a big status symbol. Pretorians are not only over-crowded – they have an inferiority complex because they know the capital of South Africa is really Johannesburg, and the pretence is a strain.

The Randburg Afrikaners are more exclusive, simply because they're in the minority in greater Johannesburg. This gives them an automatic start, but there are drawbacks – the only career advancement is at RAU or the SABC. If you're an academic, the minimum is a doctorate, preferably with a professorship. At the SABC, real status is only achieved if “Direkteur” appears somewhere in your title – surrounded with Adjunks and Assistents if necessary. You also have to be high enough to tell Cliff Saunders what to do.

The Transvaal Afrikaners who want class have to work harder, because academics and motor mechanics have the same accent and motor mechanics earn more. The Cape Afrikaner of good stock knows he was born superior, so he can do without a doctorate in Traffic Management.

Transvaal class allocations have also been thrown out by computerised numberplates. Before, those with pretensions could always jeer at cars from TDK and TK. Now you could be from Alberton and no-one would know if it wasn't for the dashboard decoration. On the other hand, you could be a Sanlam executive living in Sandton and no-one would be any the wiser if you sneaked south to see Charles Bronson at the Top Star Drive-In. Motoring in the Cape is not deceitful — pass a CY car and you know it's a cowboy from Bellville.

Bloemfontein is the only city where Afrikaners are never irritated by unilingual shop assistants. There are English-speaking people who claim to come from Bloemfontein, but no-one believes them. Here the spoken word is a happy medium — it originates in the throat, not the teeth or the stomach. There is only one real status symbol in Bloem: to have dinner with an Appeal Court judge. A doctorate in Township Administration can sometimes serve as a consolation as long as it's a KOVSIE degree. If you got it from UNISA nobody will even talk to you.

Doctorates are important because they demonstrate advancement. Sometimes they also demonstrate learning. For a doctorate from Leyden or Heidelberg (anyone over 60) or Oxbridge (30 to 60) all the rules bend. That's status. Local universities are fighting valiantly to achieve the same status among under-30s with the BA (Communications/Kommunikasieleer), which is for students on rugby scholarships and aspirant news-readers.

Out in the urban satellite towns and suburbs, a doctor is what you see when you're sick. North and South, they are very similar. The only difference between Bellville and Krugersdorp is again the voice-source — "Belil" is said rapidly in a whiny cackle, whereas "Krewersdoarp" a stony rasp. There is more crude swearing than in Linden, with great reliance placed on one particular word whose versatility is astonishing. More important, if an English word comes to the lips naturally, it is used without guilt. At the Station Bar in Langlaagte or the Railway Hotel in Salt River, the discussion covers the winning numbers for the jackpot and the tjerrie who will be taken to the Ladies' Bar on Friday night.

Women are important out there in Boksburg and Parer-Goodood. Someone

has to look after the car keys while the men are playing darts, and someone has to drink Babycham or Advokaat-and-Lemonade. After an evening at the Hotel, it's off in the Fairlane and home to Ma and coffee on the lounge suite from Lubner's. The furniture is homely and comfortable, thanks to the attentions of fox terriers called Stompie and Alsatians called Wagter.

Kempton Park is the blasted heath of Afrikanerdom. The inhabitants have well-paid jobs at Atlas Aircraft, Jan Smuts Airport and Modderfontein dynamite factory. The houses are neat and new, but there are no trees; the suburbs are bordered by dry veld and the dogs bark all night. This area is only noticed by people who fly over it on the way to Europe. Women's Lib in Kempton Park means a girlfriend who doesn't have to wash the car on Sunday, and she can choose which dress she'll wear.

Moving out to the Platteland, where so many Afrikaner tribal myths originated, there are some intriguing local variations. There's Karakul Afrikaans in SWA — hard, metallic and guttural, spoken by teenagers who have never seen rain; the breigh of Malmesbury and Pikerberg, with the throat very prominent; and the curiously soft bilingualism of the Eastern Cape in places like Graaff-Reinet. In the Groot Marico, it's still possible to notice the life which gave Herman Charles Bosman his stories, even though there are now more cigarette reps on the roads than farmers. You can still sit in the dark on the stoep, beer in hand, and listen to the farmer tell you how the Government is neglecting him, and how he knows how to evade the speedtraps.

But the Platteland has lost much of its character. All the small towns look the same. Every main street now has its Edgar's, Foschini, CNA, Russell's, Checkers — they have taken over from the Algemene Handelaar and the Slaghuys. The Post Office has proudly installed direct dialling in most places, so people can't keep in touch by listening in on the party line. The dorps that aren't worth modernising are left alone, and their populations are dwindling. Local character is not handed on, and the oom who sits on the stoep in his vest while the crickets chirp will not often be replaced.

Afrikaners still maintain outposts in Natal. But they're cross because their presence there is always a surprise to every-

one else, who forget they have been there since the Trek. They are also upset with all the Zulu names and the anglicisation of Maritzburg (which sounds as if it was named after anyone but a Voortrekker). So they've retreated to Newcastle (Iskor) and Ladysmith (big railway town), and for the rest are found in pockets like Amanzimtoti and the Bluff, and South Beach in season.

The opposite applies in Port Elizabeth. It used to be strictly English, but has been invaded by car workers who have seen to it that Uitenhage is no longer pronounced Yootenhaig. As for East London - if there are any white people left in East London they are presumably taking courses in Xhosa.

The Afrikaner population is constantly dwindling, through the process of *ver-*

*Engelsing*. You can tell how far an Afrikaner has *verEngelsed* by how vehemently he denies it.

Afrikaners still left differ from one another far more than they used to, or would like to pretend. The *Nationale Party* no longer means what it says: it is now a faction which seeks alliances outside the *volk*. The drift from the farms to the cities, the second Great Trek, has divided Afrikaners into groups like workers and managers and bureaucrats. Their sentimental ties and traditions are no longer threatened, the language and the people are firmly established. The paradox now is that confidence means disintegration. With nothing left to work for, the speech and habits of the *volk* reflect a scattering in new directions. It's a fascinating process. ●

### How Toothless Gums Boosted Brandy Shares

The reason bottle-stores are closed on election day is that otherwise the *volk* would fight and throw chairs; or forget to vote, or vote for the wrong Botha on the ballot paper. Or all three, depending on the constituency and if a dominee is one of the candidates, (Dominees always inflame passions more than advokate or doktors). With English voters, these problems do not arise. They just get tanked up at home and don't bother about voting.

One Afrikaner drinking habit that has to be explained is the preference for brandy-and-coke. (Although a sporting minority always liked brandy-and-orange juice--a taste acquired at Ellis Park and Loftus when it used to be necessary to inject the oranges to get the liquor past the police).

The Volkskas director will take a whisky; the heroes at the cricket will guzzle dozens of Castles so they can crush the cans and howl at the girls; but your actual barfly likes brandy-and-coke. The tradition began in the days when many Station Hotel patrons had no teeth. This made intelligible ordering difficult, especially as the evening drew on. After a time of pointing at the upside-down bottles and slurring feebly across the gums, they discovered it was easiest to pronounce brandy-and-coke. Try it--wrap your lips around your teeth, and say "branny-n-co." Only a new young barman wouldn't understand the first time. Now try saying "Cane, Passionfruit and Lemonade, please, barman," and you'll see what I mean. The barman will either throw you out or just give you a brandy-and-coke.

A common Afrikaner attitude to drink is revealed in the language used to describe consumption--you "use" alcohol. For example, SADF Chief Constand Viljoen once wrote in *Paratus* that he never "uses" alcohol. Even though this is a direct translation of *gebruik* the word implies a serious intent unbeknown to English.

A curious footnote here is that an Afrikaner seldom orders a drink in Afrikaans, and has never shown any desire for beers called KASTEEL or LEEU. It's probably tied up with the total absence of any racehorses with Afrikaans names. Is this an ancient puritanism? If the vices of gambling and drinking are expressed in another language, do they somehow remain foreign and unwelcome, present only as temporary corruptions? The Afrikaans word for "jackpot" is "boerpot"--but you never hear anything except "jackpot" at Turffontein. When the manne are chalking their cues at the snooker saloon in Bok Street, there's no Afrikaans equivalent for "black ball game." Why? This needs further investigation--now there's a thought for a UNISA thesis....

CSO: 3400/978

RECENT EVENTS REVIEWED; DOCUMENT CIRCULATES ON CAMPUS

Ouagadougou L'OBSERVATEUR in French 13, 14, 15 Apr 84 pp 10-11

[Column by Passek-Taale: "A Letter for Laye"]

[Excerpts] Dear Wambi,

*Age quod agis. Alea jacta est.*

The government daily SIDWAYA, whose launching was one of the high points of the International Information Seminar held in Ouaga from 2 to 6 April 1984, made its appearance on Thursday.

"For a first attempt, it was masterful!"

Monsignor Anthyme Bayala, bishop of the Diocese of Koudougou, was taken from us on 3 April 1984. He was 59. May he rest in peace.

Beginning on 1 April as a prelude to World Health Day, the National Health Seminar came to close on Saturday, 7 April.

As part of Revolutionary Customs and Merchants Month a Customs Political and Ideological Seminar began in Ouaga on Monday.

A group of volunteers from Guebwiller in Alsace (France) visited Monomtinga in the Department of Kombissiri from 23 March 1984 to 11 April 1984. They financed construction of an out-patient and maternity clinic there. Labor was supplied by the local population.

The Boeing 707 P. Air that has been much in the news made its first loading on Friday, 6 April 1984. On board were ten (10) tons of mangos and ten (10) of green beans.

These Upper Voltan products were shipped to Lyon, France. With this plane, which will later bear the name "Naganagani," Upper Volta now has adequate transportation for its foreign trade and our production.

As a result, the entire world will probably be able to enjoy the products of Upper Voltan peasants, for "Naganagani" is within reach of all those interested in commerce.

Green beans, mangos and other products will never again spoil in Upper Volta. Point Air Volta "Naganagani" is a great instrument to open up our regions.

Let us move on to the National Trade Union of African Teachers in Upper Volta (SNEAHV). No need to remind you that the members of that union have gone out on strike. No need to tell you either that they were simply laid off.

What I am writing to you now is the list published by the government daily SIDWAYA in its edition of Thursday, 12 April 1984:

Bourkina	216	Zoundweogo	31
Houet	195	Sahel	17
Yatenga	138	Ghagna	17
Oubritenga	132	Kenedougou	14
Sissili	93	Passore	7
Sourou	83	Gourma	1
Namentenga	80	Bam	0
Sanmatenga	78	Tapoa	0
Boulgou	60	Soum	0
Kossi	56	Poni	0
Comoe	55	Nahouri	0
Bougouriba	53	Ganzourgou	0
Moun-Houn	45		
Total	1,380		

Naturally, this list is disputed by SNEAHV. The fight is on.

On this same subject, Kone Batiemoko, member of the SNEAHV National Bureau, was detained and questioned at the Gendarmerie on Tuesday, 3 April. He was still there yesterday.

According to BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN No 622 of 12 April 1984, a fatal accident occurred Wednesday evening at around 1900 hours on National Highway 5 (Upper Volta-Ghana, via PO).

A 504 Break transport vehicle registered in Upper Volta ran into a group of soldiers crossing the road coming out of the CNEC [expansion unknown].

One person was killed outright and another has been hospitalized in Po.

A total of 11 persons were wounded seriously and 9 were taken to Ouagadougou that same night.

Among those wounded was the driver of the 504, Liliou Adoui and one of his four passengers. The two dead are Mahamoudou Zongo, from the Revolutionary National Guard, and Kossi Ouattara, from the Engineers and Firemen's Battalion.

The group of soldiers had arrived in Po that very evening for training. The accident occurred as they were leaving the CNEC for a maneuver, scarcely two hours after their arrival from Ouaga.

Dear Wambi, like everyone else, you have probably heard that the members of the old regimes have been called before the Revolutionary People's Tribunals. The hearings will only take place in Po. It is truly a trial in the right place, especially since it will take place in the hotbed of the Upper Voltan revolution.

Dear cousin, let me tell you that I have heard about a document being distributed openly on the Ouagadougou University Campus.

Among other things, that document calls for the establishment of a Revolutionary Trade Union Confederation and comes out against any reduction in the purchasing power of workers and any questioning of democratic and trade union freedoms!

Who signed it? The following trade unions: the SNAID (Taxes and Public Lands); the SNTER (National Education and Research); the SNTSHA (Human and Animal Health); the SNTGMIH (Geology and Mines); and the UGEV (Students).

There you have it! That's life! See you soon.

Your cousin,

Passek-Taale

11,464

CSO: 3419/619

## CONVICTS TO BE PUT TO WORK ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Harare THE HERALD in English 5 May 84 p 3

[Excerpt] Three major themes of Zimbabwe's development process emerged at yesterday's session of the provincial governors' seminar in Harare.

The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Dr Eddison Zvobgo, announced that prisoners would be made available to work on provincial development schemes; the Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Simbi Mubako, announced that Government was considering establishing more border posts to control movement in and out of the country; and the Minister of Youth, Sport and Culture, Dr Simba Makoni, said his ministry regarded unemployment among thousands of young Zimbabweans as its major problem.

Cde Zvobgo told the second seminar of provincial governors, heads of ministries and Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning provincial administrators that if any governor with other local authorities came up with projects which could be carried out by prisoners, he should forward these to Cde Zvobgo's ministry.

Prisoners should work very hard and a prison term had to be an experience which no Zimbabwean would want to repeat, Cde Zvobgo said.

The whole exercise had to be systematically organised. One of the most important issues was to ensure that prisoners did not escape while working on these development projects.

"We must combine our offices to have prisoners routinely on public works," Cde Zvobgo said.

He said his ministry had initiated a brick-moulding programme by all prisoners which had already started at Chikurubi and Khami prisons. The programme would be expanded to cover other prisons.

The bricks would also be made available for construction projects recommended by the governors but they would be sold at the "cheapest price in the country."



Cde Zvobgo said they would be sold because his ministry would have put the initial capital for the purchase of cement and other equipment necessary for the moulding, and needed to recover some of this money.

Dr Mubako told the seminar there were insufficient border stations to deal adequately with people entering from neighbouring countries.

Cde Mubako singled out the eastern border as needing more stations. Funds were available to set up additional border posts.

The minister also said Government intends to increase the number of police in rural areas.

CSO: 3400/980

ZNCC TO TRAIN EX-COMBATANTS ENGAGED IN CO-OP VENTURES

Harare THE HERALD in English 6 May 84 p 4

[Text] The Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce is stepping up its efforts to give training in basic business methods to ex-combatants engaged in co-operative ventures.

After nearly a year's delay the ZNCC has received confirmation from the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare and the Demobilisation Directorate that Government departments will assist in recommending ex-combatants for attendance at regular basic business courses held by the ZNCC at regional centres throughout the country.

Mr Ambrose Chikukwa, chairman of ZNCC's training committee, said the chamber last year responded to a call by the then Minister of Labour, Cde Kumbirai Kangai, to help introduce demobilised ex-combatants to business practices.

The call was made at the May business forum at Victoria Falls and a training sub-committee was formed to draw up proposals for approval by the ministry which would have cleared individual co-operatives for assistance and pinpointed areas where advice and expertise was most needed, Mr Chikukwa said.

The Government's approval was not received until recently and in the interim some co-operatives faced collapse because of depressed economic conditions, drought and the lack of management skills to meet their difficulties.

Although the sub-committee was now moribund the ZNCC hoped that under the auspices of the ministry and the Demobilisation Directorate ex-combatants would take full advantage of the free weekend courses given by ZNCC volunteer members.

"The many difficulties facing emerging enterprises are shared by all those who venture into business--lack of starting capital, lack of assets to raise loans, lack of working capital to raise loans and, above all, the lack of experience to understand the processes and methods of business," Mr Chikukwa said.

The ZNCC committee's programme of seminars offered training in basic bookkeeping, records, stores and stock control, costing, price control, cash flow and budgeting and the management of finance and working capital.

Courses this month are to be held in Chinhoyi, Masvingo and in Victoria Falls to coincide with this year's ZNCC business forum there.

"The courses are nowhere near comparable to full-time business courses, but they can be of great service to new enterprises, many of which even have no books and, therefore, no way of telling whether they are making a profit or loss," said Mr Chikukwa.

The courses include instructions on sales tax, income tax and other revenue regulations.

While drawing up its training proposals for ex-combatants last year, the ZNCC held several meetings with the Demobilisation Directorate.

Under the proposals the ZNCC would appoint advisers to co-operatives where needed, with Government approval. "We did not hear from the ministry until recently which is rather late, as some co-operatives of ex-combatants are in bad shape," he said.

Mr Chikukwa said the ZNCC was now appealing to retired businessmen to step forward to help the committee run more courses throughout the country.

"There is a lot of goodwill among Zimbabweans and I am hopeful a good number will volunteer for this noble cause."

CSO: 3400/980

MINISTER OF INFORMATION SCORES SOUTH AFRICAN BASED CORRESPONDENTS

Harare THE HERALD in English 7 May 84 p 1

[Text] Harare-based foreign correspondents have generally done a good job of reporting the Zimbabwe scene--unlike their South African counterparts who have been guilty of distortion, lies and sensationalism, the Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications said yesterday.

Dr Nathan Shamuyarira, who was speaking at a cocktail reception and lunch for 14 visiting West German journalists and representatives of the Harare-based Reemtsma tobacco company, said:

"There are 22 registered foreign correspondents here. We don't censor what they send out. There is no censorship in the country. The only time we see what they have written is when our representatives overseas send us clippings.

"We have few problems with local foreign correspondents. Our problem is with the corps of South African-based correspondents who engage in sensationalism.

"Generally we have had a bad Press overseas. The overseas Press has not shown the progress we have made in integrating the three armies, in reconciliation, in economic progress."

South African-based foreign journalists preferred to come to Zimbabwe for a few days and then return to their bases where they seem to delight in writing negative stories. He said they liked to write stories claiming that Zimbabwe was on the verge of economic collapse, that the country's ethnic groups were at each other's throats or that whites were being oppressed.

In spite of these negative stories Zimbabwe had left the offending journalists alone--except for banning a West German couple and an American magazine correspondent.

Cde Shamuyarira said the Government had been annoyed by the tendency of some Western reporters to refer persistently to the North Korean-trained Five Brigade without pointing out that the other four brigades were British-based.

Even Five Brigade, he said, had received British training.

"The army does a good job. It is a professional army. But if there are unjust incidents we investigate them," he said.

The minister said the army had been successfully integrated with 10 to 12 percent of its members being former Rhodesian soldiers, about 30 percent being former Zipra combatants while the rest were former Zanla guerillas.

The only reason there were more ex-Zanla combatants in the Zimbabwe National Army than other groups was "because Zanu had a larger guerilla army," said Cde Shamuyarira.

The reception was also addressed by Mr Anthony Taberer, chairman and managing director of Tabex, who said tobacco was Zimbabwe's most important single industry.

Tobacco accounted for about 25 percent of gross domestic product, supported over 400 000 people, earned about 23 percent of the country's gross foreign exchange (more than \$200 million a year), and accounted for 40 percent of Zimbabwe's total agricultural export.

"Tobacco makes a very significant contribution to the national fiscus and, although it is not possible to decipher tax data, excise revenue on cigarette and pipe tobaccos alone results in duties of approximately \$24 to \$25 million per annum."

CSO: 3400/980

# NEW FOOD-FOR-WORK PROGRAM IN BUHERA BENEFITS DROUGHT VICTIMS

Harare THE HERALD in English 7 May 84 p 5

[Article by Munyaradzi Chenje]

[Text] The Government's new food-for-work scheme is meeting an enthusiastic response where it matters most--from the people on drought relief in Buhera, where the plan is being piloted.

The scheme was launched at the beginning of this month and already some of the 54 300 people on drought relief in Buhera are working on community projects.

And the rest are raring to go. Those interviewed by The Herald in Buhera last week said the programme was long overdue.

Cde David Mukosi of Buhera said: "We thank the Government for giving us this chance to work for our country. Drought relief only gave us food, but now we can get money to send children to school, buy soap, sugar and bread.

People expressed their satisfaction at being able to do socially-useful work and being rewarded, instead of just "fellowing beer" as one of them put it.

"We are very happy with this new scheme and we hope the Government will continue with such programmes," Cde Mukosi said.

The scheme--the Rural Public Works Programme--was launched on Tuesday by the Minister of Local Government and Town Planning, Cde Enos Chikowore. It pays those who have been on drought relief \$4 a day for working on community projects.

"We don't want our people to develop some kind of beggar posture or concept where they just get things free," said Cde Chikowore about the programme.

And the drought relief scheme has proved costly for Zimbabwe's coffers.

In October last year, the Department of Social Services in the then Ministry of Labour and Social Services, said in a statement: "Drought relief food has so far been handed to about 2,1 million people in Zimbabwe's communal lands."

Between April 1 last year and April 30 this year, the Government had estimated that it would need \$120 million for the drought relief programme but only \$45 million could be allocated to it.

To meet such a massive budget, Government had to divert money earmarked for other projects to drought relief, and some projects did not even get off the ground because of this.

The scheme not only benefits the affected people but will bring a greater circulation of money to the rural areas, strengthening the "provo's" buying power.

Shops, butcheries, grinding mills and beer halls will now have a wider market thereby strengthening their viability. In many communal areas such businesses survive from hand to mouth.

By upgrading facilities like roads, clinics, schools, dams and irrigation schemes, the local population in each area will help raise its living standards.

The people will also acquire skills which should benefit them as and when the food-for-work scheme is no longer necessary. Although most of the technical work will be done by experienced people, the workers will learn basic trades.

By introducing this scheme, the Government will create employment in rural areas and indirectly stem the urban drift.

Since independence, communal people have been involved in self-reliance projects designed to develop their areas on a voluntary basis, and it is feared by some that the new project may kill this voluntary spirit.

Others argue that \$2 per day is not enough and that people may prolong projects so that they can get more money.

Two dollars a day for a person, who works for 20 days a month, can bring him about \$40, and by rural standards, this is considered a lot of money. If in a family, two people were to work on this programme, the family would have \$80 a month.

The basic food ration for a family of five for a month has been calculated as 5 kg of beans (\$7,20), 75 kg of mealie-meal (\$14,70) and 2,5 litres of cooking oil (\$3,98) totalling \$25,88. So if a family gets \$80 each month and spends \$25,88, it would be left with \$54,12. This family would still end up being the winner.

To avoid the people from delaying their projects for their own benefit, the District Development Fund, which is administering the exercise, must assess the period a particular project takes to ensure that workers complete the job in the laid-down period.

DDF'S past record and achievements speak well of its capabilities, and it is no surprise it has been chosen to administer these projects.

"Both the ministries of Local Government and Town Planning and of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare will ensure that there is no corruption," said Cde Chikowore when he outlined the plans for the scheme last week.

"Stringent measures will be taken to ensure that only people on the drought relief register are employed and paid."

If all goes well, the Government will have saved its people and the people themselves will be proud of their own newly-acquired capabilities.

CSO: 3400/980



MAZOWE FARM PEOPLE REFUSE TO BE EVICTED

Harare THE HERALD in English 8 May 84 p 1

[Article by William Bango]

[Text] More than 150 families, some of whom have been living on a Mazowe farm since 1934, have vowed to resist any attempts to evict them.

The families claim that farmers in the area have allowed them to stay "for all this time after realising that we have the right to this land."

The original owner of the farm, a Major Pilkington (who has left the country) sold the property soon after independence in 1980 to Mr John Mathews. Mr Mathews has since been battling to evict the families.

He told The Herald yesterday: "All those people do not work here. They must move so that we can grow food for the country."

The ZANU (PF) political commissar for Mazowe district, Cde Daison Banda said he came to live on the farm in 1953 and had had no problems with the owners.

"It is unfortunate that this place was bought by Mr Mathews. He no longer wants to see us here although most of the people have lived here since 1934.

"We are going to resist any attempts to move us out because this is our land," said Cde Banda.

He said only a few residents were employed in the area. Most were either self-employed or worked in other towns and cities.

Mr Mathews said arrangements were being made to accommodate those residents working in Mazowe. "But the rest must go. We plan to develop the 220 acres they are occupying illegally," he said.

The families, who were meant to leave at the end of April, have set up a committee to deal with anyone who wants to evict them, and to negotiate with the farmer and Government about their future.

Last week, said Cde Banda (the committee chairman), they went to the Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning which told them they should move out soon because they were on private property.

"We also saw officials from the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development but they told us the same thing." Alternative accommodation should be found "otherwise the problem will not be solved," said Cde Banda.

Mr Mathews refused to say what his plans were if the families refused to be evicted. He said the matter had been reported to the police and any further problems would be referred to the ZRP at Mazowe.

CSO: 3400/980

END